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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DESCENT OF REALTY
AND DisruMUTION OF PERSONALTY
Some form of inheritance has existed since ancient times. The biblical
story of Esau, who sold his birthright to his younger brother Jacob for a
mess of potage, demonstrates the long-standing recognition of inheritance
rights. Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly
guarantee to the owner of property a right to transmit that property upon
death to another person, the United States Supreme Court has held that
a total abrogation of the right of inheritance without the payment of just
compensation is unconstitutional
Every state has a system of inheritance created by statute and by case
law? State inheritance laws contemplate that the owner of property has
died in one of two ways-"testate" (with a will) or "intestate" (without a
will). A majority of all Americans die intestate without any directions as
to the disposition of their property Consequently, the legislature of
every jurisdiction has adopted statutes governing intestate succession.
Kentucky's laws on intestate inheritance are found in Kentucky Revised
Statutes ("KRS") chapter 391 entitled "Descent and Distribution."
Today, there are few significant distinctions between intestate
succession to real and personal property.' At the common law, however,
Genesis 25:29-34.
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987). But see Hall'sAdm'rv. Compton,
281 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Ky. 1955) ("The right to dispose of an estate by will is not an
inherent or natural right, but is permitted by statute."); Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S.
556, 562 (1942).
3 See THOMAS E. ATKiNSON, LAW OF WILLs 30 (2d ed. 1953).
4 JESSE DuxEvmmR & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 75
(4th ed. 1990).
' See id. at 29.
6 But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (providing
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different laws determined the identity of the intestate takers of real property
and the intestate takers of personalty.7 Thus, distinct, but parallel, technical
vocabularies developed to describe succession based on the characterization
of the decedents property as real or personal. For example, "descent' refers
to the devolution of intestate real property, while "distribution!' denominates
the intestate succession to personalty Those to Whom the decedent's real
property descends are "heirs," and those who take the decedent's personal
property are "next of kin" or "distributees"' 0
The intestacy scheme in Kentucky only applies to property remaining in
the decedent's estate after application of the dower chapters. The statutory
provisions on dower contained in KRS chapter 392 usually determine the
rights of a surviving spouse in Kentucky. The surviving spouse is an intestate
taker only if the deceased spouse was not survived by a child, a descendant
of a child, a parent a sibling, or a descendant of a sibling." Therefore,
when there is a surviving spouse, before determining the proper intestate
distribution of the decedent's property, reference must be made to the dower
chapter.
A The Source and Nature of the Law Governing Intestate Succession
1. Statutory Succession
Because the right of intestate succession to property is purely statutory,
Kentucky's statutes on descent and distribution, not the intentions of the
decedent, determine the identity of the intestate takers.' For example, in
that ancestral real property passes differently than nonancestral realty and all personalty).
7 WILUAM M. McGovERN Er AL., Wuis, TRusTs AND ESTATES § 1.1 (1988).
A similar phenomenon is present in the technical vocabulary of testate inheritance
of real and personal property. Id.
Id.
"Id. Such linguistic distinctions are, for the most part, lost on the public and are not
consistently honored in court opinions or in the statutes. For instance, '"heir" is commonly
used interchangeably with '!next of kin" to refer to an intestate taker of either real or
personal property.
" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(1)-(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1984).
'2 See Ryburn v. First Nat'l Bank of Mayfield, 399 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. 1965)
(holding that a grandniece and grandnephew could not contest the testator's will because
an intervening intestate taker under the statute was still living); Richardson's Adm'r v.
Borders, 54 S.W.2d 676, 677-78 (Ky. 1932) (sustaining the constitutionality of a statute
that disqualified a child born during a marriage from inheriting from his mother's husband
because the husband had divorced the mother on the ground that she was pregnant by
another before the marriage); see also Traughber v. King, 32 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Ky. 1930)
(holding that a Kentucky statute requires that advancements made by the testator be taken
1993-94]
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Hall's Administrator v. Compton" the decedent died testate as to one-third
of her estate and intestate as to the other two-thirds. The will provisions in
favor of one of the decedent's four nieces and nephews evidenced an intention
not to provide for the other three.'4 Nonetheless, all of the nieces and
nephews shared equally in the intestate property because they were, as a class,
the statutorily designated intestate takers of the decedent 5 This legislative
power to determine intestate takers is not limited to merely dtermining
priorities among classes of blood relatives of the decedent. It also encompass-
es the power to authorize inheritance by people related to the decedent by
marriage and adoption.'6 The only way that a decedent can disinherit a
statutorily designated intestate taker is by the affirmative act of bequeathing
all of the decedents estate to others in a validly executed will.
The identification of a decedent's intestate takers takes place at the
moment of the decedent's death. 7 Therefore, a postmortem contract of
release that an intestate taker of the testator executes in the settlement of a
potential will contest will not alter the determination of heirship made by the
intestacy statutes based on the ftcts extant at the moment of death." In
Ryburn v. First National Bank of Mayfield, a grandniece and a grandnephew
of the testator sought to contest the testators will 9 In order to have standing
to contest the will, the grandniece and grandnephew needed a strict pecuniary
interest adverse to the will.20 The contestants in Ryburn claimed to be
into account in determining the share of the testator's children).
" 281 S.W.2d 906 (Ky. 1955).
14 Id. at 910.
"Id.; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
,6 Woods v. Crump, 142 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1940) (construing a prior statute on
inheritance rights of an adopted child). Inheritance by nonblood relatives is authorized by
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.520(2) (adopted child), 391.010(4) (husband or wife of
decedent), and 391.010(6) (kindred of husband or wife of decedent).
1 Rose v. Rose, 176 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1943) (intestate takers of real property);
Farmers' Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 75 S.W.2d 1063, 1065 (Ky. 1934)
(intestate takers of personal property); see also Skinner v. Morrow, 318 S.W.2d 419, 424
(Ky. 1958) (holding that the share of the decedent's spouse is determined by the law in
effect at the time of the decedent's death, not the law in effect at the time of distribution
of the estate).
," Rybum v. First Nat'l Bank of Mayfield, 399 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1965). For a full
statement of the facts of Ryburn, see Annie Gardner Foundation v. Gardner, 375 S.W.2d
705 (Ky. 1963).
'9.Ryburn, 399 S.W.2d at 313-14.
20 See Eckert v. Givan, 183 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Ky. 1944) (holding that the heirs
of the widow of the testator could not contest the will, as they would not be entitled to
an intestate share of the testato's estate); Rogers v. Leahy, 176 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Ky. 1943)
(holding that the inchoate curtesy right of the spouse of an heir of the testator does not
enable the heir's spouse to contest the will because the spouse would not be entitled to
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unprovided for intestate takers ofthe testator, which, if tre, satisfied the strict
pecuniary interest requirement.' However, the court dismissed their suit for
lack of standing because their grandfather (a brother of the testator) and their
father (a nephew of the testator) had been alive at the testator's death22 By
statute, surviving siblings of the decedent (the grandfather) take in intestacy
to the exclusion of the siblings' own descendants (the father and the contes-
tants). An agreement later entered into between the grandfather, the father,
and the testators estate in which the grandfather and the father released all
claims in the estate of the testator' did not cure the contestants' lack of
standing because the statutes fix the death of the decedent as the relevant time
for determining the identity of the intestate takers.
2. Limitations on the Legislative Power
Although the legislature power to regulate the descent and distribution
of intestate property is very broad, it is not limitless. Both the Kentucky
Constitution and the United States Constitution impose restrictions on the
legislature power to define and alter rights of succession to intestate
property.
Section 59 ofthe Kentucky Constitution generallyprohibits the legislature
from enacting a special law when a general law can be made applicable26
That section also particularly prohibits the enactment of special laws that
affect the estate of a decedent27 or of local laws that change the law of
descent, distribution, or succession within a particular area.2 Therefore, the
legislature cannot enact a change in the law of succession if the resulting law
is "confined to territorial limits other than that of the whole state..., is
applicable to some political subdivision and not to others," 9 or "arbitrarily
or beyond reasonable justification discriminates against some persons or
objects and favors others" 30
an intestate share of the testator's estate). See generally ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 99
(describing the parties who may contest a will).
2' Ryburn, 399 S.W.2d at 314.
Sd. at 315.
23 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
24 Annie Gardner Foundation v. Gardner, 375 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1963).
21 Ryburn, 399 S.W.2d 314-15; see also cases cited supra note 17.
Ky. CONST. § 59(29).
2 7 Id. at § 59(6).
2 Id. at § 59(8).
Board of Educ. of Jefferson County v. Board of Ecluc. of Louisville, 472 S.W.2d
496, 498 (Ky. 1971) (defining a local act).
3 Id. (defining a special law).
1993-94]
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For example, KRS section 381.280, which disqualifies a killer
convicted of the felony from inheriting from the victim,3 was chal-
lenged in Wilson v. Bates' as unconstitutional special legislation.
Although the statute appears to affect the inheritance of only a specific
class, it is a general, and not a special, law because it applies uniformly
to all members of the class that it creates.' Nor does the statute violate
the mandate of Section 20 of the Kentucky Constitution against forfeiture
of estate.' Rather than depriving the killer of any property, the statute
merely prevents the killer from acquiring property through intestate
succession."s
Section 21 of the Kentucky Constitution contains two other provisions
expressly affecting inheritance rights.' First in the case of suicide, the
decedent's property still descends or is distributed as if the decedent had
died a natural death. Second, a casualty death, rather than a natural death,
does not cause a forfeiture of the decedent's estate.3
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides the most obvious source of federal constitutional limitations on
the state's power to regulate inheritance. ' The Equal Protection Clause
imposes significant limitations on the state's power to classify on the
basis of race, gender, and illegitimacy in regulating descent and distribu-
3' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
32 Wilson v. Bates, 231 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1950) (son killed both parents and was
convicted of the felony).
31 Id. at 41.
' The section provides: "No person shall be attained of treason or felony by the
General Assembly, and no attainder shall work corruption of blood, nor, except during
the life of the offender, forfeiture of estate to the Commonwealth." KY. CONST. § 20.
35 Wilson, 231 S.W.2d at 41-42 (Since "[tihe acts of killing [the victims] took place
immediately before they died,.. . [the defendant] forfeited his rights to inherit from them
immediately before they died ... [and] no part of their estate was vested in him by
reason of their death."); Heuser v. Cohen, 655 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that where husband and wife jointly-owned casualty insurance on property held as tenants
by the entirety and husband murdered his wife, the forfeiture statute prevents husband
from taking all of the property under a right of survivorship, but husband may retain one-
half of the property under equitable principles).
" The section provides: "The estate of such persons as shall destroy their own lives
shall descend or vest as in cases of natural death, and if any person shall be killed by
casualty, there shall be no forfeitur by reason thereof." Ky. CONST. § 21.
37 Id.
3 1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
[Vol 82
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tion 9 For example, in Reed v. Reed the United States Supreme
Court struck an Idaho statute that directed that if equally qualified
applicants competed for appointment as administrator of an intestate
estate, the male applicant was to be preferred over the female applicant.
The statute offended the Equal Protection Clause because the
gender-based classification it employed was not substantially related to
an important governmental objective."'
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois
statute that provided that a child born out of wedlock could inherit from
the father only if the father acknowledged the child and if the parents
married.42 This federal equal protection decision, as applied by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Pendleton v. Pendleton,43 led to a declara-
tion of the unconstitutionality of a similar Kentucky statute controlling
the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock.
The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees that property owners will
receive due process before the state deprives them of their property."
Prospective legislative changes in the rules governing succession to
property do not offend this guarantee.4" As a living person has no heirs
or distributees," no one presently exists whose rights are impermissibly
affected by prospective legislative changes in intestate succession.
Additionally, no citizen, including heirs and distributees expectant, has a
protectable property interest in the continued existence of a statute."
11 See generally LAURENCE H. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTnImONAL LAw 991-1136
(1978) (equal protection analysis).
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41 Id. at 75-76; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down an
Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and
to females under the age of 18 as violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
42 TMmble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764-66 (1977).
- 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977).
44U.S. CoNST. amend. XLV, § 1.
"' Kolb v. Ruhi's Adm'r, 198 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Ky. 1946) (finding that the
inheritance rights of an adopted child are governed by a statute enacted after the adoption,
but prior to decedent's death); Richardson's Adm'rv. Borders, 54 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Ky.
1932) (sustaining legislation that barred a child born during a lawful marriage from
inheriting from the mother's husband if the mother were later adjudged to have been
pregnant by another at the time of the marriage, although such a child would have been
an heir under previous law).
'JOHN SCURLOCK, RETROACTVE LEGISLATION AMCNG INTERESTS IN LAND 11
(1953).
47 Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Ky. 1965), overruled on different
grounds by Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 71-72 (Ky. 1989).
4 SCURIOCK, supra note 46, at 108-09.
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It is uniformly recognized, however, that at the moment the property
owner dies, the property rights of the takers become fixed or vested.49
Because of the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
legislature may not thereafter divest those takers of substantive rights
conferred upon them by virtue of the statutes in effect at the death of the
decedent. The Kentucky Court of Appeals applied this prohibition against
legislation that divests already vested property rights in its decisions
concerning the effect of the Weissinger Act50 on a husband's curtesy
rights in his wife's property.5' The Act removed many of the common
law disabilities suffered by married women, including the elimination of
the husband's right, upon marriage, to acquire title to so much of his
wife's personal property as he reduced to his possession.52 The court of
appeals determined that the statute did not divest a husband of title to that
part of his wife's personal property that he had reduced to his possession
prior to the adoption of the Act." However, the statute did eliminate his
right to acquire title to personal property his wife had acquired before the
adoption of the Act but which he had not yet reduced to possession and
his right to personal property she acquired after the effective date of the
Act.S
Retroactive legislation that merely effects procedural, rather than
substantive, changes does not violate due process guarantees.55 Also,
- Id. at 116; Richardson's Adm'r, 54 S.W.2d at 677 ('hose named as heirs and
distributees in the existing laws of descent and distribution have no vested rights until the
intestate's death. .. -'; Butler v. Butler, 4 Ky. Op. 653, 654 (1872) (surviving spouse's
rights as well as those of the decedent's heirs vested at the decedent's death and "no
subsequent legislation can divest them of [that] interest").
0 1894 Ky. Acts, ch. 76, § 37 (current version at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 404.010
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984)).
- E.g., Mitchell v. Violett, 47 S.W. 195, 196 (Ky. 1898) (finding that the Act did
not deprive the husband of his life interest in his wife's rea property because, prior to the
Act's adoption, the marriage took place, the wife's land was acquired, and a child of the
marriage was born alive); Rose v. Rose, 46 S.W. 524 (Ky. 1898) (finding that the Act did
not deprive the husband of his rights to use land that his wife had acquired before the
Act, to rent the land for three years at a time, and to receive the rents, because they
married prior to the adoption of the Act).
Phillips v. Farley, 66 S.W. 1006 (Ky. 1902) (holding that the Act deprived the
husband of a life interest in real property of his wife because a child of the marriage was
not bom alive prior to the adoption of the Act).
" Fowler v. Fowler, 127 S.W. 1014, 1016 (Ky. 1910).
5 Id.
" Cf. Heath v. Hazelip, 167 S.W. 905, 907-09 (Ky. 1914) (holding that a statute of
limitations for recovery of real property may be shortened retroactively if a reasonable
period of time is allowed under the new statute to bring actions not time-barred under the
old statute).
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litigation concerning intestate or testate inheritance does not divest an heir or
devisee of a vested property interest in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Such litigation merely determines which of the parties is the rightful owner
of the property.
The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property for
public use without just compensation is applied to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.5 Decisions by both the
United States Supreme Court58 and the Kentucky Supreme Court"9 have
recognized that an exercise of the state's police powers amounts to a taking
if it substantially defeats the owner's property interest. One of the attributes
ofproperty ownership is the ability of the owner to transfer ownership of that
property at death. In Hodel v. Iring5, the United States Supreme Court held
that an unconstitutional "taking' occurred when Congress purported to totally
eliminate both the descent and devise of certain types of property interests in
Indian trust land." Thus, the Commonwealth of Kentucky may not totally
abrogate the right of inheritance without incurring the constitutional obligation
to pay just compensation.
3. Time for Determining Heirship
The relevant statutes for determining the identity of a decedent's intestate
takers and their shares are the statutes in effect at the death of the dece-
Wills v. Lochnane, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 547, 549-50 (1873) ("[W]hen [will contests]
are settled by the courts in accordance with the law and facts of the particular case the
judgment does not deprive the unsuccessful party of his property, but declares that as [a]
matter of law he does not own the property.").
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
58 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (invalidating a Pennsylva-
nia statute which forbade mining that caused subsidence of buildings used for human
habitation); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(sustaining New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central
Station).
" Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal and Lumber Co., 678 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky. 1984)
(defining a '"tking" as depriving the owner of all beneficial enjoyment and holding
therefore, that mere passage of the Wild Rivers Act did not constitute a taking);
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 539 S.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Ky. 1976).
6 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
61 Id. at 717-18. Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act provided:
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within
a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall
descedant [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such
interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has
earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat."
481 U.S. at 709 (quoting the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. § 2206
1993-941
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dent.62 In White v. White63 the intestacy statute in effect at the time that
the litigation arose would have permitted the claimant to be an intestate
taker of the decedent, even though the claimant was not a United States
citizen. However, the court denied the claimant any share in the
decedent's estate because he was ineligible to inherit under the statute that
was in effect at the time of the decedent's death.' Similarly, the rights
of the surviving spouse in the deceased spouse's estate, other than dower,
are determined by the statutes in effect at the death of the decedent.'
Legislation adopted subsequent to the decedent's death cannot defeat the
rights of a surviving spouse or other intestate takers.66
The decedent's death is also the critical point for classifying the
decedent's assets and for determining whether a local administrator is
necessary. The nature of the decedent's property at the death of the
decedent determines whether the property is personalty or realty for the
purposes of descent and distribution.' A subsequent change in the form
of an asset such as that which occurs when real property is sold for cash
does not change the initial classification of that asset.' Moreover, the
determination as to the presence or absence of property or debts owed to
the decedent within Kentucky is made as of the date of the decedent's
death.69 The presence or absence of such property is a prerequisite to the
appointment of a local administrator for the decedent's estate.
2 See Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Ky. 1965) (holding that the law existing
at the decedent's death, not the law existing at the time of adoption, controls inheritance
rights of an adoptee), overruled on different grounds by Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68,
71-72 (Ky. 1989); Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 198 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Ky. 1947) (holding that
right of an adopted child to inherit from or through an adopting parent is determined by
the law of succession as it exists at decedent's death).
59 Ky. (2 Met.) 185 (1859).
MId. at 188.
See Blades v. Blades' Adm'r, 159 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1942) (holding that
intestate personalty exempted by statute from distribution and sale vests absolutely in
surviving spouse or distributee at moment of decedent's death); Howard v. Mitchell, 105
S.W.2d 128, 131 (Ky. 1937) (finding that the statute in effect at decedent's death
determines the homestead rights of the surviving spouse).
' Butler v. Butler, 4 Ky. Op. 653 (1872) ("The rights of the widow and heirs, in and
to the estate of the decedent vested in them, at his death, and no subsequent legislation
can divest them of the interest they acquired.").
Cf. Gaskins v. Gaskins, 223 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky. 1949) (holding that intestate
realty located in Kentucky is not subject to a surviving spouse's lien acquired by her in
the state of the decedent's domicile).
Id. at 376.
Payne v. Payne, 39 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Ky. 1931).
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B. Choice of Law
1. Applicable Choice of Law Principles
In the context of intestate succession, choice of law involves
determining which state's law decides who the intestate takers are and
what share each should take from the decedent's estate."0 No choice of
law question arises if the decedent dies domiciled in the same state in
which all of the decedent's property is located. In that case, the law of the
decedent's domicile at death governs any issue of intestate succession to
all of the decedent's property because it is all within that state. X1
however, the decedent owns any property that is located in a state that is
not the decedent's domicile at death, a choice of law issue arises. For
example, hypothesize a decedent who was a Kentucky domiciliary at
death and who had real property and bank accounts located in both
Kentucky and State X. Under the intestacy laws of Kentucky, the
decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to approximately one-half of the
decedent's real and personal property, whereas in State X a surviving
spouse is entitled to only one-third of that property. Should the law of
Kentucky or State X determine the rights of the surviving spouse?
Two choice of law principles of almost universal application are
available for solving this problem. First, the law of the situs of
"immovables" determines every question concerning those assets of the
decedent.7' Thus, in our hypothetical, Kentucky's laws of intestate
succession would control the descent of the real property located in
Kentucky, and the surviving spouse would take a one-half interest in that
property. By the same token, the law of State Xwould control the descent
of the real property that is located within its boundaries. Therefore, the
surviving spouse would take only one-third of the realty in State X.
7RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, CowmIENTARY ON THE CONFIUCT OF LAWS § 1.3
(2d ed. 1980). This book does not cover the other major conflict of law issues:
(1) where suit may be brought and (2) the effect of a judgment on suits in other
jurisdictions.
7 Gaskins, 223 S.W.2d at 376 (holding that intestate realty located in Kentucky is
not subject to a surviving spouse's lien acquired by her in the state of the decedent's
domicile); Sneed v. Ewing, 28 Ky. (5 LL Marsh.) 460, 465 (1831) (finding that in order
to pass title to realty located in Kentucky, a foreig will must be executed in conformity
with the laws of Kentucky); see also Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823)
(holding that title to realty can be determined only by the laws of the state under which
it was acquired).
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The second choice of law principle is that the law of the
decedent's domicile at death controls the distribution of "movables,"
regardless of the actual, physical location of the "movables."'
Kentucky has codified this principle in KRS section 395.260.' 3
Therefore, in the hypothetical case set out above, Kentucky's statutory
scheme of intestate succession would apply to the bank accounts in
both Kentucky and State X without regard to the intestate succession
laws of State X. The surviving spouse would, take one-half of the
monies on deposit in both of the accounts.
The terms "real property" and "personal property" are often
substituted for the terms "immovables" and "movables" in the
expression of these choice of law principles. These substitutes may be
inaccurate, however, since all real property is immovable, but not all
personal property is movable. For example, although leasehold
interests in real property are generally classified as personal property
interests, for the purposes of the choice of law rules a leasehold is an
"immovable." 74
Kentucky case law does not recognize any exceptions to the rule
that the law of the situs of immovables controls their descent and
distribution. However, there are some case law exceptions to the rule
that the law of the decedent's domicile at death controls the descent
and distribution of movables. In McDonald v. McDonald's
Administrator,75 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky distributed
damages that a Kentucky administrator had recovered under another
state's wrongful death statute, in accordance with the requirements of
that state's wrongful death statute even though those monies were a
"movable."'76 Since Kentucky was the decedent's domicile at death,
72 Payne, 39 S.W.2d at 208 (a foreign decedent's personalty located in Kentucky
must be distributed according to the laws of the decedent's domicile).
73 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 395.260 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1984). The statute
provides:
[A]dministration ... [of] the estate of a nonresident decedent ... may either
be distributed and disposed of according to the law of the decedent's domicile
... or... may be transmitted to the personal representatives . . . in the state
of the decedent's domicile, to be disposed of there according to the law of that
state.
' WEINTRAUB, supra note 70, § 8.2; see also Sneed, 28 Ky. (5 J. Marsh.) at 481
(finding that although slaves were technically classified as realty, they were treated as
'!movables" for choice of law purposes).
75 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 367 (1893).76 Id. at 367-68.
[Vol. 82
KENTUCKY INTESTACY LAWS
the choice of law rule for movables should have directed that
Kentucky law control the distribution.
In another exceptional case,' the court distributed a foreign
domiciliary's "movables," which were securities held by a Kentucky
trust company, according to the intestacy laws of Kentucky instead of
the laws of the decedent's domicile at death. The court made this
exception because, prior to leaving Kentucky to take up residence in
another state, the decedent had transferred the securities in trust to the
trust company, and the securities remained in the trust company's
possession at the decedent's death. A written instrument accompanying
this transfer provided that the securities were to remain in Kentucky
and were to pass according to Kentucky's intestacy laws in the
absence of an inter vivos revocation of the agreement or an alternative
testamentary disposition of the securities. The court gave effect to the
decedent's intention instead of applying the general choice of law
rule.78
2. Incidental Questions
The choice of law principles discussed above do not resolve
"incidental questions" that may arise when the relevant state law is
applied to an intestate distribution question.79 For example, while the
relevant choice of law principles determine the size of the share
which a surviving spouse takes in the decedent's various assets, those
choice of law principles do not determine whether the claimant is the
decedent's "surviving spouse." That issue involves the validity of any
alleged marriage between the decedent and the claimant. The law of
the state where the marriage was celebrated and the law of the state(s)
where the decedent and the claimant were domiciled at the time of the
marriage determine the validity of the marriage."0
7 Lee v. Belknap, 173 S.W. 1129 (Ky. 1915).
7' Id. at 1133-34; see also Shaw v. Grimes, 218 S.W. 447, 448 (Ky. 1919) (restating
the orthodox choice of law rule for immovables but noting that some states recognize an
exception to this rule that the law of the testator's domicile controls when the intention
of the testator is sought to be ascertained from the language used in the will).
' WniNTRAUB, supra note 70, § 3.4A n.96 ("[a]n 'incidental question' arises when,
in applying the law of the state chosen by conflict analysis, terms utilized in that law
must be defined by further conflict analysis"); A.E. Gotlieb, The Incidental Question
Revisited-Theory and Practice in the Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 734
(1977).
so WEINTRAUB, supra note 70, § 3.4A n.96.
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The law of the state that determines the validity of a marriage also
determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the children of that
marriage." Once a court determines the status of a claimant as
legitimate or illegitimate, the law of the situs for immovables and the
law of the decedent's domicile for movables establish the intestate
share of that legitimate or illegitimate claimant.' Similarly, the law
of the forum of the adoption determines a claimant's status as an
adopted child of the decedent.ss However, the intestate inheritance
rights of the adopted child are then determined in accordance with the
two general choice of law rules." For example, a child who was
validly adopted in Indiana inherited his mother's real property located
in Kentucky because Kentucky's intestacy laws controlled and, under
Kentucky's descent and distribution statutes, an adopted child had the
same rights as a birth child.s' Conversely, a child who was validly
adopted in New York was not permitted to inherit in Kentucky from
his natural, paternal great-uncle.s' Although New York law was to
the contrary, Kentucky's intestacy statutes totally cut off an adopted
child's right to inherit from or through her or his birth parents.'
3. Domicile
Because one must refer to the law of the decedent's domicile at
death to ascertain who takes and in what share, determination of
which state was the decedent's domicile can become crucial. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to explore the illusive concept of
81 Leonard v. Braswell, 36 S.W. 684, 686 (Ky. 1896) (determining that decedent's
grandchildren were illegitimate because in Illinois, the forum of their parents' marriage,
the marriage was bigamous and the offspring illegitimate).
2 Id. at 687 (explaining that although illegitimate under Illinois law, the law of the
forum of the marriage, the grandchildren of a Kentucky decedent could inherit because
Kentucky pemaits inheritance by illegitimate offspring).
" Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Ky. 1965) (stating that the law of the forum
of the adoption controls unless the status so created is repugnant to the public policy of
the state in which the adopted status is asserted), overruled on different grounds by Hicks
v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989).
'Id. at 52.
sPyle v. Fischer, 128 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1939).
"Arciero, 397 S.W.2d at 53, overruled on different grounds by Hicks v. Enlow, 764
S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989).
" Id. at 51.
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domicile.' However, as such a determination turns on various
factual issues, an appellate court will not generally set aside the
decision of a trial court with respect to domicile.89
After one has identified, through the use of appropriate choice of
law principles, which state's law applies, the law of that state will
apply regardless of whether that law is statutory, case law, or civil
law -" Although the law of a nondomiciliary state controls the
descent of immovables located within that- state, the primary
administration of the decedent's estate should take place where the
decedent was domiciled at death.9' Ancillary administration m a
nondomiciliary state in advance of intestate adminstration in the
decedent's domiciliary state is only permitted under circumstances
requiring the immediate protection of rights, the prevention of a loss,
or the preservation of some interest.92
II. THE PATrERN OF ITESTATE INHERrrANCE
A system of intestate inheritance can be predicated on blood
relationships, social bonds, participation in the creation of the decedent's
wealth, or ability to make the most productive use of the decedent's
property. Kentucky has chosen a pattern of intestate inheritance that
weighs heavily in favor of keeping the decedent's property within the
bloodline.93 Kentucky's statutory scheme also embodies a strong
legislative preference for intestate inheritance and against escheat. As
Figure 1 illustrates, inheritance is never cut off because of the remoteness
of the degree of relationship of the blood relative to the decedent. Escheat
u For an in-depth discussion, see WNAUB, supra note 70, §§ 2.1-2.16.
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Williams, 105 S.W 952, 954 (Ky. 1907) (sustamining the
finding of a trial court that a person who maintained an apartment in Louisville,
Kentucky, for thinty-eight years was nonetheless a domiciliary of Tennessee); see also
Temple v. Brittan, 12 S.W 306, 306 (Ky. 1889) (demonstrating unwillingness to disturb
the trial court's determination of domicile).
9o Lee v. Belknap, 173 S.W 1129, 1138 (Ky. 1915).
91 Payne v. Payne, 39 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Ky. 1931) (denying probate of foreign
testator's holographic will because no sufficient reasons appeared for probating the will
in Kentucky in advance of the will's probate at the testator's domicile).
9' See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Micle/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (providing
that real property acquired as a gift or inheritance from a parent shall descend to the
parent or the parent's heirs if the decedent dies intestate and without issue); id. § 391.050
(giving half-blood relations a half-share).
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because of a failure of intestate takers occurs only if the entire
descending, ascending, and collateral lines of both the decedent and of the
decedent's spouse are exhausted.' Under this intestacy scheme,
inheritance by consanguineous (related by blood) and affinal (related by
marriage) "laughing heirs" 95 is likely to occur.
Kentucky's system of intestate inheritance is antiquated in comparison
to the modem trend toward eliminating inheritance by those more
remotely related to the decedent than grandparent or issue of a
grandparent." Nonetheless, Kentucky's intestacy laws generally do not
perpetuate the common law distinctions between the distribution of
intestate personalty and the descent of intestate realty. With a few
exceptions,97 characterization of the decedent's assets as either realty or
personalty does not affect succession to the net estate of the decedent
after payment of exemptions, debts, and dower, if any. The statutes
mandate distribution of the intestate's personal property among the same
persons and in the same proportions as they require the descent of the
intestate's real estate." Similarly, Kentucky's statutory scheme rejects the
common law preference for males over females, the doctrine of
primogeniture, and the exclusion of ancestors from intestate
inheritance."
When there is more than one intestate taker, each taker becomes the
sole owner of that taker's respective fractional interest in the decedent's
personal property. With respect to the decedent's real property, multiple
takers inherit their respective fractional interests as tenants in common
because the common law preference for joint tenancies has been
eliminated by statute."° All of the tenants in common, regardless of the
size of their respective fractional interest, have co-extensive rights or
privileges in any election, division, or other matter concerning the lands
that descended to them."'
9 Id. § 391.010(6).
'Laughing heirs" are relatives which are only distantly related to the decedent.
MCGoOVERN Er AL., supra note 7, § 1.3.
9 E.g., UNIP. PROBATE CODE § 2-103, 8 U.LA. 60 (1987) (adopting a scheme which
eliminates inheritance by those more remotely related than the decedent's grandparent or
issue of the decedent's grandparent).
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (requiring
ancestral real property to pass differently than nonancestral realty and all personalty); id.
§ 391.030(1) (requiring debt to be taken from personalty first).
Id. § 391.030(1).
See id § 391.010.
10 Id. § 381.130 (allowing ajoint tenancy to be created only by expressly providing
for a right of survivorship in the instrument creating the interest).
" Id. § 391.120.
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FIGURE 1
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A. Shares of Intestate Takers
1. Share of Issue
The fist class of takers of the decedent's net estate after payment of
any exemptions, debts, and dower are the decedent's "children and their
descendants.""r If there is more than one child who survives the
decedent, the children share equally. Each child becomes the sole owner
of that child's respective fractional interest in the decedent's personalty
and inherits the decedent's realty as a tenant in common with the other
children. 10
3
Although the class description employs the conjunction "and," the
statute does not authorize inheritance by the descendants of living
children.'" It is axiomatic that remote descendants do not compete with
their own living ancestors."5 Thus, if the decedent is survived by two
children as well as the child of one of those children, the estate is divided
equally between the decedent's two children to the exclusion of the
grandchild. Grandchildren can share in the decedent's estate only if their
parent predeceased the decedent.
2. Share of Parents
While land could not pass in intestacy to parents or grandparents at
the common law,"06 Kentucky's intestacy statutes provide for the
"descent" of property, both real and personal, to ascendants."° Howev-
er, the statutes explicitly provide that the parent or parents of the
decedent qualify as intestate takers of the decedent's net estate only if
there are neither surviving children of the decedent nor descendants of
those children. Before any succeeding class of intestate takers may
inherit, all those in preceding classes must have predeceased the decedent.
Generally, if both parents survive the decedent, each parent takes an
equal share, or moiety, of the decedent's real and personal property."'a
If, however, the decedent dies without issue owning real property that was
1- Id. § 391.010(1) (providing for descent of realty); id. § 391.030(1) (providing for
distribution of personalty).
- Id. § 391.010(1).
104 Id.
'0' Rybum v. First Nat'lBank of Mayfield, 399 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. 1965) (holding
that the brother of the decedent inherited to the exclusion of that brother's child and
grandchild).1 6William H. Page, Descent Per Stirpes and Per Capita, 1946 WIs. L. REv. 3, 39.
107 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
10 Young v. Smithers, 205 S.W. 949, 950 (Ky. 1918) (defining moiety inthe context
of inheritance by a maternal grandmother and paternal aunt and uncle).
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the gift of one parent; and both parents survive the decedent, the parent who
made the gift takes the whole of that real property to the exclusion of the
other parent.'"
The hierarchy of intestate takers created by the Kentucky statutes places
the parents ahead of the surviving spouse. If the decedent is survived by a
spouse and parents, the spouse receives a personalty exemption u° and the
dower share provided for in KRS chapter 392. The parents take the remaining
estate in intestacy."' For example, assume that the decedent's estate at
death consisted of $60,000 worth of personalty and $30,000 worth of realty
after payment of the surviving spouse's personalty exemption of $7,500 as
well as alter the payment of debts, costs of administration, and funeral
expenses. The surviving spouse' share is the personalty exemption ($7,500)
plus one-half of the surplus personalty ($30,000) plus one-half of the surplus
realty ($15,000) for a total value of $52,500.2 The parents' combined
share of the remainder of the estate ($45,000) is only slightly less than the
share of the surviving spouse.
The rough equality of treatment afforded the spouse and parents may not
reflect the intention of a typical decedent. However, this result does keep
almost half of the decedent's property within the decedent's bloodline. It has
been suggested that such a result is consistent with the rationale underlying
the provisions of the penal code that criminalize the act of nonsupport of
parents," 3 but it is probably specious to suggest that Kentucky's statutory
pattern of inheritance resulted from a desire to provide for the support of
parents of the decedent. If the decedent is survived only by issue and parents
instead of a spouse and parents, the children, or their descendants, take the
entire estate to the exclusion of the parents. 4 The best explanation for the
Kentucky pattern of intestate inheritance is that it furthers an overriding
objective to keep a significant share of the decedent's property in the
bloodline. The pattern established by the statutes prefers the descending
bloodline, but if there are no descendants then the ascending or collateral
bloodlines are substituted.
3. Share of Siblings and Their Descendants
If the decedent is not survived by children, descendants of children, or
parents, the net estate after the payment of the spouse's exemption, debts, and
9 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984) (ancestral property).
11 Id. § 391.030(1)(c) (providing for a $7500 personalty exemption).
See id § 391.010(2).
112 Id. § 392.020 (defining dower).
1"3 Id. § 530.050 (nonsupport and flagrant nonsupport).
114 Id. § 391.010(1).
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dower, if any, passes to the decedent's "brothers and sisters and their
descendants.' ' . As in the case of inheritance by the decedent's children and
their descendants, if'more than one sibling survives, the siblings share equally.
Also, the conjunction in the class description does not authorize inheritance
by descendants of living siblings. Since remote descendants do not compete
in intestacy with their own living ancestors, the only way a niece or nephew
can inherit is if the parent of the niece or nephew predeceases the dece-
dent?16
If survived by a spouse and siblings, the siblings take almost as much as
the decedent's spouse. Assume a hypothetical net estate of $60,000 in
personalty and $30,000 in realty after payment of the spouse personalty
exemption of $7,500, debts, costs of administration, and funeral expens-
es.1 7 The surviving spouse's share is $52,500 ($7,500 plus one-half of the
surplus personalty and one-half of the surplus realty)."' The siblings'
combined share of the estate is $45,000. This large sibling share does not
approximate the desires of the average decedent. It also refutes any suggestion
that support considerations are an operative factor in the statutory inheritance
scheme. As a surviving spouse is much more likely than siblings to be
financially dependent on the decedent, the inclusion of siblings in the
statutory pattern of intestate inheritance before the decedent spouse (see
Figure 1) evidences Kentuckys overwhelming preference for bloodline
inheritance.
4. Share of Spouse
As long as the decedent spouse survives the decedent, the spouse is
entitled to the $7,500 personalty exemption,1 a dower share of one-half
of the surplus personalty and surplus realty the decedent died owning, and a
life estate in one-third of any realty that the decedent was seized of in fee
simple and transferred during marriage without releasing dower.2 Howev-
er, the surviving spouse does not take the entire intestate estate as an heir
unless the decedent was not survived by children, descendants of children,
parents, siblings, or descendants of siblings.'2' Although not reflective of
. Id. § 391.010(3).
16 Rybum v. First Nat'lBank of Mayfield, 399 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. 1965) (holding
that the brother of the decedent inherited to the exclusion of that brother's child and
grandchild).
117 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.030 (MichiefBobbs-Menill 1984 & Supp. 1992).
n' Id. § 392.020.
1 Id. § 391.030(1)(c).
1 Id. § 392.020.
' Id. § 391.010(4).
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the intention of the average intestate spouse, this is a significant improvement
in the treatment of the surviving spouse. Prior to 1956, a surviving spouse
was the decedent's intestate taker only if no blood kindred, however remote,
survived the decedent.22
5. Share of Other Ascendant and Collateral Relatives
If the decedent is not survived by children, descendants of children,
parents, siblings, descendants of siblings, or a spouse, the estate is divided
into two equal moieties.1" One moiety passes to the decedent's maternal
kindred, beginning first with the maternal grandparents who share equally if
both are living. If one maternal grandparent has predeceased the decedent,
then the entire moiety passes to the survivor.' If there are no maternal
grandparents, the moiety passes to maternal aunts and uncles or their
descendants;'2 if none, to maternal great-grandparents equally or the entire
moiety to the survivor," if none, to sisters and brothers of grandparents or
their descendants; and so on, to the nearest lineal ancestors and their
descendants. 7 The other moiety passes in the same manner to the dece-
dent paternal kindred' If there are no maternal kindred, the maternal
moiety passes with the paternal moiety to the paternal kindred. Conversely,
the whole estate passes to the maternal kindred if there are no paternal
kindred" (see Figure 1).
This pattern of intestate inheritance resembles the common law's
parentelic system for the descent of land. Under both of these systems, the
nearest ancestor of the decedent who is either alive or has issue living at the
decedent's death takes the intestate estate. Before a claimant related to the
decedent through a more remote common ancestor may take, regardless of the
degree of relationship to the decedent, the entire line of the closer ancestor
must be exhausted no matter how distantly related the ancestor's descendant
is to the decedent." For example, in Figure 2 the Decedent is survived by
w Compare KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(5) (Baldwin 1955) (repealed 1956)
(surviving spouse is intestate taker only if there is neither paternal nor maternal kindred)
with KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(4) (Baldwin 1956) (surviving spouse is intestate
taker after children, parents, or brothers and sisters).
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
Id. § 391.010(5)(a).
Id. § 391.010(5)(b).
126 Id. § 391.010(5)(c).
'" Id. § 391.010(5)(d).
'2" Id. § 391.010(5).
'29 Id. § 391.010(6).
'" W.D. Rollison, Principles of the Law of Succession to Intestate Properly, 11
NOTRE DAMs L. REV. 14, 25-27 (1935-36).
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a Second Cousin Once Removed and a First Cousin Twice Removed. Even
though the Second Cousin Twice Removed stands in the seventh degree of
relationship to the Decedent while the First Cousin Twice Removed stands
in the closer sixth degree of relationship, the Second Cousin Once Removed
takes the entire moiety. The Second Cousin Once Removed is related to the
Decedent as a descendant of a closer ancestor (Great-Grandparent) than is the
First Cousin Twice Removed, who is related to the Decedent as a descendant
of a more remote ancestor (Great-Great-Grandparent).
FIGURE 2
I First Cousin
I Twice Removed
- (60) I--------
Second Cousin
(60)
I Second Cousin
I Once Removed I 0I (70)I------------- -----
DECEDENT
PRMECFASEDDEENT
SUIM/IVEDDECODENT
More typically today, intestacy statutes explicitly identify certain close
relatives (e.g., children, parents, grandparents) and their issue as the intestate
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takers If the decedent is not survived by any of these named classes of
takers or their issue, the statutes then provide that the estate passes to those
surviving relatives who stand in the nearest degree of relationship to the
decedent. Under this type of statute, it is necessary to count degrees of
kinship to determine the identity of those in the nearest degree of kinship.
The Kentucky statutes avoid the need to count degrees of kinship by,
providing for universal representationm
6. Share of Spoure's Kindred
If the decedent dies without a surviving spouse or any descending,
ascending, or collateral relatives, the whole of the decedent's estate passes to
the kindred of the decedent's spouse as ifthe spouse had survived the intestate
and died entitled to the estate.133 For example, in Davis'Administrator v.
Chasteem two sisters and some nieces and nephews of the decedent's
predeceased husband inherited the decedent's intestate estate. These relatives
of the husband took because the intestate had died without kindred of any
degree and because they were the intestate takers of the predeceased husband
of the decedent."
To establish their right to inherit kindred of the decedent's spouse must
overcome the presumption that every deceased person leaves heirs capable of
inheriting." The claimant cannot sustain this burden by merely establishing
the weakness of some other person's claim to the decedent's estate. Even if
one claimant could prove that another claimant was an imposter, that fact
alone would not establish the formers right to inherit. One claiming through
the decedent's spouse still has to prove that the decedent was survived neither
by a spouse nor by any blood kindred.
137
Similarly, unsupported allegations by such a claimant that the decedent
died without heirs is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
131 E.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-42 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-103 (1993).
3 See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
n KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(6).
'4 273 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1954).
, Id. at 369.
Doeker v. McKnight, 264 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. 1954) (finding that the intestate's
widow was the only heir at law of her deceased husband under prior law by establishing
that the intestate had no kindred of any degree of relationship); Montz v. Schwabacher,
83 S.W. 569, 570 (Ky. 1904) (holding that the purchaser in a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding was not required to take title because it had not been judicially established
that the mortgagor died without heirs).
3 Hagedom v. Reiser, 221 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1949) (finding that the sister of the
deceased wife of the intestate was an unsuccessful claimant for the intestate's property).
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decedent died survived by blood heirs.3 ' Rebutting the presumption of
heirship is difficult because lack of heirship requires proof of a negative
proposition. It is further complicated by the realities of the availability of any
proof. Therefore, both direct and indirect evidence of the nonexistence of
heirs is admissible.39 Direct evidence may even take the form of flanily
history testimony. Such evidence, though based on hearsay, is a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule4' and is often the best and only evidence
obtainable. An example of indirect proof of the absence of heirs that can
overcome the presumption of heirship is a lapse of time after the decedent's
death coupled with the nonappeamnce of any heirs. 4 An unsuccessful, but
diligent, search for heirs is also indirect proof that the decedent died without
heirs. 42
The claimant in Doeker v. McKnighe43 proffered indirect evidence that
she had treated the real property of her deceased husband as her own for
fifteen years after his death without any dispute as to her right to the
property."4 The warning order attorney appointed to notify the decedent's
heirs of the pendency of the action was unable to locate any heirs. That fact
was additional indirect, but competent, evidence tending to establish the
absence of heirs. Direct evidence of the nonexistence of heirs was provided
by two long-time neighbors of the decedent and a colleague from the
decedent's place of employment. They testified that the decedent had always
referred to himself as an orphan and had often stated that he had no living
relatives in this country or in his country of birth. No witnesses or other
evidence was submitted to controvert the claimant's proof The claimant could
have carried her burden either byproof of a lapse of time accompanied by the
nonappearance of heirs or by direct evidence of the nonexistence of heirs. 45
The combination of direct and indirect proof in Doeker was sufficient to
overcome the presumption of heirship.
138 Montz, 83 S.W. at 570.
139 Doeker, 264 S.W.2d at 79-80.
14 Ellis v. Dixon, 172 S.W.2d 461, 461 (Ky. 1943) (holding that the trial court
incorectly excluded pedigree declarations offered by those claiming to be heirs of the
intestate).
141 Compare Doeker, 264 S.W.2d at 80 (finding a lapse of fifteen years to be
sufficient evidence of lack of heirship) with Montz, 83 S.W. at 570 (finding a lapse of
five years to be insufficient evidence of lack of heirship).
142 Newport Nat'lBank v. Fick, 294 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Ky. 1956) (unsuccessful search
for heirs by a probate genealogist); Davis' Adm'rv. Chasteen, 273 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Ky.
1954) (unsuccessful search for heirs by a warning order attorney).
u 264 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1954).
144 Id. at 80.
145 Id.
[VoL 82
KENTUCKY INTESTACY LAWS
Newport National Bank v. Fick"4 also involved a combination of direct
and indirect evidence that was sufficient to overcome the presumption of
heirship. The original claimant was the brother of the decedent's deceased
husband and claimed to be the deceased husband sole heir. The claimant
died alter the commencement of the action and his widow continued to
prosecute the suit in her capacity as the sole devisee under her husband's will.
The claimant hired a probate geneologist to locate any heirs of the intestate.
The geneologist opinion, predicated on a diligent search and the death
certificates of the decedent's mother and three siblings, was that the decedent
had no heirs other than those who would take through the decedent's
predeceased spouse. An attorney for the husband of the decedent and a
nephew of the decedent husband offered uncontroverted testimony that the
decedent and her husband had no issue; that the decedent was predeceased by
her parents and her siblings; and that the sibling of the decedent who had
married never had issue. Although the claimant never established whether the
decedent ever had other kin or what happened to them, the witnesses testified
that the decedent did not have surviving kindred of any degree. The evidence
submitted by the claimant in this case was incomplete; nonetheless, the court
found that; in light of the realities with respect to the availability of proof in
such an action, the claimant had sustained her burden.147
B. Representation
Sometimes a person who would have inherited from the decedent had the
person survived the decedent dies too soon. The principle of representation
substitutes the lineal descendants of the deceased person for the predeceased
heir apparent.1" The English statutes of distribution did not permit the use
of representation beyond the children of sisters and brothers, 49 and many
contemporary intestacy systems continue to restrict representation to the
nearer degrees of relationship. 5 '
Kentucky's intestacy scheme embodies the principle of universal
representation. When any member of the class first entitled to inherit
in intestacy dies before the decedent, any descendants of that member
who survive the decedent take the share of the deceased member."'
Representation is used when the intestate takers are "children and
their descendants;" ' "brothers and sisters and their descen-
146 294 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1956).
14 Id. at 522.
- Page, supra note 106, at 3.
149 Id. at 43.
' E.g., OaIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.11-.13 (Baldwin 1993).
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
12 Id. § 391.010(1).
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dants;" '' "uncles and aunts and their descendants;"'" "brothers
and sisters of the grandfathers and grandmothers and their descen-
dants; " or "other lineal ancestors and their descendants."1 6
Representation creates a subsidiary problem of whether the lineal
descendants of the heir apparent who died before the decedent take
"per capita" or "per stirpes." Per capita distribution means distribution
"by head," or equal shares to all the heirs."7 It is available as a
method of intestate distribution only if all the heirs stand in the same
degree of relationship to the decedent." Per stirpes distribution is
taking "by stock" and not as individuals.'59 It is not limited in its
availability to those situations in which all the heirs are in the same
degree of relationship. The two methods of distribution can produce
different results.
FIGURE 3
11 Decedentj[
-I --- ----I I --
Grandchild-1 Grandchild-2 Grandchild-3!---------I------------I........
DECEDENT
Q PREDECEASED DECEDENT
Fj SURVIVED DECEDENT
3 Id. § 391.010(3).
154 Id. § 391.010(5)(b).
155 Id. § 391.010(5)(d).
"s Id.
"s Wagner v. Wagner, 197 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Ky. 1946) (finding that will provision to
"divide my property between A, B, and C" required a per capita distribution even though
A was the testator's child and B and C were the children of a predeceased child of the
testator).
.. Page, supra note 106, at 6.
1" Wagner, 197 S.W.2d at 89.
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In Figure 3 all of the heirs are in the same degree of relationship
to the decedent (grandchildren). Therefore, distribution per capita as
well as distribution per stirpes can be used. Under a per capita
distribution scheme, each of the three grandchildren, GC1, GC2, and
GC3, take one-third of the decedent's estate. Orthodox per stirpes
distribution, in contrast, requires the equal division of the decedent's
property among the stocks of descent. The stock is determined at the
generational level originally closest to the intestate. In Figure 3 each
person in the generation of heirs originally nearest the decedent who
survived the decedent or who left descendants who survived the
decedent is counted as one stock of descent. Because both C1 and C2,
the heirs originally nearest the decedent, left descendants who
survived the decedent, D's property is divided equally between the
two stocks of descent. Grandchild GCl will take the half of the estate
its parent Cl would have taken if Cl had survived D. Grandchildren
GC2 and GC3, the two children of C2, will take their parent's half of
the estate equally."6 Thus, GC2 and GC3 will each take a half of
a half, or a quarter, of D's estate.
Kentucky uses the orthodox per stirpes system.' Many other
jurisdictions, however, employ a modified form of per stirpes distribu-
tion." In those jurisdictions the number of stocks of descent for
representation purposes is determined at the first generation in which
there are both class members who survived the decedent and class
members who did not survive the decedent but who left descendants
who did. Kentucky uses per stirpes in the original meaning of the
term. The number of stocks of descent are always determined at the
first generational level of class members whether any, or all, of the
members of that class are dead." Figure 4 will be used to illustrate
the difference in the two meanings of per stirpes distribution.
" Martin v. Hull, 180 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. 1944) (holding that the two surviving
children of the intestate each took one-third of the estate while the remaining one-
third was divided equally between the four children of the intestate's predeceased
daughter).
1 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
16 E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-106, 8 U.LA. 64 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
1 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (descendants of
distributees take per stirpes); Kentucky Trust Co. v. Sweeney, 163 F. Supp. 450, 452
(W.D. Ky. 1958) (dividing the estate, at the death of the life tenant of a testamentary
tust, into stocks according to the number of siblings the decedent had had even though
none of the siblings survived).
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FIGURE 4
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Under the modified meaning of per stirpes, the number of stocks
of descent is determined at the grandchild level because it is the first
generational level where there are class members who survived the
decedent and class members who did not survive but who left
descendants who did. As grandchild GC2 survived D and both
grandchildren GC1 and GC3 did not, but left descendants who did,
the estate is divided into three stocks of descent. Great-grandchild
GGC1 takes the one-third of the estate that her parent GC1 would
have taken had GC1 survived D. Grandchild GC2 takes one-third of
the estate because GC2 survived D. The one-third of the estate
attributable to GC3 is divided equally between great-grandchildren
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GGC2 and GGC3 with each taking a half of a third, or one-sixth, of
D's estate.
Under Kentucky's definition of per stirpes distribution, the estate
in Figure 4 is divided into as many stocks of descent as there are
children-the first generation of class members-who survived D and
children who predeceased D but who left descendants who survived
D. Although D had three children, the estate is divided into only two
stocks of descent because only children C1 and C2 left descendants
who survived D. Great-grandchild GGC1 takes the half of the estate
that her grandparent Cl would have taken had C1 survived D.
Because grandchildren GC2 and GC3 would have shared their parent's
half of the estate equally if GC3 had survived D, grandchild GC2
takes one-half of that half, or a quarter, of D's estate. Predeceased
grandchild GC3's one-quarter share is divided equally between great-
grandchild GGC2 and GGC3. Each of them will inherit one-eighth of
D's estate.
Kentucky's insistence upon the use of per stirpes distribution in
its original meaning, or pure form, does violence to the widely
accepted idea that if the decedent's heirs are related to the decedent
in equal degree, they should inherit equal portions of the decedent's
estate.'" In Figure 3 all of the grandchildren stand in the same
degree of relationship to the decedent. Presumably, a person has the
same affection for one grandchild as another. Yet, grandchild GC1
takes one-half of the estate in Kentucky, while grandchildren GC2 and
GC3 each take one-quarter shares. Pure per stirpes distribution also
creates the anomalous results of Figure 4. Grandchild GCJ, the
intestate taker who stands in the closest degree of relationship to the
decedent, takes less (one-fourth of the estate) than the more remote
taker, great-grandchild GGCJ (one-half of the estate).
The modified interpretation of per stirpes distribution seeks to
prevent closer descendants from taking less than more remote
descendants of the decedent. It also seeks to treat all those takers in
the same degree of relationship to the decedent equally.
'1 See, eg., MCGOvE  Er AL., mspra note 7, § 1.3; UNI'. PROBATE CODE § 2-103,
8 U.LA 60 (1987).
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FIGURE 5
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The modified interpretation of per stirpes does not, however,
always produce the desired results. In Figure 5 both Kentucky's pure
per stirpes and the modified form of per stirpes distribution determine
the stocks of descent at the generational level nearest the decedent.
Kentucky always determines the number of stocks of descent at the
first generational level of the class. The modified per stirpes formula
also uses the first generational level under these facts because it is the
first level in which there are class members who survived D and class
members who did not survive D but who left descendants who did
survive. As there are three stocks of descent under either meaning
assigned to the term per stirpes, child C3, who stands in the nearest
degree of relationship to D, takes one-third of the estate as does great-
grandchild GGC1, who stands in the most remote degree of relation-
ship to D. Grandchildren GC1 and GC2, who are more closely related
to D than great-grandchild GGC1, take only one-sixth of the estate as
the descendants of child C1.
Another method of representation that would prevent those who
are more remotely related to the decedent from ever taking more than
those who are more closely related to the decedent is called "per
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capita at each generation." 65 This method, which has been adopted in
North Carolina,'" has the additional advantage of treating all those
class members of the same degree of relationship to the decedent equally.
For example, at the first level in Figure 5 where there are living takers
(the children level), the estate is divided into as many shares as there are
takers who survived D (one) and would-be takers who didn't survive D
but who left descendants who did (two). Child C3 takes one-third of the
estate, leaving two-thirds of the estate to be distributed. At the next
generational level in Figure 5 (the grandchild level), there are two
grandchildren, GC1 and GC2, who survived D as well as one grandchild,
GC3, who did not but who left descendants who did survive. Therefore,
the remaining two-thirds of the estate is divided into three shares.
Grandchild GC1 takes one-third of the remaining two-thirds of the estate,
or two-ninths, as does grandchild GC2. Because grandchild GC3 did not
survive D, there are two-ninths of the estate left to be distributed at the
great-grandchild level. Only one person, great-grandchild GGC1, exists
at that level; consequently, that great-grandchild takes the remaining two-
ninths of D's estate.
C. Degrees of Relationship
Many jurisdictions designate certain expressly named relatives such
as children, parents, siblings, and spouse as the decedent's intestate
takers."w In the absence of any named takers within this inner circle of
relatives, the property passes to the decedent's surviving relative who
stands in the closest degree of relationship to the decedent." If two or
more relatives are in the closest degree of relationship to the decedent,
these relatives share the estate equally.
Two methods exist for computing the degree of relationship of the
claimant to the decedent: the civil law method and the canon law
method.169 The former method of computation is more widely accepted
"6 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-15, 29-16 (1992); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§§ 2-103, 2-106 (West 1964) (adopting similar provisions).
'"Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's
System for Intestate Distribution Among Descendmts, 66 Nw. U. L REV. 626, 630 (1971)
(citing William L. Eagleton, Introdution to the Intestacy Act and the Dower Rights Act,
20 IOWA L. REV. 241, 244, 247-49 (1935)).
'6 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.11-.13 (Baldwin 1993).
16 Id.
'"ATKNSON, stupra note 3, at 44-49.
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than the latter.7 Under the civil law system, a person's degree of
relationship to the decedent is the sum of the number of generational steps
from the decedent up to the closest common ancestor of the decedent and the
claimant plus the number of generational steps down from that common
ancestor to the claimant."' The canon law methodology also involves the
counting of the generational steps from the decedent up to the common
ancestor and then down from the common ancestor to the claimant. However,
under the canon law method, the claimantt degree of relationship is not the
sum of these generational steps, but is the number of generational steps in the
longer of the ascending or descending lines." Regardless of which method
is employed, the claimant with the lowest numerical degree of relationship
would inherit the decedent! property.
FIGURE 6
I~tousin
Once
Removed DECEDENTSPRDECEASED DEDENT
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"o1 Id. at 45.
171 Id.
17 2 id.
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In Figure 6 the Decedent was survived by a paternal Great-Aunt and
a maternal First Cousin Once Removed. Using the civil law computation
method, the Great-Aunt stands in the fourth degree of relationship to
the Decedent. There are three generational steps from the Decedent to the
paternal Great-Grandparents (the ancestors who are common to the
Decedent and the paternal Great-Aunt), plus one generational step down
from the common ancestor to the Great-Aunt. Using the same method,
the First Cousin Once Removed stands in the fifth degree of relationship
to the Decedent. As the maternal Great-Aunt stands in the fourth degree
of relationship and the paternal First Cousin Once Removed stands in the
fifth degree, the Great-Aunt would inherit all of the Decedent's estate.
The results are different under the canon law method of computation.
There are still three generational steps in the ascending line from the
Decedent to the common ancestor as well as one generational step in the
descending line from the common ancestor to the Great-Aunt. In this case
the number of generational steps in the ascending line is the relevant
degree of relationship because it is the longer line. Therefore, the Great-
Aunt stands in the third degree of relationship to the Decedent. On the
maternal side, there are two generational steps from the Decedent to the
common ancestors (the Grandparents) and three generational steps from
the Grandparents to the First Cousin Once Removed. Because the number
of generational steps in the longer line determines the degree of
relationship, the First Cousin Once Removed is in the third degree of
relationship to the Decedent. As both claimants are equally related to the
Decedent, the maternal First Cousin Once Removed would share the
Decedent's estate equally with the paternal Great-Aunt.
In Kentucky, the degree of relationship between the claimant and the
decedent does not determine the identity of the decedent's intestate takers.
Rather, Kentucky uses a modified parentelic system of intestate inheri-
tance. 74 If the expressly named relatives do not survive the decedent,
the property passes to the nearest lineal ancestors and their descen-
ants.
175
1 See Appendix for detailed chart of Civil Law Degrees of Relationships.
'74 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
Id. Degrees of relationship are important in Kentucky, however, as a ground for
disqualifying a judge. Any judge or master commissioner must be disqualified -in any
proceeding where the judge, the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person, is a party, lawyer, material
witness, or one who is financially interested in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. §
26A.015(2)(d) (1992). For purposes of this statutory provision, the Attorney General has
held that the legislature intended to adopt the civil law method of computing the degree
of relationship. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 77-232 (1977).
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Im. STATUS AFFECTING INHERITANCE RIGHTs
The rules of intestate inheritance at the common law contained
numerous proscriptions against inheritance by certain categories of
claimants. For instance, a child born out of wedlock could inherit neither
land nor personalty from either decedent parent. 76 Although half-blood
relatives could inherit personalty," they had no claim to the decedent's
realty.17 8 Moreover, since adoption was not recognized at the common
law,79 inheritance rights of adoptees were never an issue. Although
citizens of friendly foreign counties could inherit in intestacy, their rights
were limited to succession to personalty, with no right to claim a share
of the decedent's land.' Such common law limitations on intestate
inheritance did not remain static, however. The history of intestate
succession in England, the United States, and Kentucky is one of gradual,
but uneven, elimination of status impediments to intestate inheritance.
A. Posthumous Heirs
A posthumous heir in Kentucky is an heir of the decedent who was
not alive at the decedent's death, but who was born of a widow within ten
months after the death of the intestate."8' Such a child inherits from the
In one case, the court disqualified a judge because one of the attorneys was the
judge's brother-in-law (that is, the attorney's wife was the judge's wife's sister). Middle
States Coal Co. v. Hicks, 608 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1980) (invalidating Op. Ky. Att'y Gen.
77-286, which determined that a brother-in-law of a judge was not within the third degree
of relationship to the judge and was not considered the spouse of someone within that
degree of relationship). A first cousin by consanguinity or affinity stands in the fourth
degree of relationship to the decedent and is not within the degrees of relationship
enumerated in the statute. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26A.015(2)(d) (Michie\Bobbs-
Menill 1992) (referring only to the third degree of relationship). Nonetheless, on at least
two occasions, Kentucky's highest court has disqualified a judge thus related to one of the
parties in order to avoid appearances of impropriety. Barnes v. Cooper, 507 S.W.2d 157,
160 (Ky. 1974) (judge's spouse was a first cousin to the spouse of the defendant); Wells
v. Walter, 501 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Ky. 1973) (judge's spouse was a first cousin of the
husband in a divorce action).
176 DUKBM & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 99-101.
'77 McGovERN ET AL., supra note 7, § 1.3, at 16 (citing 2 W. BLACKsTONE,
COMMEARIES 505 (1765)).
'7' Id. (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARE 224 (1765)).
17' Id. § 2.2, at 46.
'so ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 53-54.
. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1984) (inheritance by a
posthumous child).
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decedent "in the same manner as if [the child] were in being at the time
of the intestate's death."' For example, in Sansbeny's Executor v.
McElroy" the testator did not dispose of the reversion following a life
estate that he had created in his will in favor of his wife. Therefore, the
reversion passed by the laws of intestacy. Several months after the death
of the testator, his widow gave birth to a child. This posthumous child
shared equally in the reversion with the testator's children who had been
alive at the testator's death.'"
Given the ten-month gestation period incorporated into the statutes,
an issue of the legitimacy of a posthumous child may arise. A child born
during lawful wedlock or within ten months thereafter is presumed, by
statute, to be the child of the spouses."5 However, evidence showing
"that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten
(10) months prior to the birth of the child" can overcome this presump-
tion. " Only one reported case raises the issue of whether the claimant
was the posthumous child of the decedent. 7 In that case, the child was
born nine months after his mother moved out of the home of her
husband, the decedent, and seven months after the decedent died." The
court held against the claimant because the evidence established that the
decedent had suffered from Bright's disease, which made him incapable
of sexual intercourse for the twelve-month period prior to the birth of the
clamant.1s
9
If a claimant is a rightful posthumous heir of the decedent a judicial
proceeding after the decedent's death to which the posthumous child was
not a party cannot take away the heir's interest in the decedent's
estate."9 This is true regardless of whether the judicial proceeding
19 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 440 (1869).
l Id. at 441-42.
.s KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (presumption of
paternity).
' Id.; see also Bartlett v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 470, 472-73 (Ky. 1986)
(holding that human leukocyte antigens (BLA) blood testing is sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption that the husband is the father of a child born during the marriage).
1 Goss v. Froman, 12 S.W. 387 (Ky. 1889).
' Id. at 387.
"' Id. at 388-89.
"'o Cole v. Lewis, 169 S.W. 490, 492 (Ky. 1914) (holding that the judgment and sale
of decedent's land, which occurred after decedent's death but prior to the posthumous
heir's birth, did not deprive the posthumous heir of her interest in the land); Massie v.
Hiatt's Adm'r, 82 Ky. Op. 314, 318-20 (1884) (holding that a judicial sale of decedent's
land, which occurred after the decedent's death and after the birth of the posthumous
child, did not deprive the posthumous child of her interest, as she was not a party to the
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purporting to dispose of the land in which the posthumous heir has an
interest occurred before or after the birth of the posthumous heir.' The
posthumous heir may even recover against a remote grantee as well as
against the original purchaser of the intestate's land at a judicial sale of
the intestate's property." Additionally, the posthumous heir's interest
in the estate of the decedent passes upon the subsequent death of the
posthumous heir as an asset of the heir's estate. 93
Although all of the Kentucky cases involve a posthumous child of the
decedent the statutory language authorizes inheritance by posthumous
collateral relatives as well."n Thus, if the decedent dies survived by
only a sibling and the pregnant widow of a sibling who predeceased the
decedent, the later-born niece or nephew shares equally in the decedent's
estate with the surviving sibling.
B. Adopted Heirs
Because adoption was not recognized at the common law, 95 the
right of adoption in Kentucky is purely statutory."' In order for an
adoptee to qualify for inheritance as the child of the adopting parent,
strict compliance with the terms of the adoption statutes is essentialY7
For example, in one case, the court denied the allegedly adopted daughter
of the decedent any inheritance rights in her adoptive parent's estate
because the order of adoption was entered in county court instead of in
circuit court as required by the statutes in effect at the time of the
adoption.' The court refused to recognize a "de facto" adoption of the
sale).
* Compare Cole, 169 S.W. at 491 (child born after judgment and sale of land), with
Massie, 82 Ky. Op. at 316 (child born before judicial sale of land).
0 See Massie, 82 Ky. Op. at 319.
' Sansberry's Ex'rv. McElroy, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 440, 441-42 (1869) (holding that a
posthumous child's reversionary interest passed under the statutes of descent and
distribution at the child's death, which occurred while the life tenant was still alive).
1- KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (referring to a child
born "of a widow," not of the decedent's widow).
1s See supra note 179.
Profitt v. Evans, 433 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Ky. 1968) (holding that the claimant was
not properly adopted because the order of adoption was entered in the wrong court;
therefore, the claimant could not inherit from her adoptive mother).
"9 Carter v. Capshaw, 60 S.W.2d 959, 963 (Ky. 1933) (holding that the claimant was
not properly adopted because the wife of the adopting parent did not join in the petition
for adoption).
'L' Profitt, 433 S.W.2d at 876.
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claimant by the decedent199 even though the defective adoption proceeding
occurred more than fifty years earlier when the claimant was three years old
and even though there was ample evidence that the decedent had treated the
claimant as her child for all those years °°
If the claimant acquires the status of adopted child in another jurisdiction,
Kentucky recognizes the adoption unless the status so created or the rights
flowing from the adoption are repugnant to the public policy of Ken-
tucky °0 The application of this principle in a noninheritance case led to a
finding that even though Kentucky law does not provide for equitable
adoption,2 2 an equitably adopted child was entitled to a child's insurance
benefits under the Social Security Act °0 The equitable adoption of the
claimant had been accomplished in Ohio when the parent and child were
Ohio domiciliaries.2&4 The subsequent change of their domicile to Kentucky
did not destroy the adopted status the claimant attained in Ohio 05
Although the law of the form of the adoption determines the status of
an adopted child, °6 the law of the state in which the real property of the
decedent is located and the law of the decedent's domicile for personalty
govern the inheritance rights of an adopted heir.207 In one case, the
Kentucky courts did not permit a child who was adopted under New York
law to inherit in intestacy from the child's natural, paternal great-uncle208
The New York adoption was valid in Kentucky, but New York' intestacy
law, which preserved the right of adopted children to inherit from and
through their birth parents, was not applicable °9 The great-uncle's domicile
at death and the location of his assets was Kentucky;, therefore, Kentucky's
intestacy statutes, which "cut off' the adopted child's right to inherit from his
birth family, controlled.210
m Id. at 877.
200 Id.
20 Edmands v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Ky. 1958), overruled on different grounds
by Wilson v. Jolmson, 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965) (recognizing the validity of a
Washington adoption); Pyle v. Fischer, 128 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1939) (recognizing the
validity of an Indiana adoption); Moore v. Smith, 14 S.W.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Ky. 1929)
(recognizing the validity of a Colorado adoption).
=n MCGOVERN Er AL., supra note 7, § 2.2 (defining and discussing equitable
adoption).
' Rader v. Celebrezze, 253 F. Supp. 325, 329-30 (E.D. Ky. 1966).
' Id. at 326.
2 Id. at 330.
2 Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Ky. 1965), overruled on different growuds
by Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989).
' Id. at 52; see supra part I.B.
- Arcerlo, 397 S.W.2d at 52-54.
2 Id. at 52.
o Id.
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Since the enactment of the first general adoption statute in Kentucky in
1860,1' the inheritance rights of adopted heirs have been subject to
numerous statutory changes. The frequent changes in the adoption statutes
created a question whether the adoption statutes in effect at the time of the
adoption or the adoption statutes in effect at the death of the property owner
fixed the adopted child's inheritance rights. In Kolb v. Ruhl's Administra-
tor,12 for instance, the statute under which the child was adopted did not
permit an adopted child to inherit from an ancestor, a collateral relative, or a
birth child of the adopting parents. Ten years after the adoption, the
legislature enacted a new adoption law which removed these restrictions.2! "
The decedent died survived only by collateral relatives-cousins and
descendants of predeceased cousins-and the claimant who was the adopted
child of a predeceased cousin. The court permitted the claimant to share in
the intestate distribution of the decedent's estate because it applied the general
rule that the laws of succession in existence at the time of the death of the
property owner determine the heirs and distributees of a person dying
intestate 14 Thus, the adoption statutes in effect at the decedents death,
which permitted an adopted child to inherit from the collateral relatives of its
adopting parents, were controlling!"
This timing rule, however, has also worked to bar inheritance by an
adopted child. In Thornbeny v. Timmons216 the claimant's great-aunt
adopted her at a time when Kentucky permitted an adopted child to inherit
from both the child's birth and adopting parents. A subsequent amendment to
the adoption statutes eliminated an adopted child's right to inherit from her or
his birth parents after the adoption. Thereafter, when the natural, maternal
grandfather of the adopted child died, the child did not inherit from him
because the new statutory amendments controlled.217
For purposes of inheritance, Kentucky's present adoption statute"
places the adopted child on an equal footing with a birth child of the adopting
,u 1860 Ky. Acts ch. 741, §§ 1-3.
2 198 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1946).
2
'3 Id. at 327.
214 Id. at 328-29.
" Id. But see Kentucky Trust Co. v. Sweeney, 163 F. Supp. 450, 452 (W.D. Ky.
1958) (holding that in atestamentary situation, adoption statutes in effect at the expiration
of a life estate, not at the death of the testator, control); Breckinridge v. Skillman's
Trustee, 330 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1959); Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Ky.
1953).
26 406 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. 1966).
2'7 Id. at 152.
-1 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
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parents." 9 Not only does an adopted child inherit from his or her
adopting parents as their primary intestate taker, but the issue of an
adopted child who predeceases the adopting parents also inherit as the
adopting parent's grandchildren"20 Prior statutes did not permit inheri-
tance by the adopting parents from the adopted childe' The current
statute, however, places the adopted child in the same legal status as a
child born to the adopting parents and contemplates inheritance by the
adopting parents from the adopted child if the child predeceases her or his
adopting parents. Kentucky's earlier, more restrictive, adoption statutes
also did not permit an adopted child to inherit through her or his adopting
parents.' Today, because of the removal of the restrictive phraseology
of the former statutes, adopted children have the same status as birth
children including the right to inherit from their ancestors and collateral
relatives through the adopting parents m
The holdings of some prior cases presaged the statutory equalization
of the rights of adopted children and of birth children of the adopting
parents. For instance, in Atchinson v. Atchinson's Executorsm  the
surviving spouse of an adopting parent who joined in the petition of
adoption shared in intestacy with the adopted child just as the surviving
spouse would have if the decedent's surviving child had been a birth
child. 5 Also, in Lanferman v. Vanzi/, a case in which an adopted
child inherited real property from the adopting parent and then died an
infant without issue, the real property had been determined to pass, and
still does pass, under the ancestral property clause to the kindred of that
adopting parent 7 However, an earlier decisionm holding that dam-
ages for the wrongful death of an adopted child belong to the birth
- The statute provides that the adopted child "shall be considered for purposes of
inheritance ... the natural child of the parents adopting it the same as if born of their
bodies." IL
' Bailey v. Wireman, 240 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1951); Wilcox v. Sams, 281 S.W.
832, 833 (Ky. 1926); Power v. Haley, 4 S.W. 683, 685 (Ky. 1887).
221 Lanfennan v. Vanzile, 150 S.W. 1008, 1010 (Ky. 1912).
222 See, e.g., Woods v. Crump, 142 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1940) (holding that an
adopted child could not inherit under a grant from the parents of the adopting parent);
Merritt v. Morton, 136 S.W. 133, 134 (Ky. 1911) (holding that an adopted child could not
inherit in intestacy from the mother of his adopting parent).
=' KoIb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 198 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Ky. 1946) (allowing an adopted
child to inherit from the first cousin of the adopting parent).
12 S.W. 942 (Ky. 1890).
m Id. at 943-44.
2m 150 S.W. 1008 (Ky. 1912).
7Id. at 1010-11.
Jackson's Adm'xv. Alexiou, 3 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. 1928).
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parents and not the adopting parents 'is no longer viable under the
current adoption statutes.
Kentucky's current adoption statutes significantly increase the adopted
child's rights by authorizing inheritance from, through, and by the
adopting parents. The statutes also expressly eliminate any right of
inheritance from, through, or by the birth parents? For instance, in
Thornberry v. Timmons, a child did not share in her maternal grand-
father's estate as the issue. of her predeceased birth mother because of this
statutory bar to inheritance. After the death of her birth mother, the
child's great-aunt by birth had adopted her. The adoption was prior to her
grandfather's death. By virtue of the adoption, the child lost her status as
a natural grandchild of that grandfather and became an adopted niece who
could not then share in intestacy with his other natural-born grandchil-
dren 2
The statute does include an exception to its general rule eliminating
an adopted child's right to inherit from, through, or by the birth parents
from the time of adoption. 3 When a birth parent is the spouse of the
adopting parent, the statute leaves the adopted child in the family of the
parent who is being replaced by the adoption?4 Because the adopted
child is not excised from the family of the parent who is replaced by the
adoption in the case of a stepparent adoption, the child may inherit from
both birth parents as well as from the adopting stepparent. This statutory
exception for stepparent adoptions seems particularly persuasive when one
birth parent has died and the survivor has remarried. There is no reason
to suppose that the severance of all ties to the family of the deceased
birth parent is desirable for the child or necessary for the success of the
adoption.
The adopted child's loss of inheritance rights in her or his birth family
has withstood constitutional challenge as an impermissible bill of
attainder. 5  The court in Arciero v. Hager"36  recognized that
29 Id. at 179.
-0 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (MichielBobbs-Menill 1991).
2" 406 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Ky. 1966); cf. Kentucky Trust Co. v. Sweeney, 163 F. Supp.
450, 452 (W.D. Ky. 1958) (barring an adopted niece from sharing in a testamentary
devise in her natural uncle's will).
2 Thornbeny, 406 S.W.2d at 152.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Mezrill 1991).
23 Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989) (overruling Arciero v. Hager, 397
S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965)).
235 Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Ky. 1965), overruled on different grounds
by Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989).
2 397 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965).
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Kentucky's constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder relates only to
punishment for crimes and does not apply to adjustments in civil
inheritance rights. The court also determined that the legislation is not an
impermissible ex post facto law because it acts only prospectively to
define the inheritance rights of adopted children in the estates of birth
relatives who died after the passage of the statute. The children affected
by the statute, whether adopted before or after the passage of the statute,
did not have any fixed right to inherit from birth family members who
were alive when the act was passed. They had merely an unprotected
expectancy. 7
Kentucky also has a statute authorizing the adoption of an adult
which purports to give such adoptions the same legal effect as the
adoption of a minor. Despite the statute's clear language equating
adult adoptions to adoptions of minors, in Minary v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank & Trust Company " the court limited the statute's effect. If the
adult was adopted for the purpose of bringing the adoptee under the terms
of a pre-existing testamentary instrument and it is clear that the testator,
a stranger to the adoption, did not intend to include such person, then the'
adult adoptee will not qualify for inheritance under the will 2 In
Minary the testator left most of her estate in trust for her spouse and three
sons for life and provided for distribution of the trust, upon the death of
the last life tenant, to the testator's "then living heirs." Almost thirty years
after the testator's death, one of the sons adopted his wife as his child.
The wife survived the life tenants and claimed to be an heir of the
testator. The court did not permit her to share in the principal of the trust
created by her mother-in-law's will because to do so would have thwarted
the intent of the testator and cheated the rightful heirs
The decision in Minary does not foreclose all inheritance by adult
adoptees. If the testator under whose will the adopted child is claiming
was the adopting parent, not a stranger to the adoption, the result should
be different. Similarly, the rationale of Minary might not be applica-
ble if the testator executed the will after, not before, the adult adoption,
even if the testator was a stranger to the adoption. The Minary rule also
"Id. at 53-54.
m Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.390 (adoption of am adult).
419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967).
2A See id. at 344.
241 Id. at 343-44.
' See id. at 342 (citing Woods v. Crump, 142 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1940)).
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
should not be applied if there is any other indication that the testator
intended to include the adult adoptee.
The Minary holding is limited to adult adoptions affecting testamen-
tary, not intestate, inheritance. In Harper v. Martin,'3 a seemingly
inconsistent case decided after Minary, the court permitted an adult
adoptee to inherit in intestacy through the adopting parent. The court's
rationale for the decision was that because the decedent had not prepared
a will, the adult adoption did not thwart any testamentary plan.' In the
Harper case the adopting parent, an heir apparent of the decedent,
suffered from terminal cancer. As in Minary, the claimant was adopted
solely for the purpose of qualifying him for inheritance from the decedent
through the adopting parent. Most importantly, just as the testator in
Minary could not undo the effect of the adoption because she was dead,
the decedent in Harper could not undo the effect of this adoption because
he was a declared incompetent at the time of the adoption and remained
so until his death. Therefore, he lacked the capacity to make a valid will
disinheriting the adult adoptee.245
C. Out-of-Wedlock Heirs
At the common law, a child born to parents who were not legally
married to each other was stigmatized by society as a bastard and
characterized by the law as afilius nullius-the child of no one. The child
had no inheritance rights from anyone because, the child legally had no
parents.246
Today, the social stigma associated with an out-of-wedlock birth has
lessened. In keeping with this trend, the Kentucky legislature recently
amended its statutes to remove all reference to "legitimate," "illegiti-
mate," "bastards," or similar terms and substituted the less pejorative
terms "born in wedlock" and "born out of wedlock." ' 7 The law's
harshness has been mitigated in a number of other ways. For instance,
because the concept of being born out of wedlock has been narrowed
fewer births are so characterized.
At the common law, the offspring of parents who attempted to marry,
but failed to contract a valid marriage, were born out of wedlock.
552 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
24 Id. at 692.
z4s Id.
SDUKMDN & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 99-100.
24 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 16.
OLIVE M. STONE, FAMILY LAW 218-19 (1977).
[-Vol. 82
KENTUCKY INTSsTACY LAWS
Under the current Kentucky statute, the issue of all illegal and void marriages,
including incestuous marriages, are considered born in lawful wedlock' 9
Only children born to parents who never attempted to many before the birth
of the child are now classified as born-out-of-wedlock children.
The courts' liberal interpretation of this statute has futher narrowed the
meaning of "bom out of wedlock." For example, Kentucky does not permit
common law marriages. Nevertheless, in Copenhaver v. Hemphill
the court permitted a child to inherit real property located in Kentucky from
the paternal great-uncle, a Kentucky domiciliary, even though the child was
born of a common law marriage that was void even in the state where it was
contracted.' In Copenhaver the claimant parents were living together at
the time of her birth in Ohio, a state which permitted a couple to contract a
common law marriage. The evidence established that the parents' actions
would have constituted a common law marriage in Ohio but for the fact that
the mother lacked the legal capacity to contract a marriage of any type with
anyone because she was legally married to someone else. The court
nevertheless permitted the claimant to inherit from the decedent by character-izing her as the issue of a "void common law marriage!" Thus classified,
the statute then legitimated her.
There are other cases evidencing the courts' broad reading of KRS
section 391.100. Even if the parents enter into a marriage with the full
knowledge that one of the parents is still married to another, the issue are still
treated as born in wedlock' The statute also legitimates a child conceived
before, but born after, the void marriage of its parents. 5
It is both illogical and unjust to stigmatize and penalize the offspring of
liaisons between unmarried persons. Statutes which purport to bar or limit the
inheritance rights of such children do not deter sexual relationships between
29 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1984) (treating children
of illegal or void marriages as if born in lawful wedlock).
'0 Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507, 509-10 (Ky. 1975), rev'd on other
grouns, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977).
251 235 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1951).
2 Id. at 779.
m Id.
2m See Martin v. Cobum, 98 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Ky. 1937) (father still married to
another at time of second marriage); Leonard v. Braswell, 36 S.W. 684, 685-86 (Ky.
1896) (father still married to another at time of second marriage) (construing a former
version of KRS § 391.100).
25 Swinney v. Klippert, 50 S.W. 841, 841-42 (Ky. 1899) (holding that the child was
legitimate even though the child was conceived prior to the parents' attempted marriage,
which was invalid because the father's divorce from his first wife was not finalized until
two weeks after his second marrage).
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unmarried persons. Visiting the penalty for such relationships on the child
offends the basic concept that legal penalties should result from individual
wrongdoing. 6 Obviously, no child is responsible for the conditions of her
or his birth. In Kentucky, the trend toward ameliorating the harshness of the
common law's treatment of out-of-wedlock children culminated in the
invalidation of the statute" purporting to regulate the inheritance rights of
out-of-wedlock children. 8
The Kentucky statute at issue provided that an out-of-wedlock child could
inherit from her or his mother and her kindred and that they could, in turn,
inherit from the child. In contrast, an out-of-wedlock child could inherit
from and through her or his father only if the paients married and the father
acknowledged the child2 6 The same limitation applied to the right of the
father and his kindred to inherit from the out-of-wedlock child.26' Because
the United States Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon' invalidated a
similar state statute as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection to out-of-
wedlock children, the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the Kentucky
statute in Pendleton v. Pendleton63
In Pendleton the claimant was an out-of-wedlock infant child of the
decedent whose paternity had been established by a court adjudication during
the lifetime of the decedent. The claimant raised only the issue of the
constitutional validity of that part of the statute limiting an out-of-wedlock
child's right to inherit from her or his father.2! " Therefore, the child
challenge did not raise the issue of the statutory limitation on the father right
to inherit from his out-of-wedlock child. The court, however, did not
expressly limit its decision to the statutory restrictions on the rights of out-of-
wedlock children to inherit from their fathers. In a subsequent case, the
Kentucky Supreme Court in dicta characterized the Pendleton decision as
invalidating the statute "in toto."2M
As a result of Pendleton and its progeny, out-of-wedlock children had the
same inheritance rights as children born in wedlock. An Attorney General
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977).
KY. REV. STAT. § 391.090, repealed by 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 331.
" Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Ky. 1977).
s KY. REV. STAT. § 391.090(2), repealed by 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 331.
Id. § 391.090(3).
241 Id. § 391.090(1).
- 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
23 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977); cf. Rudolph v. Rudolph, 556 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977) (invalidating KY. REV. STAT. § 391.090 as violative of KY. CONST. § 2).
Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d at 539.
Fykes v. Clark, 635 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Ky. 1982).
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opinion interpreted Pendleton to mean that an out-of-wedlock child
inheriting from her or his father is entitled to claim a child's exemption
for inheritance tax purposes and is entitled to the same share in intestacy
as that of an in-wedlock child 2"' In a testamentary situation, the court
treated an out-of-wedlock child as the issue of his paternal grandfather for
inheritance purposes." In Murray v. Murray,2" the child's father, the
testator, died leaving a will gift to his own, already-deceased father.
Kentucky's antilapse statutes permit the issue of a beneficiary who
predeceases the testator to take the will gift that the beneficiary would
have taken if living.269 The court held that all of the grandchildren of
the testator's father, including the out-of-wedlock child of the testator,
were the grandfather's issue and thus entitled to share the will gift to their
grandfather.2 70
Subsequently, in Fykes v. Clark71 the court permitted a posthu-
mous, out-of-wedlock child to inherit in intestacy from his father. The
claimant was born seven months after the death of the decedent to a
woman who had never married the decedent. Although the putative father
was dead, the court permitted the claimant to establish that the decedent
was his father, and the claimant successfully established his paternity.
Thus, he had the same right to inherit from the decedent as did a child
born in wedlock to the decedent.2
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated Kentucky's statute
delimiting inheritance rights of out-of-wedlock children in 1977, the
Kentucky legislature did not enact a statute to fill the void created by the
Pendleton decision for almost a dozen years. In 1988, the legislature
adopted KRS section 391.105, establishing different statutory rules for
determining the rights of intestate succession for children born out of
wedlock depending on the gender of the parent from, through or by
whom the right of inheritance is claimed.273
Similar to its predecessor, KRS section 391.105 provides that an out-
of-wedlock child is the child of the natural mother.27 Without limita-
tion, the child can inherit from her and her kindred, and the mother and
' Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 77-412 (1977).
247Murray v. Murray, 564 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Ky. 1978).
2Id.
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394A00 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
Murray, 564 S.W.2d at 8.
635 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1982).
t2 Id. at 318.
m' 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 90, § 3.
2'4KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.105(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
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her kindred can in tam inherit without limitation from the out-of-wedlock
child. KRS section 391.105 expands the out-of-wedlock child right to
inherit from and through her or his father and the father' right to inherit from
his child. These rights, however, are not as generous as those afforded an out-
of-wedlock child whose mother dies intestate 5 If the biological parents
participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even
though the attempted marriage is void, the child may inherit from or through
the father.276 In addition, an out-of-wedlock child or the child' descendants
can inherit from or through the child biological father if there was either an
adjudication ofpatemity before the father died or an adjudication ofpatemity,
based upon clear and convincing evidence, after the fathers death.2
KRS section 391.105(1)(c) imposes the most onerous restrictions on the
right of the father or his kindred to inherit from or through the out-of-
wedlock child. An adjudication of paternity before the death of the out-of-
wedlock child is sufficient to confer a right of inheritance on the father and
his kindred.278 A posthumous adjudication of paternity alone, based upon
clear and convincing evidence, however, does not authorize inheritance by the
father or his kindred. The adjudication must be accompanied by evidence
demonstrating that the father "openly treated the child as his, and that [he] did
not follow a consistent policy of refusing to support the child on the ground
of nonpatemity."2
79
Because of the difficulty of proving paternity and the concomitant danger
of spurious claims, the United States Supreme Court authorized, and KRS
section 391.105 legislates, the use of the higher "clear and convincing"
standard ofproof when the claimant asserts a right to inherit in intestacy from
her or his putative father"0 or when the father of an out-of-wedlock child
claims a right to inherit from his putative child. In 1y4e v. Clark2 11 the
court addressed the issue of what quantum and type of evidence satisfies this
heightened standard of proof. The claimant in Jykes asserted that he was the
posthumous, out-of-wedlock child of the decedent. His proof consisted of
uncontradicted testimony from his mother, his paternal aunt, and a longtime
27' See id. § 391.105(1)(b).
z' Id. § 391.105(1)(a).
Id. § 391.105(1)(b).
" Id. § 391.105(1)(c)1.
I" d. § 391.105(l)(c)2.
2s0 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-72 (1977).
28 635 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1982); cf. I-ibbs v. Chandler, 684 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that the mother is not required to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the putative father was the child's father in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment in a paternity suit).
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friend of the decedent who was the uncle of the decedent's ex-wife. The
testimony of these witnesses established that the nature of the relationship
between the claimant's mother and the decedent was consistent with the
decedent being the father. It also established that the decedent had told
the witnesses that he was the father and that he and the claimant's mother
had planned to marry on the weekend that the decedent died. There was
also testimony from the witnesses that the claimant bore a physical
resemblance to the decedent. This proof satisfied the clear and convincing
standard Although the proof in the Fykes case was uncontradicted,
the court made it clear that this heightened standard does not require
uncontradicted proof. "[I]f there is proof of a probative and substantial
nature caring the weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinary
prudent minded people," then the standard of clear and convincing
evidence is satisfied.
Although the -ykes court permitted inheritance by a posthumous, out-
of-wedlock child, inheritance by a posthumous, out-of-wedlock child and
the alternative methods of establishing paternity for inheritance purposes
set out in KRS section 391.105 may not be constitutionally required. A
short time after invalidating an inheritance statute similar to Kentucky's
in Trimble v. Gordon, the United States Supreme Court decided Lalli
v. Lalli.' The Lalli Court sustained a New York inheritance statute
that provided only one, very restrictive, antemortem method by which an
out-of-wedlock child could prove paternity and inherit from her or his
father in intestacy. Under the New York statute, the child could inherit
only if a court order of filiation was obtained prior to the father's death.
Paternity was not at issue in Lalli because the decedent had acknowl-
edged paternity of the child in a notarized permission for the child to
marry. Nonetheless, the Court did not permit the child to inherit because
he lacked the required antemortem court order of filiation.'
The Trimble and Lalli decisions require much less generous inheri-
tance rights for out-of-wedlock children than Kentucky law presently
confers on them. The statute at issue in Trimble provided no method by
which an out-of-wedlock child could make herself or himself an heir of
her or his father. Only the father, by marrying the child's mother, could
confer heirship on his out-of-wedlock child.2 Consequently, the statute
' Id. at 318.
23Id. (quoting Clemens v. Richards, 200 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Ky. 1947)).
430 U.S. 762 (1976).
, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
See id. at 275.
2 Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764-65.
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denied equal protection to out-of-wedlock children. The Laii statute
avoided constitutional infirmity by providing a method by which an out-
of-wedlock child could force heirship on a reluctant father. The child, or
someone on behalf of the child, could initiate a filiation proceeding
during the father's lifetime.: Thus, as long as there is one method by
which the child can establish a right to inherit from her or his father,
even if that method is an antemortem method only, alternative or more
generous methods of qualifying an out-of-wedlock child for inheritance
rights in her or his father's estate are not constitutionally required.
D. Half-Blood Heirs
The term "half blood" refers to a collateral, consanguineous relative
of the decedent with whom the decedent shares only one common
ancestor rather than the usual two.' For instance, if the decedent and
a sibling have the same mother (the common ancestor), but have different
fathers, that sibling is a half-blood sister or brother of the decedent'
Similarly, if the decedent and a maternal cousin share the same maternal
grandmother (the common ancestor), but have different maternal
grandfathers, the cousin is a half-blood cousin to the decedent. A
decedent can only have half-blood, collateral relatives and cannot have a
half-blood ancestor or descendantO' For example, if the decedent has
children by a number of different spouses, all of the children are
descendants of the decedent and all are equally the children of the
decedent. The decedent is the full-blood parent of all of the children.
In many states half-blood heirs have the same inheritance rights'as
full-blood heirs. In Kentucky, by statute, collaterals of the half blood
"inherit only half as much as those of the wholeblood, or as ascending
kindred, when they take with either.' 3 The statutory reference to
ascending kindred was originally necessary because an earlier form of the
statute, which identifies the decedent's intestate takers, created a class of
2 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261-62.
" ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 50.
m9 Id. at 51.
291 Id. at 50-51.
2 Id. at 74; see also Morris v. Sparrow, 459 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Ky. 1970) (suggesting
that, without a statute to the contrary, a half-blood would share equally with those of the
full blood).
23 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984). This is the Scottish
system of inheritance for half bloods. See Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession Among
Collaterals, 20 IOWA L. REv. 185, 197 (1934-35).
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intestate takers comprised of the decedent's "mother, brothers, and
sisters." Under that statute it was possible for half-blood collaterals
(brothers and sisters) to inherit with ascending kindred (the decedent's
mother) s Currently, no statutory class of intestate takers includes
collateral and ascending kindred; 6 therefore, the reference to ascending
kindred is now meaningless.
To determine whether the half blood statute applies, one must
determine the class of intestate takers entitled to inherit under KRS
section 391.010, which establishes the order of descent and distribution
of the decedent's intestate property. Before any subsequent class of heirs
may take, all those in the preceding class must have predeceased the
decedent. If there is even one member of a preceding class alive at the
decedent's death, no member of a subsequent class may inherit. 7 Thus,
if siblings or their descendants, as well as aunts and uncles, survive the
decedent, under the statute, the siblings or their descendants 8 exclude
the aunts and uncles.5
Application of the half blood statute does not disturb these rules
about the order of descent and distribution of the decedent's property. If
descendants of predeceased half-blood brothers as well as whole-blood
aunts and uncles survive the decedent, the descendants of the half-blood
brothers take the entire estate to the exclusion of the whole-blood aunts
and uncles.' The half-blood takers belong to a class of intestate heirs
which precedes the class of "uncles and aunts and their descendants" in
the statutory order of inheritance."' In fact because the class first
entitled to take, "brothers and sisters and their descendants,"' 2 does not
include any full-blood heirs, the statutory provisions relevant to the size
of the share of half-blood heirs in relationship to full-blood heirs is
inapplicable. The provision only applies to the apportionment of the estate
294 See Milner v. Calvert, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 472, 475 (1858) (quoting the descent and
distribution statute in force at the time, which was Ky. Revised Statutes, Chap. 30, sec.
1.3, p. 279 (1852)).
29 Id. at 476 (holding that the mother of the deceased child took double the share of
the deceased child's half blood sister or brother).
m See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Meniil 1984).
297 Ryburn v. First Nat'lBank of Mayfield, 399 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. 1965) (holding
that a grandniece and a grandnephew could not contest the testator's will as they were not
intestate takers of the testator).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
Id. § 391.010(5)(b).
Ragland v. Shrout, 476 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Ky. 1972).
'0' See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.010.
2 Id. § 391.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1984).
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within a class of takers which consists of both full- and half-blood
claimants. If the class members are all half bloods, they not only exclude
members of all subsequent classes of potential heirs, but they also share
the estate equally among themselves."' 3
If there are both full-blood and half-blood heirs within the class, the
half blood statute applies. Even if some of the members of the class of
heirs predeceased the decedent but left issue who survived the decedent,
the half blood statute still applies as long as there are both full- and half-
blood heirs within the class.
FIGURE 7
IHalf-Blood I IHalf-Blood I Deednt u-B dt ister i Sister i Sis
--- 31;Z,
I Niece
DECE DENT D/O
Ej SURVIVED DECEDE Ir
us-m HAI.F-13LOODREAFONsIP
In Morris v. Sparrow" two sisters of the half blood and the
daughter of a ful-blood sister who predeceased the decedent survived the
decedent (see Figure 7). The presence of the full-blood niece did not
exclude inheritance by the decedent's half-blood sisters. Under the half
blood statute the niece merely took a share twice as large as the share of
30, Holmes V. ILate, 123 S.W. 318, 321 (Ky. 1909) (holding that the half-blood
maternal aunts and uncles inherited all of the realty that the infant decedent had inherited
from is mother).
'04 459 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1970).
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each half-blood sister; that is, the full-blood niece took one-half, and each
half-blood sister took one-fourth of the decedent's estate. 5
If the decedent is not survived by children, descendants of children,
parents, siblings, descendants of siblings, or a spouse, then KRS section
391.010 requires the division of the estate into two equal moieties."°
The half blood statute applies to the classes within each moiety, but not
between the moieties.
FIGURE 8
SDECEDENT
0 PREDEC-ASEDDECEDNTr
SURVIVED ECEDENT
-. HAL-BLOODRHAnONSHIPS
For example, in one case. 7 the decedent was only survived by
cousins (see Figure 8). There was one maternal half-blood first cousin
and a number of paternal cousins of the whole blood who were descen-
dants of paternal great-aunts and great-uncles of the whole blood. As
... Id. at 769.
3-6 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(1)-(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984); see supra
notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
3'7 Brown v. Sanders, 389 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1965).
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there were no heirs to inherit under any of the first four statutory classes of
intestate takers, the estate was divided into two moieties3 8 The half blood
statute applies to each moiety separately. Thus, the entire maternal moiety of
one-half of the estate passed to the maternal half-blood cousin while the
paternal full-blood cousins shared only the paternal half of the estate?
Since the class first entitled to inherit the maternal moiety included only a
half-blood and no full-blood claimants, the half blood statute had no
application at all to the distribution of this decedent's estate. The paternal
cousins had no claim to the maternal moiety and the half blood statute did not
create any new right to share in that moiety.
When half-blood and full-blood claimants compete to inherit real property
that the decedent took from a parent, both the ancestral property statute'
and the half blood statute3 " may apply. If the decedent was an infant
without issue, any real property derived by gift devise, or descent from one
of the decedent's parents descends to that parent and to that parent's kindred
under the ancestral property statute 2
FIGURE 9
Ote ..... man ..... .. r... ..... u~u w . .=u Father MteI
I Sibling 1 Sibling 1 Sibling ! I Sibling ! Sibling I at[!Sibling I
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El PREDIECEASED DECE:3DENTT
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In White v. Hogge"' the infant decedent died owning realty that he
had inherited from his father. Only two whole-blood siblings and four half-
318 Id. at 78.
3 9 Id. at 79.
310 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
311 Id. § 391.050.
3 Id. § 391.020(2).
3' 291 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1956).
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blood siblings, who were the children of the decedent's father from a first
marriage, survived the infant (see Figure 9). The half blood statute would
be applicable if the decedent's siblings had inherited the ancestral
property @s collateral relatives of the decedent. The two full bloods would
each then inherit one-fourth of the realty and the four half-blood siblings
would each take a one-eighth interest. In two previous decisions of
Kentucky's highest court, this was the result.
14
In the White case, however, the court reconsidered its earlier
interpretation of the ancestral property clause and concluded that the
descent of ancestral property of an infant who dies without issue is
determined by the relationship of the claimants to the parent who gave
the property to the decedent, rather than by the relationship of the
claimants to the infant decedent."5 In White the claimants, two whole-
blood and four half-blood siblings of the decedent, were all descendants
of the father."6 Because a person never has descendants or ascendants
of the half blood, the descendants of the parent, the father, were all full
bloods. As a result, the half blood statute was inapplicable and each child
took a one-sixth interest in the ancestral property.
The half blood statute is also applicable when the class entitled to
take is composed of out-of-wedlock, half-blood heirs and out-of-wedlock,
full-blood heirs of the decedent.1 7 If the decedent is survived by three
siblings with whom the decedent shared the same mother, but only two
of those siblings shared the same father with the decedent and the
decedent's mother never married either of the fathers, the half blood
statute applies. The half-blood, out-of-wedlock child of the decedent's
mother inherits a share that is one-half the size of the share of the out-of-
wedlock, full-blood sibling of the decedent.1 This was the result even
before the Kentucky legislature gave out-of-wedlock heirs the same
inheritance rights as heirs born in wedlock 19
After determining that the half blood statute is applicable, one must
still determine the size of the claimants' shares. In ascertaining the
314 Talbott's Heirs v. Talbott's Heirs, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 1, 6 (Ky. 1856), overruled
by White v. Hogge, 291 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1956); King v. Middlesborough Town & Lands
Co., 50 S.W. 37 (1899), ovemded by White v. Hogge, 291 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1956).
"n White v. Hogge, 291 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Ky. 1956).
316 Id at 23.
31 Stevenson v. Washington's Adm'r, 21 S.W.2d 274, 275-76 (Ky. 1929); cf. West
v. Hardwick's Ex'r, 191 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Ky. 1946) (finding the teim 'heirs" to include
relatives of the half blood unless the testator intended otherwise).
31S Stevenson, 21 S.W.2d at 275.
39 Id. at 275-76.
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number of shares, every full-blood collateral who is entitled to inherit
counts twice and every half-blood collateral counts only once.' If
there is one whole-blood and one half-blood heir, the estate is divided
into thirds. The whole blood is entitled to twice as much of the estate, or
two-thirds, while the half blood takes one-third.32 If there are eight
claimants in the class entitled to take and seven of them are half-blood
heirs, the estate is divided into nine shares. The seven half bloods count
once and the one whole blood counts twice in determining the proper
fractional division of the decedent's property. The whole blood takes a
two-ninths share and each half blood takes half as much, or a one-ninth
share.3m
E. Step Heirs
A "step" relationship is not a sufficient legal relationship to the
decedent to give rise to any right to share in the estate of the "step"
relative.3' Perhaps the unwillingness to give legal recognition to such
a relationship, regardless of its ddration; comes in part from the difficulty
of defining "step" relationships. The complex family situations that often
give rise to "step" relationships create a number of questions regarding
the formation of such relationships. Must a stepchild be a minor in order
to create a "step" relationship, or is the stepchild's age immaterial? Does
the "step" relationship terminate upon the divorce of a stepparent and a
biological parent? Must one of the child's biological parents be dead in
order for a "step" relationship to exist between the child and the new
spouse of the other biological parent? Does a stepparent-stepchild
relationship arise when the child is born out of wedlock and the
biological mother marries someone other than the biological father? If
both biological parents remarry, does the child form a "step" relationship
with both of the new spouses or only with the new spouse of the
biological parent with whom the child resides?"
"z' Nixon's Heirs v. Nixon's Adm'r, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 5, 7 (1839).
32' Covington v. Beck, 292 S.W. 752, 753 (Ky. 1927) (holding that the fall-blood
brother took two-thirds and the half-blood sister took one-third); cq: Brown v. Saunders,
389 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ky. 1965) (finding that the appellants incorrectly proposed a division
of the estate of three-quarters to whole-blood claimants and one-quarter to half-blood
claimant).
32 Nixon's Heirs, 38 Ky. (8 Dana). at 10.
32 Culleton v. Keun, 39 S.W. 511, 512 (Ky. 1897) (stepson had no claim in
stepfather's estate even though his mother contributed significantly to its formation).
"A See Bernard J. Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Rep" Relationship:
Cinderella Revisited, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209 (1970) (exploring when and under what
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F. Alien Heirs
Aliens did not suffer any disabilities with respect to the acquisition,
ownership or transfer of personalty at the common law, but they did with
respect to land.' Aliens could take real property by purchase or
devise, but not by descent (that is, they could inherit land by will, but not
in intestacy), and the land was subject to seizure by the sovereign at any
timeY Even if the sovereign did not exercise that right during the
alien's lifetime, the realty could not pass by either intestate or testate
inheritance at the death of the alien."
While a number of Kentucky statutes relax some of the common law
limitations on an alien's ability to acquire, hold or transfer land, the
statutes do not remove all of the disabilities.3' These statutes are in the
form of "enabling acts" that do not change the common law except to the
extent that the common law is inconsistent or repugnant to the stat-
utes.' In Kentucky, for example, a nonresident alien may hold real
property acquired in any manner, including acquisition by descent or
devise, for a period of eight years.33' This partially removes one of
the disabilities that aliens suffered under the common law by enabling the
alien to hold the property for the statutory period against the state, or
sovereign.
3
If the nonresident alien does not dispose of the land within the
stipulated time period, however, the common law power of the sovereign
circumstances a stepparent's obligation to support a stepchild will arise).
32ANSON, supra note 3, at 53-54.
Ripley v. Von Zedtwitz, 256 S.W. 1106, 1107-08 (Ky. 1923) (holding that real
estate that is devised to a nonresident alien and that is not disposed of within the
eight-year statutory period does not pass to the testator's next of kin capable of inheriting
because only the state may challenge the right of an alien to hold real property).
7ATKINsoN, supra note 3, at 54.
3 See KY. REy. STAT. AN. §§ 381.290 (alien's property rights); 381.300 (escheat
provisions); 381.310 (spouse and children of citizens); 381.320 (alien'srights topersonalty
and rights to real property, if the alien is a nonresident); 381.330 (right of nonresident
alien to inherit real property); 381.340 (distribution of property on the death of a
nonresident alien); 391.030(1)(b) (descent of personalty); and 391.060 (title may be
inherited through an alien) (Michie/Bobbs-Menrill 1992).
3 Ripley, 256 S.W. at 1108.
330 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.330 (Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (right of nonresident
aliens to inherit real property).
.. Id. § 381.300(1) (realty of nonresident alien liable to escheat after eight years).
Also, the alien heir takes subject to any dower rights of the alien's surviving spouse.
Eustache v. Rodaquest, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 42, 46 (Ky. 1874).
SRipley, 256 S.W. at 1108.
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is restored. The State may elect at any time thereafter to escheat the
property,33 although there is no automatic reversion to the State. The
land stays with the nonresident alien unless the State affirmatively
exercises its power to escheat the property by bringing an action in circuit
court." The State is the only party legally capable of enforcing the
eight-year limitation period through its escheat powers. 35 Even if the
nonresident alien acquires the land by descent or devise, the decedent's
relatives who would have inherited after the alien may not complain if the
alien holds the land beyond the permissible time period.3"
The statutes are not completely integrated into a unified system
defining the rights of aliens who acquire an interest in real or personal
property in Kentucky. For example, one statute purports to eliminate all
impediments to any alien's right to inherit intestate personalty.u7
Another statute, however, imposes two limitations on an alien's ability to
take and hold personal property in the same manner as a citizen. Only
friendly aliens may take personalty as a citizen would, and chattels real
(leaseholds) are expressly excluded from the term "personalty."'3
The statutes are riddled with distinctions between the rights of
resident aliens in the process of naturalization, resident aliens not in the
process of naturalization, and nonresident aliens. Resident aliens in the
process of naturalization suffer no disabilities as they are expressly
permitted to inherit, hold, and pass by descent, devise, or otherwise any
interest in personal or real property."9 Resident aliens who are not in
the process of naturalization may hold real property acquired for the
purpose of a residence, occupation, business, or trade for as long as they
remain residents of the state." During their residency, such aliens have
all the rights, remedies, and exemptions concerning their real property as
would a citizen." Presumably, this includes the right to transmit the
real estate so held at death by either descent or devise. The statutes do
not expressly resolve the dilemma posed by a resident alien who holds
land for one of the purposes enumerated above but later ceases to be a
- KY. REV. STAT. AN-N. § 381.300(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992).
3 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 76-332 (1976).
33s Ripley, 256 S.W. at 1108; see Commonwealth v. Tamer, 169 S.W.2d 19, 20-21
(Ky. 1943) (holding that the board of education of the district in which the property is
located or the attorney general may institute suit in the name of the Commonwealth).
"36Ripley, 256 S.W. at 1108.
317 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.030(1)(b) (Micbie/Bobbs-Menill Supp. 1992).
33 Id. § 381.320.
3 Id. § 381.290.
uo Id. § 381.320.
341 id.
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resident of the state. Logically, the statute imposing an eight-year limit
on the holding of real property by a nonresident alien 2 should become
applicable and begin to run.
Regardless of the manner of acquisition, nonresident aliens may take
and hold real property for eight years."s If nonresident aliens obtain
possession of real estate by descent or devise and die before the
expiration of the term limiting their right of enjoyment or sale, they are
expressly given the power to pass such rights by descent or devise.'
If the heir or devisee is also a nonresident alien, KRS section 381.300 is
unclear as to whether the alien merely has the remainder of the decedent's
eight-year term before the State can escheat the property or whether
inheritance by a nonresident alien begins a new period of holding under
the statutes. 4
The legislature has placed numerous limitations on the State's escheat
power. For example, the State's power to escheat the real property of
aliens is eliminated if the alien becomes a citizen of the United States
before the State has escheated the property.' Similarly, any purchaser,
lessee, heir or devisee of an alien's real property who is a United States
citizen takes the land free from any right of the State to thereafter
exercise its power of escheat. 7 This is true even if the State had a
present right to escheat the land before the purchase, lease, descent, or
devise. None of the limitations placed on the right of resident and
nonresident aliens to take and hold real or personal property by devise,
purchase, descent, or distribution apply if the alien's spouse is a United
States citizen" In addition, regardless of where the alien was born, the
limitations imposed by these statutes are inapplicable if either the mother
or the father of the alien was an American citizen at the time of the
alien's birth. 4
If a trustee who is an American citizen holds real property on active
trust for the benefit of a nonresident alien beneficiary, an interesting
question arises whether the statutes limiting aliens' rights to acquire, hold
and dispose of real property apply. In one case addressing this issue,' "
342 1d. § 381.300(1).
Id.; id. § 381.330.
'"Id. § 381.300(2).
34 See id
- Id. § 381.300(2).
30 Id. § 381.310.
349 Id.
3" Ripley v. Von Zedtwitz, 256 S.W. 1106 (Ky. 1923).
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the court assumed, but expressly did not decide, that the land was subject to
the statutory limitations.3 " Two subsequent opinions of the Kentucky
Attorney General provide support for the proposition that such property
should not be subject to escheat by the State.3' In both opinions the
Attorney General found that the escheat provisions were inapplicable to real
property if the real property was held by a Kentucky corporation formed by
a nonresident alien or if the corporation's shares were partially or wholly
owned by a nonresident alien. The opinions reasoned that the owner of stock
in a corporation does not become the legal owner of the corporationt real
property and cannot deal with the corporate property as if it were the stock-
holders own property. Rather, the stockholder owns stock in the corporation,
which is a personalty interest. The law does not treat the stockholder as the
legal owner of the corporate assets absent fraud or other special
circumstances.353 Thus, the distinction between the corporation and its
shareholders shields the real property from the escheat provisions applicable
to nonresident aliens.
This same reasoning can be applied in the trust context. Legal title to the
trust property is in the trustee and only equitable title is in the beneficiary.
Neither the trustee nor the beneficiary can ignore the existence of the trust
and treat the property as if it were a nontrust asset of the beneficiary.3 The
courts enforce this division of ownership between the trustee and beneficiary
absent fraud or other special circumstances?55 Based on the distinctions
between the trust and its beneficiaries and between property of the trust and
the equitable ownership interest of the beneficiaries, real property in a trust
ought not to be subject to escheat even if some or all of the beneficiaries are
nonresident aliens.'
Kentucky statutory limitations and restrictions on the ability of aliens to
acquire, hold, and transfer real property also raise a number of constitutional
questions. An opinion of the Kentucky Attorney General concludes that the
statutes are constitutional unless they are contrary to a treaty between the
United States and the country of which the alien is a citizen?' The
opinion, however, is conclusory in nature and no Kentucky case expressly
addresses the constitutionality of these statutes.358
5 Id. at 1108.
Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 78-585 (1978); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 77-576 (1977).
3 Op. Ky. Att'y Gem 78-585 (1978); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 77-576 (1977).
's AusTN W. ScoTr, ABRiDGmBNT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.7, at 130 (1960).
's GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 9 (6th ed. 1987).
316 Contra 3A AM. JUa. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 2014 (1962).
3r" Op. Ky. Att'y Gem 81-248 (1981).
358 Id.
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment com-
mands that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.:" The amendment's protection depends
upon a territorial concept, not citizenship. Therefore, resident aliens are
within, ° while nonresident aliens are probably outside, the equal
protection guarantees of the United States Constitution."
The precedential value of early decisions ' of the United States
Supreme Court that sustained state statutes restricting alien ownership of
real property is very limited. The Court decided these cases before it
began to treat alienage as a suspect class.' State laws which discrimi-
nate against a suspect class are subject to a strict scrutiny review.'
The statutes are usually struck under this level of scrutiny because the
state cannot show that the classification is strictly necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court has
characterized the alienage cases reviewed under the compelling state
interest standard as involving statutes that withheld from aliens economic
benefits that were generally available to citizens. The Court reasoned that
resident aliens, like citizens, contribute to the economic welfare of the
state through the payment of taxes. Therefore, absent some compelling
state interest, a state cannot discriminate against aliens in the allocation
of economic benefits.' 5 Under the strict scrutiny standard of review,
then, Kentucky's statutes restricting the rights of resident aliens to
acquire, hold, and transfer real property would be struck as an impermis-
sible denial of equal protection.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has employed the less
stringent rational relation tests" to determine and sustain the validity of
3- U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Yick We v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that Chinese subjects
living in San Francisco were entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection).
' De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877
(1975).
' Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (holding that a state may prohibit
landholding by an alien ineligible for American citizenship); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326
(1923) (holding that a state may forbid indirect ownership of agricultural land through a
corporation when the majority of the corporation's stockholders are aliens).
" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (treating alienage as
inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny; holding a statute denying welfare
benefits to be unconstitutional).
3" E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438 (1982) (holding that a statute denying
resident aliens the right to be employed as deputy probation officers is constitutional).
' Id at 438-40 (holding that alienage restrictions of economic interests are subject
to a rational relation, and not a strict scrutiny, test).
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statutory classifications based on alienage.? If Kentucky' statutes on the
rights of resident aliens in real property were reviewed under this less
demanding standard, the statutes would be sustained.
By its express terms, the Due Process Clause is not limited in its
application by the territorial considerations embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause. A state may not deprive "any person!' of property without due process
of law."6 Procedural due process must be accorded to nonresident as well
as resident aliens before they can be deprived of a validly acquired interest
in real property. 69 Other escheat statutes in Kentucky similar to the ones
applicable to aliens have been upheld as satisfying the due process guarantees
of the Constitution as long as the state provides an opportunity to be
heard.370 The escheat statutes applicable to aliens do provide an alien with
an opportunity to be heard in satisfaction of the due process
requirements' Consequently, the statutes regulating aliens' rights in real
property probably satisfy the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Provisions in treaties between the United States government and other
foreign nations conferring procedural and substantive rights on foreign
nationals with respect to land ownership in the United States supersede any
contray Kentucky statutes. Treaties, like valid acts of Congress, are part of
the supreme law of the land.
Congress could preempt all state laws purporting to regulate alien
ownership of real property if it chose to do so. Under the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution,373 Congress has extensive powers to
regulate both interstate commerce and commerce with foreign countries. This
power no doubt encompasses the power to enact a comprehensive federal
plan of alien land ownership.374
3" E.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 79-81 (1979) (holding a New York statute
denying resident aliens the right to be employed as elementary and secondary school
teachers to be constitutional); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-300 (1978) (holding
a New York statute denying resident aliens the right to be employed as police officers to
be constitutional).
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... :1.
See David A. Williams, Note, Alien Ownership of Kansas Famland" Can It Be
Prohibited?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 514, 526 (1981).
370 Anderson Nat'lBank v. Reeves, 172 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky. 1943) (holding that a
statute allowing dormant bank accounts to escheat to the state did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment), affid sub nom. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233
(1944).
' Op. Ky. Att'y Gem. 81-248 (1981).
37 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3- U.S. CONST. W ll I 8,§ notl. 3.374 See Wilim, acpra note 369, at 528.
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IV. CONDUCT AFFECTING INhERiTANCE RIGHTS
Generally, neither moral unworthiness nor misconduct, even of a
criminal nature, disqualifies an heir from inheritance. Thus, a scoundrel
or a thief may succeed to the decedent's property. Kentucky, however,
bars succession to the property of the decedent when the claimant has
engaged in certain statutorily defined conduct.
A. Homicide
Prior to the adoption of KRS section 381.280, Kentucky case law
barred an insurance policy beneficiary who had feloniously killed the
insured, regardless of the motive, from taking the proceeds of the
policy. 5 The rationale was that the beneficiary's wrongful act was a
fraud upon a contract right- The case law also evidenced an unwillingness
to permit testate inheritance by a will beneficiary who murdered the
testator.37 An intestate taker, however, who murdered the decedent did
not forfeit the right to take the victim's property in intestacy." The
justification for this shocking rule was that intestate succession is
controlled entirely by statute. Since the statute on descent and distribution
did not bar a murdering heir or distributee from intestate inheritance, the
court would not engraft a forfeiture provision onto the statutes.
In 1940, the Kentucky legislature adopted KRS section 381.280,"' 8
which codified the case law prohibitions against inheritance by a
murdering will or insurance beneficiary. The statute also expanded the
prohibition to include a murdering intestate taker or a murdering joint
tenant with right of survivorship. The statute provides that a spouse,
intestate taker, will beneficiary, joint tenant with right of survivorship, or
beneficiary under any insurance policy who is convicted of feloniously
killing the decedent forfeits all interest in and to the decedent's proper-
ty.'7 The forfeited property interest "descends to the decedent's other
heirs at law, unless otherwise disposed of by the decedent." '
"75 National Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Hood'sAdm'r, 94 S.W.2d 1022, 1023 (Ky.
1936) (disallowing a wife who killed her husband and was convicted of the felony from
collecting the proceeds of the policy).
376 Eversole v. Eversole, 185 S.W. 487, 488 (Ky. 1916) (implying in dicta that one
who kills a testator for the purpose of obtaining the testator's property should not receive
the property).
377 Id.
3' 1940 Ky. Acts ch. 97.
3" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
310 Id.
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There are two prerequisites to the operation of the statute's forfeiture
provision: (1) the murderer must be convicted of the homicide, and (2)
the conviction must be for a felony. The criminal conviction requirement
restricts the effectiveness of the statute. For example, in the case of a
murder-suicide, the statutory prerequisites to forfeiture cannot be satisfied
as there cannot be a conviction of the wrongdoer because of the suicide.
In such a case, the statute is inapplicable." 1 Similarly, if the murderer
is prosecuted, but acquitted, the forfeiture provision does not apply.
This anomalous situation arises because the policy considerations and
the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution are different from those at
work in the civil context. In the civil context it is axiomatic that a
wrongdoer should not profit from the wrong committed, and the
wrongdoing need only be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.' Succession to property is a civil, not a criminal, matter.
Therefore, a probate court should be able to determine by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a felonious killing has occurred and bar the
wrongdoer from succession to the property of the victim even absent a
criminal conviction or in spite of an acquittal.'
The statutory requirement that the wrongdoer must be convicted of
a felony rightfully precludes forfeiture if the decedent's life is taken in
self-defense3" or under circumstances which result only in a misde-
meanor offense.38 Neither situation involves wrongdoing of such a
nature as would warrant the forfeiture of inheritance rights. However, the
statute sweeps too broadly because forfeiture is not limited to instances
of intentional felonious killings. As compared to a person who intention-
ally or wantonly and recklessly causes the death of the decedent, a person
who is guilty of an accidental manslaughter killing of the decedent is not
very culpable. Nevertheless, because manslaughter is a felony, such a
person presently comes within the statute's forfeiture provision.'
381 Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Ky. 1954) (allowing estate of husband
who immediately committed suicide after killing his wife to take half of wife's estate).
3 National Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Hood'sAdm'r, 94 S.W.2d 1022, 1023 (Ky.
1936).
3- See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 cnt., 8 U.LA. 172 (1982).
3" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Prater, 508 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (allowing
husband who killed wife in self-defense to collect the proceeds of an insurance policy).
381 Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky.
1966) (allowing wife convicted of misdemeanor of involuntary manslaughter to collect
insurance proceeds from a policy on husband's life).
3.6 The forfeiture statute withstood state constitutional challenges in Wilson v. Bates.
See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
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The courts have characterized KRS section 381.280 as being "in the
nature of a statutory exception to the statute[s] of descent and distribu-
tion." Its forfeiture provision only applies in situations involving
postmortem succession to property. Thus, the court found the statute to
be irrelevant in determining whether a wrongful death action could be
brought against a killer who was the spouse of the victim but who had
not been convicted of the crime.3
The forfeited property interest of a killer whom the statute bars from
sharing in the victim's estate must be disposed of in some manner. The
statute provides that the interest descends to the victim's other heirs
unless otherwise disposed of by the decedent.3s In the situation of
intestate and testate succession, the courts have interpreted the statute to
mean that the forfeited property passes as if the murderer were not alive
at the victim's death.3' The courts have also limited the application of
the statute to the one who committed the wrongful act. Thus, in Bates v.
Wilson 3 1 a son was convicted of killing both of his parents, and his
daughter took his share of his parents' estates.' The child of the
wrongdoer in Bates inherited as if her father had predeceased his parents
because the statute does not prohibit the innocent child of the wrongdoer
from inheriting the share that the murderer would have taken but for the
murder and the conviction.
In Wilson v. Bates,93 the companion case to Bates, the court
determined that the murdering son never acquired any interest in his
parents' estate. Consequently, his attempt, prior to his conviction, to
mortgage a one-half interest in the victims' property was a nullity.
Conviction is merely the judicial determination that the murderer has
forfeited all right to inherit from the victim. According to the court, the
murderer actually forfeits the right to inherit from the victim immediately
prior to the death of the victim?' No part of the victim's estate ever
vests in the wrongdoer.
31 Moore v. Citizens Bank of Pikeville, 420 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Ky. 1967).
I/d.
3- KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie/Bobbs-Merri 1972).
31* Bates v. Wilson, 232 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Ky. 1950) (treating son who was convicted
of feloniously murdering his parents as though he had predeceased his parents); Pierce v.
Pierce, 216 S.W.2d 408, 408 (Ky. 1948) (treating son who was convicted of feloniously
killing his father as though he had never been born).
a1 232 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1950).
"9 Id. at 838.
3- 231 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1950).
31 Id. at 41.
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In Pierce v. Pierce,395 another case involving a son who was
convicted of killing his parent, the court found that the statute operates
only as a bar to the son's right to inherit his father's property. It did not
forever bar the convicted murderer from acquiring title to the victim's
property from some other source. 9 Because the son was treated as if
he were dead at the death of his father, the father's property passed to his
father (the murderer's paternal grandfather). Later, the grandfather made
a contract which purported to require the grandfather to sell the inherited
land to his grandson, the convicted killer of the decedent. The court
determined that KRS section 381.280 did not make the contract unen-
forceable, even though by the contract the murderer would acquire title
to the same property that he would have inherited but for the murder. 7
KRS section 381.280 also bars a convicted murderer from taking as
the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the victim's life. However, by
barring the beneficiary from taking the insurance proceeds, the statute
does not relieve the insurer of its contractual obligation. The insurer must
pay those who are next entitled to the insurance proceeds upon the failure
of the named beneficiary to take.39
In National Life Insurance Co. of Montpelier, Vermont v. Hood's
Administrator,399 a prestatute case, the decedent had not named an
alternative beneficiary. Consequently, the insuance proceeds became an
asset of the insured's estate and passed as personalty to the insured's
personal representative. The court expressly refused to decide whether the
murderer, the insured's wife, could share in the distribution of the
proceeds after they were paid over to the deceased's personal representa-
tive." At the time of the decision a convicted murderer could inherit
in intestacy from the victim.4"' Now, however, the statute specifically
bars intestate inheritance by a convicted murderer of the decedent.
The beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of the insured who is
convicted of killing the insured forfeits all right to share in the proceeds
of the insurance as either a beneficiary under the policy or an intestate
taker.403
' 216 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1948).
3- Id. at 409.
37 Id.
3' First Ky. Trust Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 557, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1984).
3- 94 S.W.2d 1022 (Ky. 1936).
4 Id. at 1025.
40' See Eversole v. Eversole, 185 S.W. 487, 488 (Ky. 1916).
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie/Bobbs-MeniIU 1972).40 id.
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In First Kentucky Trust Company v. United States," a federal case
applying Kentucky law, a husband convicted of killing his wife was the
designated beneficiary on four insurance policies on the life of the wife.
The statute, however, expressly barred the husband from directly taking
the insurance proceeds. The alternative beneficiaries on the policies were
the husband's executors or administrators. According to Kentucky
law, if the beneficiary of an insurance policy predeceases the insured, the
proceeds go to the alternative beneficiaries. Moreover, Kentucky case law
treats a murdering insurance beneficiary as if she or he had predeceased
the insured. Nonetheless, the court determined that the proceeds could not
pass to the alternative beneficiaries because the alternative beneficiaries
were the killer's personal representatives and the murderer cannot share
in any manner in the proceeds. Instead of being forfeited to the company
on the failure of both the primary and alternative beneficiaries, the
proceeds of the policies became payable to the estate of the insured.4
Even though the primary beneficiary on an insurance policy is
convicted of killing the insured, if the insurance policy is not valid, the
alternative beneficiaries on the policy or the estate of the insured will not
take the proceeds of the policy. In Coyler's Administrator v. New York
Life Insurance Company,"7 the beneficiary procured a life insurance
policy on the insured's life. At the time that the policy was obtained, the
beneficiary had already decided to murder the insured. When the
beneficiary thereafter murdered the insured, neither the beneficiary nor
the estate of the insured recovered on the policy because a policy
obtained under such circumstances is "void from its inception."408
Kentucky's courts have struggled with the problem of how to allocate
rights in property held in a tenancy by the entirety when one tenant
murders the other and thereby becomes the surviving tenant. A tenancy
by the entirety is a unique form of concurrent ownership which may exist
only between spouses. Such a tenancy creates one indivisible estate in
both spouses. Upon the death of the first spouse, the estate continues in
the survivor alone. Also, each spouse has a contingent right of
survivorship in the property during the joint, married lives of the spouses.
Each spouse can unilaterally convey or encumber only her or his
' 737 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1984).
40' Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 561.
188 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1945).
Id. at 314.
40 RoGEEL A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAw op PROPERTY § 5.5 (1984).
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individual contingent right of survivorship."' The transferee of a
spouse's contingent right of survivorship does not take a present right of
possession. The transferee has only a right to possess the property if the
spouse who made the transfer ultimately is the surviving tenant by the
entirety4
n
The first case involving the killing of one tenant by the entirety by
the other tenant, Cowan v. Pleasant,"2 did not require the court to
apply the forfeiture provision in KRS section 381.280. However, the court
purported to rely on the underlying justification for the statute in reaching
its decision. The husband in Cowan had killed his wife and then
committed suicide. He could not be convicted of the felony for taking his
wife's life, so the statute was not operative. Although the court could find
only limited support for its decision, it treated the murder as transforming
the tenancy by the entirety, with its contingent right of survivorship, into
a tenancy in common."' Each tenant in common has an absolute right
to dispose of her or his undivided fractional interest in the property either
inter vivos by deed or at death.4 The court divided the property held
by the entirety equally between the estate of the victim and the estate of
the murderer. The court's rationale was that this result was in keeping
with the legislature's intention when enacting KRS section 381.280 not
to punish a child whose parent committed a wrongful act of murder.4 5
Supposedly, splitting the property between the two spouses' estates
avoided punishing the innocent children of the murderer.
What the Cowan decision ignores is the civil maxim that a wrongdoer
should not be permitted to profit from their own wrong." Until the
moment that the husband killed his wife, he had no guarantee that he
would ever have an individual interest in the property. He had to survive
the co-tenant, his wife, in order to take the property as his own individual
property. By the wrongful act of murder, the court expanded his
contingent right of survivorship into an undivided one-half interest in the
land, which the murderer could then dispose of during his life or at his
410 See RICHARD R. PowEu. & PAnuCK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
622[4] (1993).
411 See Hoffman v. Newell, 60 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Ky. 1932) (seminal case concerning
tenancies by the entirety).
4'2 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954).
4'3 Id. at 495.
414 CUNNINGHAM Er AL., supra note 409, § 5.2.
415 Cowan, 263 S.W.2d at 495-96.
416 See National Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Hood's Adm'r, 94 S.W.2d 1022, 1023
(Ky. 1936).
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death417 If the court had applied the rationale of earlier decisions applying
KRS section 381.280, it would have treated the husband as if he had
predeceased his wife.!"0 The victim would become the surviving tenant by
the entirety by application of this legal fiction, and her estate would have
taken the entire interest in the property by virtue of her survivorship.
The Cowan decision also does violence to the express language of KRS
section 381.280. The statute states that a convicted murderer "forfeits all
interest in and to the property of the decedent including any interest [the
murderer] would receive as surviving joint tenant."' 9 The property interest
thus forfeited should descend to the decedent other heirs.
More recent court decisions continue to treat the murder of one tenant by
the entirety by the other as a conversion of the estate into a tenancy in
common without a right of survivorship. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
permitted a convicted, murdering tenant by the entirety to retain one-half of
the proceeds of a casualty insurance policy on property the murderer and the
victim had held by the entirety. The court thought that "equity" dictated that
the property be divided equally between the husband or his heirs and the heirs
of the murdered wife.420 It is difficult to understand what equitable
considerations support giving a husband who feloniously kills his wife, an
innocent party, a half interest in the property. His wrongfid act unilaterally
destroyed his wife ability to take the whole as the surviving tenant-a right
she had until she was killed.
In Peyton v. Young42 the Kentucky Supreme Court reached a correct
result despite misplaced discussion of the statutory and case law concerning
murdering tenants by the entirety. In Peyton, a wife and husband had
purchased their home as tenants by the entirety. The husband subsequently
encumbered his contingent right of survivorship by a mortgage in which his
wife did not join. The wife and husband divorced, and the husband conveyed
his interest in the house to his former spouse. Shortly after the conveyance,
the husband killed his former spouse and himself The court held that only
one-half of the property was encumbered by the mortgage given by the
husband.4
Peyton, however, was not a case of murdering tenants by the entirety or
murdering joint tenants with right of survivorship. When tenants by the
entirety divorce, one essential element of the tenancy-spousal unity-is
47 See Cowan, 263 S.W.2d at 495.
411 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 390.
419 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie/Bobbs-Menri 1972).
420 Heuser v. Cohen, 655 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
- 659 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1983).
42, Id. at 207.
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destroyed. 4  On divorce, the parties become tenants in common, each
having an individual, undivided one-half interest in the property which either
can sell or encumber4  The prior mortgage encumbered the husband
interest in the tenancy by the entirety at the time of the divorce, and the
encumbrance continued when his interest in the property was expanded by the
divorce. When he transferred his interest to his former spouse, he only had
an encumbered interest to transfer!"s That he later killed himself and his
former spouse is irrelevant to the property question concerning the presence
or absence of an encumbrance on the property in the former spouse hands.
Neither the statutory provision on the rights of murdering joint tenants42
nor the case law interpreting that statute27 is applicable because the parties
were no longer joint tenants at the time of the murder-suicide. Indeed, the
parties were not concurrent owners of any sort. By virtue of the divorce and
property transfer, the former wife was the sole owner of the property, one-half
of which was encumbered by her former husband's prior mortgage.
Most recently, in First Kentucky Trust Company v. United States,42 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached a far more
equitable result by finding that a tenant by the entirety who is convicted of
a felony for taking the life of the other tenant is barred from asserting any
interest as the surviving tenant. The court, however, incorrectly stated that this
result was required under KRS section 381.280.!" As demonstrated
above, 3 Kentucky case law directs that only half of the property held by
the entirety belongs to the estate of the victim. The other half is the property
of the killer. The Sixth Circuit incorrectly included in the victim estate the
whole value of the property held by the victim and her murderer as tenants
by the entirety.
B. Adultery
Until Parliament enacted a statute prohibiting inheritance by an adulterous
wife431 adultery was not a bar to a wife's dower at the common law!'
' The five unities essential for a tenancy by the entirety ame time, title, interest,
possession and person. CoRN-EUus J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 218 (2d ed. 1988).
- POWELL & RoHAN, supra note 410, § 624.
421 See Peyton, 659 S.W.2d at 207.
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
4 E.g., Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954).
4 737 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1984).
42 Id. at 560.
430 See supra notes 412-27 and accompanying text.
4 Stat. of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 34 (Eng.).
432 See generally Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1930) (providing an excellent
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KRS section 392.090(2) continues the English statutory bar to inheritance
by an adulterous wife and expands it to include adulterous husbands. The
statute provides that if either spouse voluntarily leaves the other and lives
in adultery, the adulterous spouse forfeits all right and interest in the
property of the other.43 Every case involving the application of this
statute involves the claim that a wife is barred from inheritance in her
husband's estate because of her adulterous conduct. Either Kentucky
husbands are uncommonly virtuous and faithful or a double standard is
at work.
There are two prerequisites to the operation of the statute's forfeiture
provision: the surviving spouse must have (1) voluntarily "left' the other
and (2) lived in adultery.4 In a non-Kentucky case, a wife was not
barred from inheriting because she had lived in adultery only after her
husband had deserted her. 35 Merely leaving is not enough to disqualify
the spouse who leaves; the spouse must also live in adultery. In one
case, ' a wife who left her husband two years before his death and
lived with her mother in another town without procuring a divorce was
not barred from taking her distributable share in her husband's estate.
Even though the separation may have been intended as permanent, there
could not be a forfeiture absent any adulterous conduct.437
Although the terms of the statute require that there be a leaving by
the adulterous spouse, there can be a forfeiture even if the adulterous
spouse does not physically leave the home. Thus, the statute barred a wife
from sharing in her husband's estate when she lived openly in adultery in
the family home after her husband was confined to a mental institu-
tion.4! ' In a later case, Ferguson v. Ferguson,439 the allegation of the
wife's adulterous conduct while living with her husband was not proved.
However, the court reaffirmed the principle that even a spouse who
continues to live with the other spouse forfeits any interest in the other
spouse's estate by engaging in adulterous conduct."
history of Kentucky's adultery statute).
"' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090(2) (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1984); see, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 156 S.W. 413 (Ky. 1913); Goss v. Forman, 12 S.W. 387 (Ky.
1885).
43 Id.
4' Beaty v. Richardson, 34 S.E. 73, 76 (S.C. 1899); see also Gordon v. Dickinson,
23 N.E. 439, 440 (. 1890).
' Meyers' Adm'rv. Meyers, 50 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1932).
3 Id. at 83.
4" McQuinn v. McQuinn, 61 S.W. 358, 360 (Ky. 1901).
43" 156 S.W. 413 (Ky. 1913).
4 Id. at 414. Contra Sergent v. North Cumberland Mfg. Co., 66 S.W. 1036, 1037
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The requirement that the spouse must "live in adultery" has been
subject to court interpretation. Although one act of adultery is probably
not sufficient to cause a forfeiture of inheritance rights,"' constantly
living in adultery is not a prerequisite to forfeiture. In Goss v.
Formane2 a woman left her husband's house approximately two months
before he died. Although she did not live with a man after leaving her
husband, she did have sexual intercourse on several occasions with
another man. The court found that the wife forfeited her inheritance rights
in her husband's estate. The court determined that it was not necessary
that the wife should live constantly with one man in adultery during her
abandonment of her husband. Having sexual intercourse with any man or
men periodically, when it was convenient, or when the opportunity was
afforded constituted "living in adultery" within the meaning of the
statute.
443
* The determination of whether or not a spouse has committed adultery
is a factual question within the province of the trial court that generally
will not be disturbed on appeal." Evidence admissible in making this
determination includes the testimony of the spouse's alleged paramour.
However, the court has stated on two different occasions that such
testimony is to be viewed with suspicion and acted upon with extreme
caution."5 The court's admonitions concerning the reliability of such
evidence was predicated on the fact that the witness in each instance was
a willing, or voluntary, witness. The court thought that any man who
would voluntarily by his testimony "destroy the wife, affix a stain to her
children and family,"' 4 and admit to conduct degrading and blameable
to himself was not to be believed." 7 Presumably, if the witness is
subpoenaed and is unwilling to testify, the testimony is not viewed with
such suspicion.
The presumption against the reliability of the paramour's testimony
was actually unnecessary in these two cases. There were numerous other
indicia of the unreliability of the witness' testimony. In both instances the
(Ky. 1902).
"i Cy Booth v. Booth, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 988, 988 (1891) (holding that a single act of
adultery by the husband does not entitle the wife to a divorce on the ground of adultery
under an earlier statute).
12 S.W. 387 (Ky. 1885).
44 Id. at 389; see also Bond v. Bond's Adm'r, 150 S.W. 363 (Ky. 1912) (holding that
periodic adulterous conduct caused forfeiture of the wife's dower rights).
4" See Ferguson, 156 S.W. at 415; Bond, 150 S.W. at 364.
MS Ferguson, 156 S.W. at 415; Bond, 150 S.W. at 364.
Bond, 150 S.W. at 364.
447 Id.
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testimony of the self-proclaimed paramour was uncorroborated. In both
cases others totally discredited the witnesses' character for truth and
sobriety, and the alleged paramours' stories of their relationships with the
surviving wives were highly improbable factually.'
If the statute's forfeiture provision is triggered, it not only bars a
spouse from asserting dower rights, but it also bars a spouse's claim for
the homestead" and personalty exemptions.4 Although there is no
case on point, it should also work to bar an adulterous spouse from taking
as the decedent's intestate taker pursuant to KRS section 391.010(4) when
the decedent is not survived by any issue, parents, siblings or issue of
siblings. Because the statute has been interpreted to bar only rights to
intestate succession to the decedent's property, it does not bar a devise or
bequest in a will to the adulterous spouse of the testator.45
Since KRS section 392.090(2) only provides for forfeiture of any
right or interest in the property of the nonadulterous spouse, the statute
does not bar an adulterous spouse who is the beneficiary of a life
insure policy on the deceased spouse's life from taking the proceeds
of the policy.45 This is true whether the policy was taken out and paid
for by the adulterous spouse or by the deceased spouse. By statute, an
insurance policy procured and paid for by one spouse on the life of the
other spouse is the separate property of the spouse who procured it. 53
The insured spouse has no interest in the policy or its proceeds that
would be subject to forfeiture under KRS section 392.090(2). Even if the
insured spouse procured and paid for the policy, there is no forfeiture
when the beneficiary spouse commits adultery. The insured spouse could
have changed the beneficiary designation during the insured's lifetime. If
this power is not exercised, upon the death of the insured, title to the
proceeds vests, by statute, in the beneficiary.4 The proceeds never
form any part of the insured's estate. Therefore, they are not a property
interest of the decedent that is forfeited by a surviving spouse who
commits adultery.
' Ferguson, 156 S.W. at 414-15; Bond, 150 S.W. at 363.
A9 Davis v. Calvert, 38 S.W. 884, 885 (Ky. 1897) (holding that a wife is not entitled
to dower or homestead in her husband's land as against the right of a third person to
compensation for supporting the husband in his last illness).
4" Bond 150 S.W. at 363.
4" Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Ky. 1930).
" Bradley v. Bradley's Adm'r, 198 S.W. 905, 908 (Ky. 1917).
4M KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (rights of
married woman in life insurance).
414 Id. § 304.14-300 (exemption of proceeds of life insurance); id. § 304.14-320
(exemption of proceeds of group insurance).
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KRS section 392.090(2) does not bar a spouse's ability to recover for
the wrongful death of the other spouse even though the surviving spouse
left the decedent and lived in adultery.' 5 A wrongful death recovery
goes directly to those designated as beneficiaries under Kentucky's
wrongful death statute.4' The recovery is for the designated beneficia-
ries and never becomes part of the decedent's estate. Therefore, it is not
a property interest of the decedent, and it is not forfeited under the
statute.
Even if a spouse voluntarily leaves the other and lives in adultery, the
statute's forfeiture provision can be avoided. If the spouses later become
reconciled and live together as spouses, the statute's forfeiture provision
becomes inapplicable.4 '
C. Bigamy
Although there are no reported cases construing it, KRS section
392.100 provides that a person convicted of bigamy forfeits any claim to
dower in the estate of the first spouse!' Upon conviction, the first
spouse is endowed with a life estate in one-third of the real estate of the
bigamous spouse as well as an absolute interest in one-third of the
bigamous spouse's personalty. The property is allotted and recovered in
the same manner as dower 9
A person is guilty of the criminal offense of bigamy if she or he
enters into a subsequent marriage knowing that she or he or the other
party is still married to another person.'" As the knowledge of the
earlier, unterminated marriage is the essential element of the offense,
either party to the subsequent marriage may be convicted. Bigamy is also
committed if the parties to a bigamous marriage in another state later
cohabitate in Kentucky." It is a defense to a bigamy prosecution that
the accused believed she or he was legally eligible to marry."
If there has been a bigamous marriage, but there has not been any
bigamy conviction, intestate inheritance rights of the various marriage
participants in each other's estates may nonetheless have to be deter-
411 Napier's Adm'r v. Napier's Adm'r, 275 S.W. 379, 380 (Ky. 1925).
4m KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (MichiefBobbs-Meill 1992).
4- Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
45, See id. at § 392.100 (supplying no cases in the annotated section).
4" Id. § 392.100.
-o Id. § 530.010(1)(a).
461 Id. § 530.010(1)(b).
" Id. § 530.010(2).
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mined. KRS section 392.100 does not provide a mechanism for allocating
the inheritance claims of multiple surviving "spouses" in the estate of a
bigamous spouse.' The statute also does not provide any express bar
to inheritance claims by a nonconvicted bigamous spouse in the estates
of either of the bigamous spouse's marriage partners. However, the
bigamous spouse would be barred from inheriting from the estate of the
first spouse under KRS section 392.090(2), the adultery statute.4
Logically, if the second marriage is invalid and the bigamous spouse
survives the second spouse, the bigamous spouse is not the surviving
spouse of the second spouse and has no claim to a share in that estate.
Similarly, if the bigamous spouse dies survived by both the first and
second spouses and the second marriage is invalid, the second spouse is
not the surviving spouse. The first spouse would be the party entitled to
inherit as the surviving spouse of the deceased bigamous spouse.
This analysis, though correct, hinges on whether the second marriage
is invalid. KRS section 403.120 provides the method for adjudicating the
validity of a marriage in Kentucky. 5 If the marriage is allegedly
invalid as bigamous, its validity may only be attacked by one of the
parties to the marriage within one year after the petitioner obtains
knowledge of the bigamous nature of the marriage.' A collateral
attack by a third party is not permitted. Only the bigamous spouse and
the second spouse, the parties to the second marriage, may attack the
validity of their marriage. In a contest between the first spouse and the
second spouse for the right to inherit as the surviving spouse of the
bigamous spouse, the statute precludes any attack by the first spouse on
the second marriage as bigamous. This is because the first spouse is not
a party to the second marriage.
Although the case did not involve competing claims by more than
one alleged spouse of the decedent, the court in Ferguson v. Ferguson
applied the statutory bar to collateral attacks on the validity of a marriage
alleged to be bigamous."7 A son of the decedent by the decedent's first
wife contested the appointment of the decedent's second wife as
administrator of the estate. Because the decedent had married the second
48 See id. § 392.100.
4" Id. § 392.090(2). That statute provides that if a spouse voluntarily leaves her or
his spouse and lives in adultery, the adulterous spouse is barred from inheriting from the
nonadulterous spouse's estate. See supra notes 432-57 and accompanying text (discussing
the operation and interpretation of KRS § 392.090(2)).
0KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.120 (Micbie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
4"6 Id. § 403.120.
7610 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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wife prior to obtaining a final decree of divorce from his first spouse, the
second marriage was bigamous when contracted. However, relying on
KRS section 403.120, the court determined that the son had no standing
to collaterally attack the validity of the second marriage.' Therefore,
he could not contest the second wife's status as the decedent's surviving
spouse nor her right to be appointed administrator of the decedent's estate.
In support of its decision, the court reasoned that collateral attacks on
marriages are unfair as they exact economic penalties from the surviving
spouse by denying inheritance rights as well as social security and other
benefits. 469 This is a valid consideration in a Ferguson-type case. The
decedent and his second wife had been married for ten years prior to his
death. The first marriage was terminated by divorce six days after the
second marriage was contracted.470 No one, other than the second wife,
could claim to be the decedent's surviving spouse. In a situation where
two people are claiming to be the decedent's surviving spouse, however,
the equities are not so clearly in favor of precluding a collateral attack on
the second marriage.
Kentucky patterned KRS section 403.120 on Section 208 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.47' However, Kentucky omitted
crucial language of the Uniform Act authorizing limited collateral attacks
on bigamous marriages. Kentucky also significantly shortened the period
during which the parties to the second marriage may attack the validity
of an alleged bigamous marriage.4 The Uniform Act permits a
collateral attack on a bigamous marriage by the first spouse or a child of
either party as well as permitting a direct attack by the parties themselves.473
A choice of two alternative statutes of limitation are set out in the
Uniform Act, but Kentucky enacted neither of them. One statute of
limitation permits a collateral attack at any time prior to the death of one
of the parties to the subsequent marriage. 414 The other permits a collat-
eral attack at any time not to exceed five years following the death of
.. Id. at 927.
4 Id. at 926.
4o Id.
47 UNit. MARJAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 208, 9A U.LA. 170 (1987).
4 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.120 (providing a one year period after a
party learns of the prohibited marriage) with UNiF. MARRIAoE AND DIVORCE ACT §
208(c) Alternative A (allowing a challenge to the marriage at any time prior to the death
of one of the parties) and id. § 208(a) Alternative B (allowing a challenge to the marriage
for a five year period after the death of either party).
4- Id. § 208 Alternative A(c) and Alternative B(c).
474 Id. § 208 Alternative A(c).
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either party.475 Under the first alternative, the first spouse cannot mount
a postmortem collateral attack and is precluded from inheriting if the
collateral attack is not brought before the death of the bigamous spouse.
The second alternative, in contrast, does authorize a postmortem
determination of the validity of the second marriage.
Unlike the alternatives in the Uniform Act, KRS section 403.120
never permits a collateral attack by the first spouse or a child of the
bigamous spouse"7 In Kentucky, the first spouse can never obtain a
declaration of invalidity of the second marriage to protect her or his
inheritance rights in the estate of the bigamous spouse. A law which
permits one spouse to unilaterally defeat the other spouse's inheritance
rights by the wrongful act of bigamy is not very easily justified.
D. Divorce
By statute, an absolute divorce bars all claims of either spouse to the
property of the other spouse upon the former spouse's death.4" The
surviving former spouse cannot claim dower in any property that the
deceased former spouse died owning.
Since a unilateral conveyance of real property by one spouse could
not defeat the other spouse's dower rights if the spouses had remained
married, the surviving spouse would have been entitled to a life estate in
one-third of the real property conveyed away 78 However, the divorce
subsequent to the unilateral conveyance extinguishes the nonconsenting
spouse's inchoate dower claim in the property.479 After an absolute
divorce, the surviving former spouse also has no claim to any distributive
shareo° of, or homestead"' in, the deceased former spouse's estate.
The only time a former spouse has any claim in the estate of a deceased
former spouse is if such an award was made to the surviving spouse in
the divorce action.'
A valid divorce is the essential prerequisite to the operation of the
statute's absolute bar to inheritance rights in the deceased former spouse's
47' Id. § 208 Alternative B(c).
476 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.120 (Micbie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
- Id. § 392.090(1).
47 Id. § 392.020.
€' Bromley v. McCall, 192 S.W. 507, 508 (Ky. 1917); McKean v. Brown, 83 Ky. Op.
208, 209 (1885).
4" Bromley, 192 S.W. at 507.
4'u Skmer v. Walker, 34 S.W. 233, 235 (Ky. 1896).
Sapp v. Sapp, 193 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Ky. 1946).
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estate. If one spouse lives apart from the other spouse without procuring a
divorce, that spouse's share in the other spouse's estate is not barred. This is
so even if the spouse intended the separation to be permanent.
The divorce need not have been obtained in Kentucky. f the divorce
was validly granted in another jurisdiction, the statute's inheritance bar
precludes any claim by the divorced surviving spouse to inheritance rights in
the estate of the deceased former spouse.'
If both spouses consent Kentucky still permits divorce from bed and
board in lieu of an absolute divorce.' Such a divorce is an anachronistic
holdover from the time when Kentucky only permitted divorce upon a
showing of "fault.' A divorce from bed and board severs the marital
relationship as to property and personal rights acquired after the bed and
board divorce is granted but prohibits either party from manying during the
life of the other. Unlike an absolute divorce, though, both spouses in a
divorce from bed and board retain their inheritance rights in the estate of the
other. '
If the spouses do obtain a judgment of divorce from bed and board, they
can incorporate a property agreement settling their inheritance rights in each
other's estates into the judgment. In Cecil v. Farmer's National Banlw the
wife accepted two thousand dollars in full settlement of her distributive share
in her husband's estate. The property settlement was incorporated into the
judgment of divorce from bed and board. The parties later reconciled and
resumed living together as spouses for the six years preceding the husband's
death. The wife claimed a right to take her statutory dower share in her
husband's estate as his surviving spouse. The court determined that the
reconciliation of the parties and the resumption of marital relations did not set
aside the judgment of divorce from bed and board that contained the property
settlement of the wife's inheritance rights.
In order to annul a decree of divorce from bed and board, the parties
must follow a statutorily prescribed procedure. 9 In Cecil the parties did
not follow that procedure. However, their failure to comply with the statutory
procedure for setting aside the divorce decree did not preclude the rescission
of the property settlement by the mutual agreement of the parties. If the wife's
4u Meyers' Adm'rv. Meyers, 50 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Ky. 1932).
4' Hawkins v. Ragsdale, 80 Ky. Op. 353, 354 (1882).
as Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
4" Id.; see Coleman v. Coleman, 269 S.W.2d 730, 738 (Ky. 1954); Stevens v.
Stevens, 231 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Ky. 1950); Lively v. Lively, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 838 (1886); Rich
v. Rich, 70 Ky. Op. 53 (1870).
" 245 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. 1952).
4u Id. at 433.
4" Id. at 432; see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
[Vol. 82
KENTUCKY INTESTACY LAWS
agreement to accept a lump sum payment in fll settlement of her distributive
share of her husbands estate were mutually rescinded, the wife would not be
barred from claiming her statutory dower share in her husbands estate. The
Cecil court remanded the case for a determination of whether there had been
a mutual rescission!4"
Regardless of whether the surviving spouse in the Cecil case could prove
on remand that there had been a mutual rescission of the property settlement,
she was entitled to be appointed and-to continue as the decedent's personal
representative. KRS section 395.040 establishes a preference in appointing a
personal representative for the decedent in favor of those first entitled to
distribution from the decedent's estate. A surviving spouse is preferred and
then such others as are next entitled to distributio. 49' If after the
appointment it develops that the personal representative has no distributive
share in the estate of the decedent, that alone is not cause for removal of the
appointee!'
E. Suicide
At the common law, the land of a convicted or outlawed felon was
forfeited to the crown for a year and a day followed by the escheat of the
land to the overlord.493 Personalty of the felon was forfeited absolutely to
the crown. As suicide was a felony, it resulted in such forfeitures and
escheat.
Section 21 ofthe Kentucky Constitution expressly eliminates the common
law consequences of suicide.495 Section 21 provides that "[t]he estate of
such persons as shall destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in the
cases of natural death.:"96 Thus, the suicide of the decedent does not disrupt
the normal course of succession.
V. TRANSACTIONS AFFECTING INHERITANCE
A. Advancements
An advancement is an inter vivos gift by a parent to a child that is
intended by the donor as an anticipation of the donee's intestate share of
4- Cecil, 245 S.W.2d at 433.
"n Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 395.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
Cecil, 245 S.W.2d at 433.
W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON TiRE LAW OF WflUS § 55.1, at 301 (1962).
4 Id.
49 Ky. CONST. § 21.
4 id.
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the donor's estate.497 The Kentucky statute differs from the typical
statute since it applies not only to gifts from parents to children, but also
to gifts from a grandparent.498
B. Releases and Assignments
Although Kentucky's case law does not clearly articulate the
distinction between a release and an assignment of an expectant interest
in the estate of a living person, there is a definitional distinction. If an
expectancy is relinquished to the source of the inheritance before the
death of the source, it is a release.4" An assignment occurs when, prior
to the death of the source of the inheritance, the expectancy is transferred
to a third person who is not the source.5® Contrary to the majority
rule," ' a contract of assignment and any deed or other conveyance
made pursuant to such an agreement is void in Kentucky.'ra Contracts
of release are also prohibited,5 3 with the exception of antenuptial
agreements providing for the release of inheritance rights in the estate of
the other spouse. Absent fraud or undue influence, if an antenuptial
agreement establishing the inheritance rights of the parties is supported
by valuable consideration, the agreement is valid in Kentucky.'
1 BOWS & PARKER, supra note 493, § 12.3, at 575.
E.g., Sandidge v. Kentucky Trust Co., 402 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Ky. 1966). For a
complete exposition of Kemucky's law on advancements, see Carolyn S. Bratt, Kentucky's
Doctrine of Advancements: A Time for Reform, 75 KY. L.J. 341 (1986).
41 ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 725-28.
Id. at 729-30.
501 E.g., Bednar v. Bednar, 485 N.E.2d 834, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Barrent v.
Geisinger, 93 N.E. 576, 577-78 (Ill. 1899).
' E.g., Prater v. Hicks, 220 S.W.2d 1011, 1012 (Ky. 1949) (daughter to stranger);
Engle v. Walters, 140 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. 1940) (grandson to aunt); Riggsby v.
Montgomery, 271 S.W. 564, 565 (Ky. 1925) (children to stepfather); Hunt v. Smith, 230
S.W. 936, 938-40 (Ky. 1921) (children to stranger); Flatt v. Flatt, 225 S.W. 1067, 1068
(Ky. 1920) (child to grandchild); Burton v. Campbell, 195 S.W. 1091, 1092-93 (Ky.
1917) (son to other intestate takers); Hall v. Hall, 155 S.W. 755, 756-57 (Ky. 1913)
(children to other children); Spears v. Spaw, 118 S.W. 275, 276 (Ky. 1909) (children to
another child); Fumish's Adm'r v. Lilly, 84 S.W. 734, 735 (Ky. 1905) (children to
another child); McCall'sAdm'r v. Hampton, 32 S.W. 406, 408 (Ky. 1895) (son to another
child); Alves v. Schlesinger, 81 Ky. Op. 290, 293 (1883) (son to another child); Wheeler's
Ex'r v. Wheeler, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 474, 477 (1859) (son to another child).
50 Weddington v. Adkins, 54 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1932) (child to parent); Elliot v.
Leslie, 99 S.W. 619, 620-21 (Ky. 1907) (child to parent); Daniel v. Lewis, 13 Ky. L. Rep.
827, 828 (1892) (grandchild to grandfather).
' Hardesty v. Hardesty's Ex'r, 34 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ky. 1930); Herren v. Cochran,
697 S.W.2d 149, 150-51 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
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Various rationales have been offered in support of Kentucky's general
prohibition of antemortem contracts of release or assignment. The
decisions regularly assert that the contracts are unenforceable because
they lack a subject matter."° According to the court, every contract of
sale must have a seller, a purchaser and a thing to be sold." At the
time that a contract of assignment or release is entered into, the seller has
only a hope, not a certainty, of sharing in the estate of a then-living
ancestor or testator."7 As this naked possibility of inheritance means
that the seller has no present right, vested or contingent, a contract of
release or assignment lacks one of the fundamental elements of a
contract-an object of the sale."8
Various policy grounds have also been asserted to justify the
prohibition against all contracts of release and assignment. The courts
paternalistically assume that those who anticipate sharing in the estate of
a living person are peculiarly in need of protection from their own
inprovidence Also, this temptation to reduce their potential future
inheritance to a presently enjoyable interest through a sale supposedly
makes beneficiary expectants especially susceptible to the fraud and
deceit of unscrupulous purchasers.510 If the courts are correct in this
evaluation, a rule of strict scrutiny of contracts of release and assignment
is justifiable, but not a blanket prohibition against all contracts of release
and assignment.
Kentucky's rule prohibiting the antemortem release or assignment of
an expectancy is also justified as a means of preventing an expectant
taker from working a fraud on the present owner of the property.
511
Since the expectant takers cannot anticipate their ownership of the
property of an ancestor or testator, the property owner is supposedly
assured that property is inherited and enjoyed by the intended recipi-
ents. This argument has its roots in the idea that one facet of property
ownership is the right to direct its devolution at death. However, the rule
against contracts of release and assignment does not necessarily assure
5 E.g., Elliott, 99 S.W. at 621-22; McCall'sAdm'r, 32 S.W. at 407-08; Alves, 81 Ky.
Op. at 292; Wheeler's Ex'r, 59 Ky. (2 Met) at 477.
506 Elliott, 99 S.W. at 622.
5
" McCall'sAdm'r, 32 S.W. at 407.
' Cushing v. Gushin, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 259, 262 (1870).
- Burton v. Campbell, 195 S.W. 1091, 1093 (Ky. 1917); McCall's Adm'r, 32 S.W.
at 408.
5'0 Burton, 195 S.W. at 1093; Elliott, 99 S.W. at 621; McCall's Adm'r, 32 S.W. at
408.
"n Elliott, 99 S.W. at 621.
2 McCall'sAdm'r, 32 S.W. at 408.
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that the intended object of the decedent's bounty will enjoy the property.
At the moment of the ancestor's death, an intestate taker becomes the
owner of the property with the power to alienate her or his interest in
it.513 Thus, the rule that forbids only antemortem, but not postmortem,
assignments does not guarantee that the intended beneficiary will enjoy
the property.
The Kentucky courts have voiced the concern that if expectant
inheritance rights are assigned to a stranger-to-the-source of the inheri-
tance rights, a danger arises because the stranger has acquired an
economic interest in the life of the source. The economic interest may
provide an incentive to the stranger to hasten the source's death. 4 This
argument is particularly weak. A majority of American jurisdictions
permit antemortem assignments of prospective inheritance rights"'5
without any reported increase in the number of untimely deaths of the
property owners. Furthermore, such a rationale only supports the
prohibition of contracts of assignment entered into with strangers to the
source. It does not support such a prohibition if the purchaser under the
assignment is another natural object of the property owner's bounty, nor
does it support a prohibition of contracts of release. The release of an
inheritance right to the source of the inheritance creates no incentive,
economic or otherwise, in favor of the early death of the source.
When the parties purport to enter into contracts of release or
assignment, the expectant intestate taker or will beneficiary receives
consideration from the purchase. Because the release or assignment is
invalid, a question arises as to the proper disposition of the consideration
5' E.g., Robertson v. Hines, 157 S.W. 704, 704 (Ky. 1913) (noting that Ky. St.
§ 2087 (now KRS § 396.110) provides that one who purchases an intestate taker's share
within six months of the deceden's death takes it subject to payment of the decedent's
debts and costs of administration); Fumish's Adm'rv. Lilly, 84 S.W. 734, 735 (Ky. 1905)
(holding that children can convey to a sibling their interest in their deceased father's
estate, but not their expectancy in the estate of their living mother); Kern v. Raunser, 50
S.W. 838, 840 (Ky. 1899) (allowing will beneficiaries to make a postmortem assignment
of their interest in the testator's estate to the surviving spouse); Peak v. Wigginton, 11
S.W. 89, 91 (Ky. 1889) (allowing the decedent's grandchildren to validly relinquish any
claim in their deceased grandfather's estate as part of compromise in a dispute between
the grandchildren and the daughter of the decedent); Evans v. Robinson, 44 Ky. (5 B.
Mon.) 589, 589 (1845) (holding that an assignee in a postmortem assignment of the
distributee's share of the decedent's estate received nothing from the estate because the
administrator had fully paid the distributee); Haden v. Haden's Heirs, 30 Ky. (7 J.3.
Marsh.) 168, 169 (1832) (holding that a postmortem waiver of inheritance rights in the
testator's estate was binding on those claiming through the waiving party).
514 Burton, 195 S.W. at 1093.
... ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 726, 729.
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received by the expectant beneficiary. An intestate taker is not barred by her
or his contract of release with the source from sharing in the intestate estate
of the source. An intestate taker is also not required to return the
consideration received to the estate of the source. Instead, the consideration
is treated as an advancement chargeable to the intestate taker, who cannot
share fuRther in the decedent's estate until the other intestate takers are made
equaI516
When the void contract is an attempted assignment of an expectancy,
recovery of the consideration paid is problematic. If the seller of an
expectancy attempts to avoid her or his agreement by setting aside the deed
and recovering the property from te purchaser, the sellers title to the
property will be confirmed and the purchaser is entitled to the return of the
consideration paid. In Flatt v. Flat 17 a child of the property owner entered
into a contract with another person to sell the child's one-sixth expectant
interest in her living parent real estate. When the parent died, the land
passed under the testator will to his surviving spouse for life with a
remainder in his six issue. The purchaser of the one-sixth remainder interest
died before the life tenant, and the purchaser' estate sold the purchaserA
purported interest in the remainder to a stranger. The stranger took possession
of the land and made improvements on it.518 Five years later, after the death
of the life tenant, the child brought suit against the stranger to avoid the deed
and recover the land as well as its fair rental value. The court held that the
child had title to a one-sixth interest in the land because the attempted sale of
the expectancy was against public policy and because the deed made pursuant
to the void contract was also void. However, the stranger was permitted
to subrogate to the rights of the original purchaser and recover the purchase
price plus interest from the date of the void conveyance to the setting aside
of the deed. The stranger was also entitled to a monetary recovery against the
child for improvements that the stranger had placed on the land to the extent
that the improvements had increased the vendible value of the land. The child
was permitted to offset against these amounts the yearly rental value of the
land for the years for which the child sued 2
56 Weddington v. Adkins, 54 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1932) (charging child with an
advancement equal to the value of the land conveyed by parent minus the amount of the
lien); Elliott v. Leslie, 99 S.W. 619, 622 (Ky. 1907) (charging son with a $1000
advancement); Daniel v. Lewis, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 827, 827 (1892) (charging'grandchild with
a $500 advancement); Cushing v. Cushing, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 259, 262 (1870) (charging
son with a $2000 advancement).
517 225 S.W. 1067 (Ky. 1920).
"a Id. at 1068.
5 Id.
= Id. at 1069.
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If the purchaser under a warranty deed from a seller who had only an
expectancy is ousted by someone other than either the seller of the
expectancy or someone claiming through the seller, the purchaser cannot
recover the consideration paid for the void contract. In Hunt v. Smit 52'
the purchasers were ousted from the land by the source of the seller's
expectancy, not by the seller. In their futile attempt to defend against the
source's lawsuit to oust them, the purchasers also incurred legal fees. The
court applied the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor and denied recovery of
both the consideration paid and the legal costs incurred. The court
reasoned that a purchaser is presumed to know that a contract of
assignment of an expectancy is no more than a contract of chance, against
public policy and unenforceable for any purpose. '  When, as in the
Flatt case, the seller under a void contract of assignment seeks equity
(rescission of the deed), then the seller must do equity (restitution of the
consideration)., Otherwise, there is no relief for a purchaser who enters
into a void contract of assignment.
If the seller subsequently inherits the property anticipated in the
contract of assignment, the purchaser is not entitled to specific
performance of the contract.' Even if the seller executed a deed
containing a warranty of title in order to complete the contract of
assignment, the purchaser is not permitted to invoke equitable principles
to estop the seller, after the seller acquires title, from either asserting title
to the property or from denying the title of the purchaser.5' Typically,
a seller who warrants title to land when the seller does not have title is
estopped from asserting title to the property and from denying the title of
the purchaser if the seller later acquires the title. The seller's
after-acquired title is usually found to inure to the benefit of the
purchaser.526 However, this equitable principle has no application when
the subject matter sought to be conveyed is a mere expectancy of
inheritance because of the very strong public policy of the state against
such contracts.527 Such a contract and any deed made pursuant to such a
contract, even a deed containing warranties of title, are void in equity" and
't 230 S.W. 936 (Ky. 1921).
2 Id. at 941.
'2 Flaft, 225 S.W. at 1069.
' Lowry v. Spear, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 451, 454 (1870).
"'See Harkins v. Hatfield, 297 S.W. 1109, 1111 (Ky. 1927); Riggsby v. Montgom-
ery, 271 S.W. 564, 565 (Ky. 1925); Spacey v. Close, 212 S.W. 127, 129 (Ky. 1919);
McCall's Adm'r v. Hampton, 32 S.W. 406, 408 (Ky. 1895).
See Spacey, 212 S.W. at 129.
5v Ad.
'2 Riggsby, 271 S.W. at 565; Hunt v. Smith, 230 S.W. 936, 940 (Ky. 1921); Flatt v.
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at law.' Thus, the purchaser can neither invoke the equitable principle
of estoppel nor recover damages for breach of warranty at law.5 °
Although the decisions emphatically assert that contracts of release
or assignment are void, there are a handful of cases where the void
contract had some limited effect. In Lowry v. Spear 3 a woman and her
husband contracted with another to sell her expectancy under her living
father's will. The woman and her husband agreed to pay liquidated
damages if they failed to secure good title to the purchaser within a year
of the father's death. After the father's death, the purchaser possessed the
land with the acquiescence of the sellers, but the sellers did not convey
title to the purchaser.5" After the husband died, the purchaser sued for
specific performance of the contract. Since the contract was void as an
attempt to sell an expectancy, it was unenforceable against the woman.
The liquidated damages clause, like a warranty of title in a void deed of
an expectancy, was unenforceable because it was embodied in the void
contract of assignment.533 However, the husband's participation in the
transaction created a covenant for indemnity with the purchaser that
entitled the purchaser to recover from the husband's estate the money
actually paid as consideration. The court did not permit an award of
interest on the consideration or a deduction from the consideration of the
fair rental value of the land. 51
Snyder v. Snyder 5 is a similar case. In Snyder, a mother joined
with her child in a deed purporting to convey the child's one-sixth
expectant share of the mother's property to the purchaser. The deed stated
that the mother was participating in the deed in order to secure the
interest to the purchaser.5' Although the deed was without any effect
against the child because it was an invalid attempt to assign an expectan-
cy, the deed was a valid conveyance by the mother to the purchaser of a
one-sixth remainder interest in her land. When the mother died, the
purchaser's remainder interest in one-sixth of the land became a present
interest in one-sixth of the land.537 Five-sixths of the land remained to
FAtt, 225 S.W. 1067, 1069 (Ky. 1920); Spacey, 212 S.W. at 129; Burton v. Campbell,
195 S.W. 1091, 1093 (Ky. 1917).
m Hunt, 230 S.W. at 940.
530 Id.
531 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 451 (1870).
m Id. at 452.
3 Id. at 454.
n 4 Id.
n' 235 S.W. 743 (Ky. 1921).
m Id. at 744.
37 Id. at 746.
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be divided among the mother six issue. Thus, the child who had purported
to sell his own expectancy took a one-sixth interest in only five-sixths of the
property.538
While the courts have given effect to contracts to sell an expectancy
when the source of the inheritance consented in writing to the sale, in each
such case the writing signed by the source actually went well beyond a
consent to the transaction. For example, in Lee Executor v. /e 39 a son
purported to sell to his brother his share under the will of their living father.
The father executed a writing in which he requested that the brother pay a
sum of money to the son and promised to make a codicil to his will giving
the son's share to the brother380 Similarly, in McBee v. Myers" the
father consented to the sale of his daughter's expectancy in his property. He
stated in writing that he would give as much land to the purchaser from his
daughter as he would give to any of his children. In both Lee's Executor and
McBee, the parent failed to make the promised devise. Although the contract
between the expectant beneficiary and the purchaser was unenforceable, in
both cases the purchaser was permitted to recover the property against the
father estate, the source of the expectancy. 2 The court in MBee
reasoned that the father, by virtue of his promise to secure the property in
question to the purchaser in exchange for the consideration paid to the
expectant beneficiary, was divested of the right to dispose otherwise of that
portion of his estate designated in the writing. "
These two cases have been criticized as resting on merely the technical
distinction, without a sound difference, between a sale of an expectancy
without the written consent of the source and a sale with the written consent
of the source. The critics claim that in either case the expectant beneficiary
had no interest or estate in the property to sell.' These cases are better
understood, however, as will contract cases. The writing evidenced a promise
from the source to the purchaser to make a particular will. Such a promise
was absent in the cases wherein the source merely assented verbally to the
purported assignment.5' The courts in Lee and MeBee merely enforced the
parent contractual obligation to the purchaser to make the promised will gift.
539 Id.
9 63 Ky. (2 Dty.) 134 (1865).
" Id. at 134-35.
5" 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 356 (1868).
'4 Id. at 359; Lee's &'r, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) at 136.
4 MCBee, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) at 359.
w Elliott v. Leslie, 99 S.W. 619, 621 (Ky. 1907).
s E.g., Spears v. Spaw, 118 S.W. 275 (Ky. 1909); Alves v. Scblesinger, 81 Ky. 290
(1883).
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In a more recent case, Roberts v. Conley,* " the court expressly used
the will contract theory to sustain its decision s 7 A daughter purported to
convey to other issue of her mother any interest that the daughter might
receive under her mother's will. In the same instrument the mother promised
the other issue that she would make a will excluding the daughter from any
share in the mother's estate.5 Nonetheless, the mother final will included
the daughter as a beneficiary. The court excluded the daughter pursuant to the
mother agreement with the other heirs, which the court characterized as a
will contract.O The court held that a written contract not to leave property
by will to a particular person is valid because a written contract to leave
property by will to a particular person is valid and enforceable 5s
It is unfortunate that the Kentucky Supreme Court used the Roberts case
to articulate the will contract rationale for giving effect to these otherwise
void contracts of assignment. A valid will contract requires consideration'
for the promise to leave a particular will. Roberts is the weakest of the three
cases because, despite the mother's written promise to make a will excluding
the daughter, there is no consideration to support it. In the Leek Executor and
McBee cases, the child who wanted to sell his expectancy received a
monetary payment from the would-be purchaser 2  The purchaser
payment to the child was made at the direction of the parent and served as
the consideration to support the parent's promise to the purchaser to make the
particular will. In Roberts, however, the parent paid the money to her
daughter and then promised her other children that she would not leave any
property to that daughter.55 There was no consideration for the mother's
promise either by way of a payment to the daughter or by the return of a
promise of value to the mother.
C. Marriage Contracts
There are four basic types of marriage contracts: premarital (antenuptial),
marital (postnuptial), separation, and reconciliation contracts. The difference
between an antenuptial and a marital contract is one of timing. An antenuptial
'"626 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1981).
'47Id. at 638-39.
'"Id. at 635.
'9Id. at 638-39.
ss Id.
.. First Sec. Nat'lBank & Trust Co. of Lexington v. Merriman, 440 S.W.2d 256, 259
(Ky. 1969).
'n McBee v. Meyers, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 356, 357 (1868); Lee's Ex'r v. Lee, 63 Ky. (2
Duv.) 134, 135 (1865).
' Roberts, 626 S.W.2d at 635.
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contract is executed by a couple contemplating marriage,"s whereas a
marital contract is executed by a couple who is already married.555 The
marital contract differs from a separation agreement in that the separation
agreement is made in contemplation of divorce or separation, whereas the
marital contract is not.5 As the name implies, a reconciliation contract
is entered into by a married couple who have separated but are
contemplating a resumption of their marital relationship. 5
The permissibility of these various types of marriage contracts
formerly depended upon the type of provisions contained therein. For
example, provisions for the allocation of spousal property rights at death
and individual spousal control of separate spousal property during
marriage have always been a permissible subject matter for any of the
four types of marriage contracts. Provisions' allocating spousal property
or support rights at divorce were permissible if the contract was one of
separation or reconciliation.5" In 1990, the Kentucky Supreme Court
upheld the validity of antenuptial agreements that allocated the parties'
property and support rights at divorce. 59 For purposes of this Article,
the discussion of marriage contracts is limited to contracts, typically
premarital and marital contracts, relinquishing or limiting spousal
inheritance rights at death.
At the early common law, premarital and marital contracts were
ineffectual. As a married woman lacked the capacity to contract, a wife
could not enter into a valid contract with her husband during marriage.
If the couple contracted with each other prior to marriage, upon marriage
the wife's legal identity merged into her husband. This civil death of a
I- LouisE E. GRAHAM & JAMEs G. KELLER, KENTUCKY DoMEstic RELAtiONS LAW
§ 13.02(A) (1988).
Id. § 13.02(B).
". See id. § 7.03.
Id. § 7.05(D).
558 Whalen v. Whalen, 581 S.W.2d 578, 579-80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(enforcing a reconciliation agreement because it contemplated a resumption of the marital
relationship and provided for a property distribution in the event that the reconciliation
failed). But cf. Clark v. Clark, 425 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky. 1968) (holding a reconciliation
agreement unenforceable because it only contained provisions that became operative at
divorce).
'" See Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 936-37 (Ky. 1990); Edwardson
v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945-46 (Ky. 1990). For a discussion of
antenuptial and postnuptial agreements, see GRAAAM & KELR, supra note 554,
§ 13.04.
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woman upon marriage extinguished any antenuptial agreement between
the spouses.' The common law bar to both antenuptial and postnuptial
marriage contracts has been eliminated by case law" and by
statute.-" Today, married women retain their separate legal identity
after marriage" 3 as well as their premarital capacity to contract.'
Because a premarital contract to relinquish or limit spousal inheri-
tance rights is in consideration of marriage, it is an agreement which falls
within Kentucky's Statute of Frauds. 5 As a result, the agreement must
be written and signed by the party to be charged."6 Kentucky does not
follow the rule that part performance of an unenforceable oral contract is
sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of Fraud's writing
requirement." Thus, even if a marriage subsequent to an oral premari-
tal contract is construed as part performance of the contract, the oral
agreement is nonetheless unenforceable.5'
If a party to an oral antenuptial agreement has received part of the
consideration from the other party and then invokes the Statute of Frauds
defense to avoid complying with the remaining terms of the agreement,
the consideration already received must be returned."' In one case,57
the oral premarital contract provided that each party renounced her or his
interest in the estate of the other and that each would make the other the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the promisor's life. When the
wife died, her husband claimed the proceeds of the life insurance policy
on her life as the policy's beneficiary, but he also claimed his spousal
share of her estate. He alleged that their oral antenuptial contract was
unenforceable. The court readily sustained the unenforceability of the
" 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENuPTiAL CONTRACTS
§ 90, at 90-26 to 90-27 (1985).
5" See Maze's Ex'rs v. Maze, 99 S.W. 336, 337 (Ky. 1907) (refusing to rely on trial
court's rationale that a married woman could not contract with her husband because she
was femme couverte).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 404.010-.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
Id. § 404.010.
Id. § 404.020.
Id. § 371.010(5).
5Id. § 371.010.
See Terry v. Terry, 95 S.W.2d 282, 283-84 (Ky. 1936).
See Wesley v. Wesley, 204 S.W. 165, 170 (Ky. 1918) (holding that an oral
antenuptial agreement to give the wife a specific sum of money in consideration of the
marriage was unenforceable).
See, e.g., Newby v. Wilson, 307 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Ky. 1957).
Glazebrook v. Glazebrook's Ex'r, 13 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1929).
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contract because it was not in writing. However, the court held that the
husband was the beneficary on the insurance policy only as consideration
for the oral agreement." Therefore, he was not permitted to keep the
consideration and rely on the Statute of Frauds to avoid his contract
promise renouncing any interest m his wife's property. The court
permitted him to elect to take Ins renounced share against the will of his
wife, but he had to return the insurance proceeds to his wife's estate.'
Although oral premarital and marital contracts are unenforceable,
testimony concerning such oral agreements is admissible for some
purposes. If there was fraud or mistake in the procurement of a written
contract, the fraud or mistake may be proven by parol evidence of a
previous or contemporaneous oral agreement between the parties that
vanes or contradicts the terms and conditions of the written agree-
ment. 3
The terms of a premarital and marital agreement not only must be m
writing, but the terms must also be unambiguous. 4 Any ambiguity m
the meaning of the contract is construed against the person relying on the
contract.' In Hardesty v. Hardesty's Executor'76  the antenuptial
agreement expressly provided that the wife would receive a certain
denomination savings bond if she survived her husband. Although the
contract did not contain any express waiver of dower and other marital
rights by the wife, such a waiver can be implied when the antenuptial
contract makes such substantial provisions for the spouse as to indicate
that it was intended to be m lieu of dower and other inheritance
rights.' However, this contract provision of $500 for the wife was not
a substantial sum. Thus, no implied waiver was found. Instead, the court
construed the agreement against the husband's estate. The court treated
the husband's promise as merely an inducement to marry and not as a
Id. at 777-78.
mId.
ro Games v. Games' Adm'r, 173 S.W 774, 776 (Ky. 1915) (using parole evidence to
explain and interpret circumstances surrounding a written antenuptial agreement).
S74See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 200 (Arz. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
husband's antenuptial agreement to support his wife through her master's degree program
was unenforceable because it did not clearly set forth all the material terms). But see
Jackson v. Jackson, 626 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1982) (holding that a husband's antenuptial
agreement to furnish his wife with "decent support during his natural life" was
enforceable).
'7' Hardesty v. Hardesty's Ex'r, 34 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ky. 1936).
7 34 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1936).
5m Id.
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complete settlement of the wife's rights. 8 As a result, the wife took the
$500 bond as well as her elective share in her deceased husband's
estate
. 9
Premarital and marital contracts also require an exchange of
consideration in order to be valid. In an antenuptial contract, the marriage
is adequate consideration to support the contract.580 In a postnuptial
contract, the consideration requirement is satisfied if both parties either
waive existing rights or take on new obligations.5 ' For postnuptial
contracts that do not contain reciprocal promises, the consideration might
be found in the continuation of the marriage.
There are only two Kentucky cases involving a postnuptial marriage
contract. In the most recent case, Herren v. Cochran,5" the parties to
a valid premarital contract executed an addendum to it after their
marriage. The addendum made certain provisions more generous for the
wife if the husband were to die during the first five years of the marriage,
but did not contain any consideration for these changes. The court did not
address the validity of the addendum because the husband did not die
until seven years after the marriage. However, it is interesting to note that
the court in discussing the addendum referred to it "as moot," not as
invalid." In Maze's Executors v. Maze,' the earlier Kentucky case,
the court invalidated a postnuptial agreement by which a husband and
wife waived all of their inheritance rights. The court invalidated the
agreement not because it was a postnuptial agreement, but because it was
inequitable and fraudulently obtained by the husband." 5
Although premarital and marital contracts must be supported by
consideration, the consideration need not be expressed in the writing
embodying the terms of the agreement."' When necessary, the
consideration may be proved by parol or other evidence. Similarly, even
if adequate consideration to support the contract is recited in the writing
m Id.
579 Id. at 443.
noId.
.Cfq. Scott v. Scott, 529 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Ky. 1975) (holding that mutual waivers
and promises are adequate consideration).
" 697 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1985).
Id. at 150.
99 S.W. 336 (Ky. 1907).
-"'Id. at 336-37.
' . Glazebrook v. Glazebrook's Ex'r, 13 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Ky. 1929) (stating that
the designation of appellant as beneficiary under a life insurance policy pursuant to an
antenuptial agreement was part of the consideration for said agreement).
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evidencing the contract, the truthfulness of the recital may be attacked by
parol and other evidence.'
As with all contracts, premarital and marital contracts cannot be
procured by fraud or undue influence. However, the party attacking the
validity of such contracts is not required to produce the same volume or
degree of proof of fraud or undue influence as would be necessary to set
aside an ordinary contract"m The rationale behind this lower standard
for establishing fraud or undue influence in the case of premarital or
marital contracts is that the agreement arises out of a confidential, not a
commercial, relationship. u9
Fraud may take the form of a knowing misrepresentation by one of
the contracting parties of her or his assets. An actionable misrepresenta-
tion must satisfy the elements of the common law tort of deceit. One
party must make a knowing, material, false statement with the intent of
inducing reliance by the other party, and the other party must reasonably
rely upon the false statement.' g In the context of premarital and marital
contracts, fraud more commonly takes the form of nondisclosure or
concealment; 1 that is, one of the parties does not fairly disclose the
value of her or his property to the other party.
For a premarital or marital contract to be valid, the party who is
waiving inheritance and other property rights in the other spouse's estate
must be aware of the nature and the extent of the other spouse's estate
and the value of the marital rights in that property which are being
surrendered by the terms of the contract.5' Typically, the waiving
spouse acquires her or his knowledge of the nature and extent of the other
spouse's estate directly from the other spouse. 93 However, in Gaines
v. Gaines'Administrator,s" the prospective husband's failure to disclose
his assets did not invalidate the antenuptial contract because the
prospective wife had personal knowledge, acquired from her years in the
community, that her husband-to-be was the "wealthiest man in Boone
'" C. Apple v. McCullough, 38 S.W.2d 955, 956-57 (Ky. 1931) (holding that
consideration recited in a written contract may be contradicted by parol evidence).
.1. Maze's Ex'rs, 99 S.W. at 337.
" Potter's Ex'r v. Potter, 29 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1930) (invalidating an antenuptial
agreement for nondisclosure).
590 W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSEP AND KEETON ON THE LAW Op TORTS § 105,
at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
' E.g., Potter's Ex'r, 29 S.W.2d at 16.
59 Id.
' E.g., Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Ky. 1935).
' 173 S.W. 774 (Ky. 1915).
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County."'595 Thus, either actual disclosure by the contracting party or notice
from other sources of the nature and size of the prospective spouse's estate
will defeat a claim that the contract was obtained fraudulently through
nondisclosure or concealment.
An antenuptial contract signed before the waiving party is fully apprised
of the nature and extent of the other party estate and the value of the marital
rights being surrendered is valid if there, is full disclosure prior to the
marriage 6 In Stratton v. Wilson597 the court sustained such a contract.
Even though the waiving party had signed the contract before full disclosure
was made, the court treated the marriage of the parties subsequent to the
signing of the contract and the disclosure of assets as a manifestation of the
waiving partyt willingness to accept the provisions of the contract59
A gross disproportion between the amount the waiving party is to receive
under the contract and what that party would have received under the statutes
controlling the inheritance rights of a spouse does not in itself establish fraud
in the procurement of the contract 5" However, it does give rise to a
rebuttable presumption that the contract was obtained by fraud, and the court
will carefully scrutinize the circumstances of the execution of such
agreements.' The party relying on the contract bears the burden of
showing that, despite the disproportionality, the execution of the contract was
fairly obtained without fraud, concealment, or deception!0 ' For example,
in Harlin v. Harlin the wife was to receive only one twenty-fiflh of her
husband estate if she survived him. This amount was significantly less than
what the inheritance statutes would have given her. Nonetheless, the court
sustained the contract because the husband had fully disclosed the nature and
extent of his estate prior to entering into the contract and because there were
no other indicia of unfairness about the contract. 3
There are cases from other jurisdictions requiring each spouse to have
counsel in order to insure a fair contract free from fraud and undue
influence.' In Kentucky, however, the absence of independent counsel,
standing alone, does not raise a presumption of fraud or undue influence0 5
... Id. at 776.
' Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1990).
7 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1916), overrded on different grounds by Gentry v. Gentry, 798
S.W.2d 928, 934 (Ky. 1990).
Id. at 525.
Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d 937, 939-40 (Ky. 1935); Gaines, 173 S.W. at 777.
Gaines, 173 S.W. at 777.
601 Id.
87 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1935).
Id. at 939-40.
E.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 214 (Wash. 1972).
65 See Lipski v. Lipsi, 510 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1974) (sustaining an antenuptial
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Premarital and marital contracts must be freely entered into by the
parties. A showing of undue influence or duress negates the voluntariness
of the transaction. Such a showing can be made in those situations where
one party to the contract so dominates the other that the weaker party's
volition is overcome. For example, in Tilton v. Tilton °6 the court struck
an antenuptial contract between a financially well-off businessman and his
poor, uneducated housekeeper because of his overwhelming dominance
in the relationship." 7 A similar result was reached in Potter's Executor
v. Potter,"8 because the husband was a person of means and the wife
was financially dependent on her family, could only read and write a
little, and lacked any business knowledge.' The superiority of the
husband's bargaining position amounted to undue influence. However, in
Lipski v. Lipsl)d 1 the court sustained an antenuptial contract providing
the wife with only $25,000 out of a million dollar estate. The court
determined that the parties were of equal bargaining power, or at least
had enough power so as to protect their individual interests.6 Although
the husband was a prosperous businessman, the wife in this case was a
woman of education whom the court characterized as possessing good
judgment. The court also assumed that the wife had knowledge of a
surviving spouse's legal rights because her previous marriage had ended
in the death of her husband.1
If the more dominant spouse deprives the weaker spouse of an
opportunity to consult with friends and family prior to signing the
contract the court may use that fact as a ground for finding that the
contract was a product of undue influence."" Conversely, a lapse of
time between an agreement to relinquish or modify inheritance rights and
agreement despite only one party being represented by counsel); Harlin, 87 S.W.2d at
937.
113 S.W. 134 (Ky. 1908).
6"Id. at 137.
29 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1930).
6 Id. at 16.
610 510 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1974).
1 Id. at 8.
612 Id.
613 Maze's Ex'rs v. Maze, 99 S.W. 336, 337 (Ky. 1907) (acting under the advice of
his lawyer, the husband had his wife write out the marital contract, thereby avoiding the
witnessing requirement and depriving the wife of an opportunity to consult with her
friends or counsel); Simpson v. Simpson's Ex'rs, 23 S.W. 361, 362-63 (Ky. 1893)
(discussing a situation where the husband had his future wife sign an antenuptial
agreement drawn up two days before their scheduled marriage and deprived his wife of
an opportunity to consult with her friends by insisting that the marriage take place at 5:00
am. the next morning).
[Vol. 82
KENTUCKY INTESTACY LAWS
the actual signing of the contract containing those terms refutes the
allegation that the waiving party was under the dominion of the other
party. 14 Although the cases setting aside a premarital contract for
undue influence in Kentucky all involve a dominant male, shrewd in
business, who marries an uneducated, submissive woman, the undue
influence defense to enforcement of an antenuptial contract is not so
limited. It would be equally applicable to a situation in which a younger
woman takes undue advantage of an older man in order to procure a
relinquishment of his inheritance rights in her estate.
Although there are cases to the contrary in other states,61 a pre-
sumption of undue influence should not arise merely because one of the
parties either threatens to call off the engagement or will not agree to the
mariage unless certain provisions are included in an antenuptial contract
Any other rule is inconsistent with the idea behind premarital and marital
contracts that spouses generally have the capacity to bargain with each
other. A prospective spouse should be able to offer the terms under which
she or he is willing to marry without giving rise to a charge of undue
influence in the procurement of the contract.
While there is a greater potential for duress and undue influence
when one prospective spouse presents an antenuptial contract to another
immediately prior to the marriage ceremony, Kentucky case law has
sustained the validity of an antenuptial contract signed only a half an
hour before the wedding."6 The parties in Harlin v. Harlin had general-
ly discussed the terms of the agreement for a period of three to four
months prior to the day of the signing and the wedding."7 The issue in
the case of a marriage contract executed on the day of, or very close to,
the wedding is not just the timing, but whether the would-be spouses
have previously discussed the terms. If the agreement merely reflects the
results of earlier discussions, there ought not to be a finding of undue
influence in the procurement of the contract. 8 If, however, the terms
of the contract were not discussed prior to its presentment shortly before
" See Gaines v. Gaines' Adm'r, 173 S.W. 774, 777-78 (Ky. 1915) (discussing a
situation in which a second antenuptial contract was signed six months after the execution
of an earlier contract containing substantially the same provisions).
' See, e.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
In re Marriage of Matson, 705 P.2d 817, 820-21 (Wash. 1985).
Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ky. 1935).6 7Id.
"1 See Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 (Mass. 1981) (upholding an
antenuptial agreement that was previously discussed by the parties and presented to the
intended husband on their wedding day).
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the wedding, a very heavy presumption of undue influence is appropri-
ate.619
There is also a fairness requirement for marriage contracts which
must be satisfied in conjunction with, and independent of, any other
allegations of fraud, duress, or undue influence. This requirement goes
beyond the idea that a contract cannot be the product of fraud, duress, or
undue influence. It is really an equitable idea that functions either as an
independent limit on premarital and marital contracts or as supporting
evidence tending to prove fraud or undue influence. The contract
provisions must be reasonable and entered into in good faith by both
parties.2 The fairness of the contract is determined by careful scrutiny
of all the circumstances surrounding its execution." The age of the
parties, their previous matrimonial experience, and the circumstances of
each party,' including their business acumen,6' educational
levels,6' relative financial situations,6' whether the marriage is one
of convenience,62 and the haste or secretiveness of the signing' are
relevant factors in determining the fairness of the contract provisions. For
example, a marriage of convenience might explain the disproportionality
of the provisions for one of the parties. A hasty or secretive signing of
the contract might be indicative of an unfairly obtained agreement.
Premarital and marital contracts are effective to limit or bar the
surviving spouse's inheritance rights as long as the contract has not been
abandoned or revoked. Unilateral, inter vivos abandonment is a recog-
nized defense to the enforcement of an antenuptial agreement.' The
surviving spouse must show that the deceased spouse possessed actual or
mSee Simpson v. Simpson's Ex'rs, 23 S.W. 361, 362 (Ky. 1893).
"0 Tilton v. Tilton, 113 S.W. 134, 136-37 (Ky. 1908).
See Harlin, 87 S.W.2d at 939-40; Gaines v. Gaines' Adm'r, 173 S.W. 774, 777-78
(Ky. 1915).
62 Harlin, 87 S.W.2d at 939.
Maze's Ex'rs v. Maze, 99 S.W. 336, 337 (Ky. 1907).
Lipski v. Lipski, 510 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1974); Potter's Ex'r v. Potter, 29 S.W.2d
15, 16 (Ky. 1930); Plton, 113 S.W. at 137.
s Potter's Ex'r, 29 S.W.2d at 16; Tilton, 113 S.W. at 137; Simpson v. Simpson's
Ex'rs, 23 S.W. 361, 362 (Ky. 1893).
' Gaines v. Gaines' Adm'r, 173 S.W. 774, 777 (Ky. 1915).
' Maze's Ex'rs, 99 S.W. at 336-37; Simpson, 23 S.W. at 362.
62 See Harlin v. Harlin, 87 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Ky. 1935) (holding that a husband's
failure to pay certain taxes stipulated in the antenuptial contract for the year in which he
died did not constitute an abandonment of the contract); see also Prather v. Cox, 689
S.W.2d 623, 624 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (finding the evidence sufficient for reasonable
minds to conclude that the husband had abandoned the antenuptial contract by controlling
both spouses' property and commingling it).
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constructive knowledge of the proper interpretation of the terms and
voluntarily abandoned the contract by failing to carry out some of its
terms.' If this is established, the contract will no longer serve as a bar
to the surviving spouse's inheritance rights. As with other contracts,
revocation of an antenuptial or postnuptial contract, as opposed to
abandonment, cannot be accomplished unilaterally. While the issue of
whether these types of contracts can be revoked orally is unresolved, 30
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has treated physical destruction of the
antenuptial contract by one spouse in the presence of the other spouse as
a valid revocation of the instrument.63
For a premarital or marital agreement to be valid against a bona fide
purchaser from, or creditor ot one of the parties to the contract, the
contract must be acknowledged and recorded.'
D. Disclaimers
Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Disclaimer of Transfers by Will,
Intestacy or Appointment Act (the "Act").633 The Act eliminated the
common law rule that a testate share could be disclaimed by the intended
beneficiary within a reasonable period of time after the testator's death,
but that an intestate share could not be renounced by its recipient.'
Under the common law rule, title to intestate property passed to the
intestate taker instantly upon the death of the decedent, whereas a will
gift had to be accepted by the donee before title actually devolved. While
a disclaimer by a will beneficiary prevented title from passing to the
intended beneficiary, a disclaimer by an intestate taker divested the
intestate taker of title to the property renounced.635 This conceptual
distinction between disclaimers by will beneficiaries and disclaimers by
intestate takers meant that the latter event was treated as a gratuitous
transfer of title by the disclaimant to another. This, in turn, meant that the
disclaimer had federal gift tax implications.' The Act eliminates the
m Harlin, 87 S.W.2d at 940.
"0 Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522, 524-25 (Ky. 1916), overnded on different
growus by Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Ky. 1990).
" 'Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
12 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
- Id. §§ 394.610-.680.
04 ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 774-76.
"'Id. at 775-76.
'3' Hardenberg v. Commn'r, 198 F.2d 63, 66 (8th Cir.) (discussing the effect of an
intestate disclaimer), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952), aft'g, 17 T.C. 166 (1951); Brown
v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914, 916-17 (6th Cir.) (discussing the effect ofatestate disclaimer),
cert. denied, "290 U.S. 641 (1933).
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conceptual distinction between these two acts of renunciation by
permitting disclaimers by both intestate and testate takers.637 Neither
type of disclaimer is now treated as a gratuitous transfer of the disclaim-
ant's interest in the property.
By adopting the Act the legislature has expanded the right to
disclaim of many takers. Not only may both intestate and testate takers
disclaim, but a will beneficiary who is given a future interest, rather than
a present interest, in property of either a legal or equitable nature may
also disclaim.' u Will beneficiaries of interests such as a power to
consume, to appoint, or to apply property for any purpose also have the
right to disclaim such interests. 39 The Act extends the right to disclaim
to representatives of incapacitated or protected persons and to appointees
under a power of appointment exercised by a testamentary
instrument.' " Successive disclaimers are permitted because persons
succeeding to a disclaimed interest also have the power to disclaim."1
Since 1980, the right to disclaim survives the death of the person having
the right to do so. 2 The right may be exercised by the personal
representative of such a person within the time periods stipulated in the
Act"4
3
A person who has the right to disclaim may disclaim in whole or in
part.' At the least complicated level, a partial disclaimer permits an
intestate or testate taker to disclaim some fractional portion of her or his
share." 5 Thus, an intestate taker who is entitled to all of the decedent's
estate could disclaim a third of her or his interest and retain title to a
two-thirds interest in the estate. A will beneficiary who was given land
and money could disclaim one gift and keep the other. Similarly, a sole
intestate taker of a decedent who died owning Blackacre in fee simple
should be able to disclaim her or his fee title to a physical portion of the
land. For example, if Blackacre consists of ninety-nine acres, the intestate
should be able to disclaim fee title to one-third of the land while retaining
fee title to the remaining sixty-six acres. In addition, a will recipient of
-7 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.610 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1984).
638 Id.
-9 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(a) cmt., 8 U.L.A. 161 (1991).
K 3 . REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.610 (MichiefBobbs-Menill 1984).
41 Id.
-2 1980 Ky. Acts cI. 259, § 17.
63 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.610 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
"Id.
64 2 RICHARD V. WELLMAN, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 73 (2d
ed. 1977).
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a $1000 monetary bequest should be able to disclaim ownership of some
part of the sum of money and keep the rest.
The more difficult question is whether the Act's provision on partial
disclaimers authorizes a disclaimer that has the effect of changing the
nature of the disclaimant's title interest in the property. For example,
suppose an intestate taker of a fee simple interest in Blackacre wants to
disclaim all but a life estate interest in the land.' Under Kentucky's
intestacy statutes, the sole intestate taker succeeds to the decedent's whole
title in the land that the decedent died owning."7 When there is more
than one intestate taker, they are concurrent owners of a fractional interest
in the same size estate that the decedent died owning. ' If the Act
authorizes the disclaimer of part of the decedent's title as well as title to
a physical part of the land, the intestate taker's remaining interest in the
land is one incapable of creation by operation of the state's intestacy laws.
A fee simple interest in either one hundred acres of land or in ten acres
of land because of a disclaimer of title to ninety acres is still the same
title interest the intestacy statutes contemplate descending to an intestate
taker. However, a life estate in land that the decedent owned at death in
fee simple is not an interest capable of being created in an intestate taker
by operation of the intestacy statutes. At least one commentator has
suggested that if the disclaiming instrument, rather than the intestacy
statutes or the will, determines the nature of the taker's title, the
disclaimer ought not to be permitted.49 Thus, under this interpretation
of the Act, it would be permissible to disclaim title to a physical part of
the object of the gift, but it would be impermissible to disclaim part of
the title interest in the object of the gift.
A valid disclaimer must be done via a writing that declares the
disclaimant's intention to disclaim, describes the property or interest
disclaimed as well as the extent of the disclaimer, and is signed by the
disclaimant.o8 To remove the uncertainties of the common law rule that
a disclaimer had to be made within a reasonable period of time,65 the
Act fixes a definite time within which a disclaimer must be made. A
disclaimer of a present interest must be made within nine months after the
" This situation is significantly different from the disclaimer of all title to some
physical portion of Blackacre. The attempted disclaimer, if permitted, actually redefines
the nature of the intestate share of the disclaimant.
"7 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
'Id.
'
9 WIMAN, supra note 645, at 73-74.
6 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.610 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
6" ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 776.
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death of the property owner or donee of the power.652 A future interest
must be disclaimed no later than nine months after the taker of the
interest is definitely ascertained and the interest taken is indefeasibly
vested.65
3
For example, if a will leaves property to "A for life, remainder to B,"
the life tenant's interest must be disclaimed within nine months of the
testator's death because A is given a present possessory life estate in the
property. Although B is given a future interest in remainder, B must also
disclaim within nine months of the testator's death. The identity of the
taker (B) is fixed at the moment of the testator's death. As there is no
requirement that B must survive the life tenant to take the remainder, B's
remainder interest is indefeasibly vested at the death of the testator. If on
the other hand, the devise were to "A for life, then ifB survives A, to B,"
A must again disclaim within nine months of the testator's death, but B
must disclaim no later than nine months after the death of A. Only when
A dies survived by B does B's interest indefeasibly vest in B.
The disclaimant must file the disclaimer in the district court of the
county in which proceedings have been or could be commenced, if not
yet commenced, for the administration of the deceased owner's estate.6'
A copy of the disclaimer must also be delivered in person or mailed by
registered or certified mail to the personal representative or other
fiduciary of the decedent or donee of the power.655 If disclaiming real
property or an interest in real property, the disclaimant may record a copy
of the disclaimer in the office of the county clerk of the county in which
the real property is situated.6
Even if the relevant time period for disclaiming has not yet expired,
the right to disclaim may be otherwise barred. Various acts of the
disclaimant, inconsistent with renunciation, bar the right to renounce.
Such acts include 'an assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or
transfer of the interest or a contract therefor.6' Similarly, a written
waiver of the right to disclaim will bar a later attempt to disclaim.'
Acceptance of the interest by the disclaimant659 or the judicial sale of
"2 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 394.620(1) (Micbie/Bobbs-Mefrill 1984).
Id. § 394.620(2).
654 Id. § 394.620(3).
6 Id.
6 Id. From the perspective ofa title examiner, this provision for permissive recording
of a disclaimed interest in real property should have been mandatory.
6Y Id. § 394.640(1)(a).
"' Id. § 394.640(1)(b).
9 Id. § 394.640(1)(c).
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the interest for the account of the disclaimant before the disclaimer is
effected also bars the right to disclaim.'
The disclaimant is not barred from disclaiming by outside events or
limitations placed on his interest. For example, as a taking by eminent
domain is unrelated to the satisfaction of the disclaimant's obligations, a
timely disclaimer of the proceeds of a condemnation action is not barred
by such a judicial proceeding."' Also, the right to disclaim is not
barred if the interest is subject to a spendthrift limitation, such as those
imposed on trust beneficiaries, or similar restrictions. 2 If a valid
disclaimer or a written waiver of the right to disclaim is made, it binds
the disolaimant and all persons claiming through or under the
disclaimant."
In all cases of intestate disclaimers and in cases where a testator or
donee of the power has not provided otherwise, the disclaimed interest,
regardless of its character as a present or future interest, devolves as if the
disclaimant had predeceased the property owner or the donee of the
power."4 In intestacy, if the decedent were survived by two children,
one of whom disclaimed and had three children of her or his own, the
nondisclaiming child would take only half of the estate. The issue of the
disclaimant would share the other half equally because the estate is
distributed as if the decedent had been survived by only one child and the
issue of a predeceased child.
Similarly, future interests that take effect at the termination of the
disclaimed interest take effect as if the disclaimant had predeceased the
property owner or the donee of the power."5 For example, if a testator
left Blackacre to "my daughter for life, remainder to her children who
survive her" and the daughter disclaimed with two children alive, the
remainder is accelerated. That is, the two children of the daughter take a
present fee interest in Blackacre at the death of the testator. Each is a
tenant in common with an undivided one-half interest in the land even
though these children might actually predecease their mother or more
children might be born later to their mother.'
Because the statute expressly provides that a disclaimer relates back
"for all purposes" to the date of death of the property owner or the donee
d I § 394.640(I)(d).
UNiP. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d) cmts., 8 U.L.A. 168 (1991).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.640(2) (Micbie/Bobbs-Merril 1984).
Id. § 394.640(3).
Id. § 394.630.
60 Id.
6 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) cmts., 8 U.LA. 165-66 (1991).
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of the power," the Act affects the rights of taxing authorities, creditors
of the disclaimant, and the disclaimant's surviving spouse. Regardless ot
the disclaimant's motive for the disclaimer, the disclaimed property is
never part of the disclaimant's estate." Therefore, the disclaimer is not
treated as a gift by the disclaimant. The dower rights of the disclaimant's
spouse never attach to the disclaimed property, and the disclaimant's
creditors have no claim to the property for satisfaction of the disclaim-
ant's debts. In fact, the creditors are not even entitled to notice of the
disclaimer.
69
The Act is the exclusive method of disclaimer for intestate takers,
devisees, legatees, other beneficiaries under a testamentary instrument,
appointees under an exercised testamentary power of appointment, and
those succeeding to such disclaimed interests."0 Although the Act
supplants the common law right of such persons to disclaim, the Act does
not affect one's right to waive, release, disclaim, or renounce under other
statutes."1 Specifically, the Act does not affect the surviving spouse's
right to renounce under KRS section 394.0802 or the right of the
donee of a power to renounce the power under KRS section 386.095.' 3
Finally, the Act- does not govern disclaimers by a grantee of an inter
vivos conveyance, a donee of an inter vivos gift, a surviving joint tenant,
a beneficiary under a nontestamentary instrument or contract, a person
succeeding to any such interest, or an appointee under a power of
appointment exercised by a nontestamentary instrument. Such non-
testamentary disclaimers are governed by the Uniform Disclaimer of
Transfers Under Nontestamentary Instruments Act.64
E. Ancestral Property
At the common law, "ancestral property" was real property that the
decedent acquired by intestate succession (descent) from an ancestor. The
normal rules of intestate succession were altered because of the ancestral
source of the realty. Upon the decedent's intestate death without issue,
ancestral property, unlike other property, was inheritable only by
66 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.630 (Michie/Bobbs-Menr11 1984).
6 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c) cmts., 8 U.L.A. 166 (1991).
6" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.650 (MichiielBobbs-Merrill 1984).
671 id.
- Id. § 394.080.
- Id. § 386.095.
64 Id. § 394.035.
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collateral relatives of the decedent who were also of the blood of the
ancestor who first purchased the property. 5
The purpose of this doctrine of ancestral property was to keep real
property within the blood family into which it was originally brought. 6
The doctrine was strictly applied. For example, assume the decedent died
intestate without issue owning Blackacre, a piece of land which the
decedent had acquired by intestate succession from her or his father who
had been the first purchaser of the land. Only paternal collateral relatives
of the decedent could succeed to the ownership of Blackacre. If the
decedent died survived by a half-blood sibling through the decedent's
mother and a paternal first cousin, the paternal first cousin inherited
Blackacre because the half-blood sibling was not related to the decedent's
father who first purchased the land. If there were no relatives of both the
decedent and the father who survived the decedent, but only the maternal
half-blood sibling, the land did not pass to this maternal collateral relative
of the decedent. Instead, the land escheated to the state.'
Most American jurisdictions no longer distinguish between ancestral
real property and other real property that the decedent died owning.'
However, consistent with its emphasis on keeping intestate property
within bloodlines, Kentucky continues to recognize by statute a modified
form of the ancestral property doctrine. 9 When applicable, the ances-
tral property statute overrides or limits the general laws relating to the
descent of real property.
Kentucky's ancestral property statute distinguishes between adult and
minor decedents in its application. If an adult decedent dies intestate and
without issue, and if the decedent died owning real estate acquired by gift
from a parent and the parent who made the gift survives, the real property
passes back to the donor parent to the exclusion of the decedent's other
parent. If the parent who made the gift does not survive the adult
decedent, however, the realty passes under the normal rules for the
descent of realty without regard to its ancestral origin.' °
If the decedent is a minor who died intestate and without issue
owning realty acquired by inter vivos gift, intestate succession or devise
from a parent there is a more radical departure from the general pattern
S ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 39. A person was the first purchaser of the land if she
or he obtained it by any manner other than descent. Id. at n.9.
06 Id. at 77.
6
" Id. at 39 n.9.
' Id. at 77.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Micbie/Bobbs-MerriU 1984).
ao Id. § 391.020(1).
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of succession to realty. In the case of a minor decedent, if the parent who
made the gift survives the minor decedent, the result is the same as when
the decedent is an adult. The whole of the real property returns to the
donor parent. However, if the donor parent does not survive the minor
decedent, the land descends only to the kindred of the donor parent."'
Further, the normal pattern of intestate succession to the land is restored
only if the kindred of the donor parent who survive the decedent are
more remotely related to the decedent than grandparents, aunts and
uncles, and their descendants.'
Both the common law doctrine of ancestral property and Kentucky's
ancestral property statute apply only to real property and do not apply to
gifts of money or other personalty that the decedent acquired from the
ancestral source and died owning."3 If, during the decedent's lifetime,
real estate acquired from a parent is converted into money (personalty),
the question arises at the decedent's death whether the proceeds of the
conversion are realty subject to the dictates of the ancestral property
statute or personalty which is exempt from the statute. Regardless of
whether the conversion was the product of a volitional act of the decedent
(a sale), a nonvolitional act (a mortgage foreclosure), or a compulsory
taking (a condemnation proceeding), if the decedent was sui Juris at
the time of the conversion, the proceeds are personalty.' However,
when real property of a person who is not sui juris is converted by a
guardian or a committee for that person pursuant to some compulsory,
statutory power, the courts have held that although the proceeds are
personalty for some purposes, they are realty for purposes of inheri-
tance.686
In McCoy v. Ferguson,' for example, the proceeds of a lawful
condemnation of land of an infant were treated as personalty in the hands
of the infant's guardian from the time the guardian received the proceeds
until the ward's death. After the death of the minor ward, however, the
remaining proceeds were realty for purposes of intestate inheritance. As
the real property taken in the condemnation proceeding had been
inherited by the infant decedent from a parent, the remaining proceeds
1 Id. § 391.020(2).
a2 Id.
Guier v. Bridges, 70 S.W. 288, 289 (Ky. 1902).
4 uijuris literally means "of his own right." In this context the term refers to one
who has "the capacity to manage one's own affairs" or who is '!not under a legal
disability to act for one's self." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1602 (4th ed. 1957).
McCoy v. Ferguson, 60 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. 1933).
'Id.
60 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1933).
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were subject to the dictates of the ancestral property statute. Thus, the
proceeds passed to the kindred of the donor parent!' In an earlier
case, the court relied on a specific statute, which was repealed by the
time McCoy was decided, to distribute the proceeds from the sale of real
estate that the minor had inherited from her father to the paternal aunts and
uncles to the exclusion of the infant's mother. 9' The McCoy decision,
however, clearly rests on a policy decision, not on a statute. A judicial sale
of an infants land does not exempt the proceeds of the sale from the
operation of the statutes controlling the descent of real estate including the
mandates of the ancestral property statute.69
At the common law, only real estate that the decedent acquired by
descent from an ancestor was classified as ancestral property.693 Kentucky's
definition of statutory ancestral property is broader. The definition includes
real property of an adult decedent acquired by inter vivos gift and real
property of a minor decedent acquired by inter vivos and testamentary gift as
well as by descent from a parent.'
If a purported sale of realty by a parent to a child is actually a gift of the
land, the court will ignore the form of the conveyance and treat the land as
realty subject to the ancestral property statute. In Yaden v. Moore,695
because the father was in financial difficulty, he executed a deed to a farm to
his adult son. When the son subsequently predeceased his father and mother
without issue, the court treated the transfer as a git and not as a sale, of the
land because the father had received only nominal consideration.
Consequently, the entire farm passed to the father under the ancestral property
statute to the complete exclusion of the decedent's mother.696
Kentucky's ancestral property statute is narrower than the common law
doctrine in one respect. Under the statute, the ancestral source of the real
property must be the decedents parent,697 whereas the common law
SI Id. at 932-33.
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
6 McDonald v. Weisiger, 100 S.W. 832 (Ky. 1907).
.. Id. at 833.
w McCoy, 60 S.W.2d at 932. Contra Layne v. Clark, 153 S.W. 437, 440 (Ky. 1913)
(treating proceeds from timber severed during infant donee's lifetime as personalty and
as not subject to ancestral property statute).
' ATKNSON, supra note 3, at 39.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(1)-(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1984).
24 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1930).
Yaden, 24 S.W.2d at 927-28; see also Bagby v. Bagby, 152 S.W. 537 (Ky. 1913)
(conveying a gift of property from the decedent son's mother back to her onhis death, to
the exclusion of the decedent's father).
"'7 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(1)-(2) (MichiefBobbs-Menill 1984).
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doctrine contained no such limitation. Under the common law, the source of
the realty could be any ancestor of the decedent.69 As the Kentucky statute
is strictly construed, 99 if the source of the intestate's title to real property
is a grandparent or sibling,"' the property descends without reference
to the provisions of the ancestral property statute. Even if the siblingt title
that the decedent inherited originally came from the decedent's parent, the
ancestral property statute is still inapplicable.7 In one case,"3 upon the
death of the father, a brother and sister inherited equal one-half interests in a
vested remainder that their father had owned at his death. The sister
subsequently died an infant survived by her brother and her mother. The
brother thereafter died an infant survived by his mother and paternal kindred.
The one-half interest in the vested remainder that the brother had inherited
directly from his father descended to his father's kindred, not to his mother,
because it was a real property interest subject to the ancestral property statute.
The decedent's remaining fractional interest inthe vested remainder descended
to his mother without reference to the ancestral property statute because the
decedent's sister, not his father, had been the source of the intestate's title to
that fractional interest.!4
Other questions have arisen concerning the source of the decedentb title
to real property that the decedent owned at death. Even if the decedent's
interest in the land is a remainder interest rather than a present possessory fee,
it is distributed in accordance with the provisions of the ancestral property
statute if the remainder was created in favor of the decedent by a parent.705
K on the other hand, a grandparent or someone else creates a life estate in the
decedent's parent with a remainder in favor of the decedent, the source of the
decedent's title is the creator of the interest, the grandparent, not the life tenant
parent.7" Therefore, that remainder interest is not ancestral property.
ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 39.
Guier v. Bridges, 70 S.W. 288, 289 (Ky. 1902).
700 Huffinan v. Hatcher, 198 S.W. 236, 236 (Ky. 1917); Turner's Trustee v.
Washington, 80 S.W. 460, 462 (Ky. 1904); Smith's Ex'r v. Smith, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 520,
521 (1866); Duncan v. Lafferty's Adm'r, 29 Ky. (6 J. Marsh.) 46, 46 (1831).
7' Conlee v. Conlee, 190 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1945).
Id.
Conlee v. Coulee, 190 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1945).
7 Id. at 45.
7o See, e.g., Walden v. Phillips, 5 S.W. 757, 758 (Ky. 1887) (father conveyed land
to his wife for life, remainder to their children).
7 See Huffnan v. Hatcher, 198 S.W. 236, 238 (Ky. 1917) (great-grandparent was the
source); McDowell v. Kent, 194 S.W. 374, 375 (Ky. 1917) (grandparent was the source);
Guier v. Bridges, 70 S.W. 288, 288-89 (Ky. 1902) (non-relative was the source); Cooksey
v. Hill, 50 S.W. 235, 238 (Ky. 1899) (grandparent was the source); Smith's Ex'rv. Smith,
[Vol 82
KENTUCKY INTESTACY LAWS
In Cooksey v. Hill' both the will of the decedent's grandfather and
the will of the decedent's mother purported to convey the land in question
to the decedent.7 8 The court interpreted the will of the grandfather,
who had died fir as devising a defeasible fee to his daughter (the
decedent's mother) subject to divestment in favor of her children if she
died leaving any. When that in fact happened, her child (the decedent)
took the land in question as a devisee of a shifting executory interest
under the grandfather's will. The provisions of the mother's will
purporting to leave the same land to the decedent were without effect.
The mother had no interest in the land at her death to devise because the
divesting condition (death with children surviving) had occurred.7
Hence, whether the grandparent conveys a present fee interest or a future
interest in land to the decedent, the grandparent, not the parent, is the
source of the decedent's title and the property interest is not subject to the
ancestral property statute.
710
The court determined in Guier v. Bridge' that the decedent's land
does not have a parental source if the parent merely paid the price of the
land to the owner who, in turn, conveyed title to the child."2 The
stranger is treated as the source of the decedent's title, making the
ancestral property statute inapplicable. In Connell v. Harper,03
however, the court looked beyond the form of the transaction in
determining whether the decedent's realty had a parental source. Rather
than treating the third party as the source of the title, the court treated her
or him as merely the vehicle through and by which the interest of the
parents in the land was ultimately transferred to the decedent. In Connell,
a woman contemplating marriage transferred real property to her sister in
trust without any indication of the trust purpose.0 Her sister then
transferred the property in trust back to the woman for life, remainder to
the woman's children. These transfers were intended to shelter the land
from liability for the debts of the woman's intended spouse. The woman
then married, a child was born, and the woman died. After the child's
65 Ky. (2 Bush) 520, 521 (1866) (grandparent was the source); Duncan v. Lafferty's
Adm'r 29 Ky. (6 JJ. Marsh.) 46, 46 (1831) (grandparent was the source).
50 S.W. 235 (Ky. 1899).
0 Id. at 236.
Id. at 238.
71 Cookley, 50 S.W. at 238 (executory interest); see also Huffman, 98 S.W. at 238
(vested remainder); Smith's Ex'r, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 521 (fee simple).
" 70 S.W. 288 (Ky. 1902) (parent paid the purchase price).
7
n Id. at 289.
3 259 S.W. 1017 (Ky. 1924).
7 Id. at 1018.
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death, the court determined that the child's mother, not the mother's sister,
was the source of the child's title to the realty."' As the child had died
an infant and without children while owning realty acquired from a
parent, the ancestral property statute applied. The realty descended to the
maternal grandfather of the child, not to the child's own father."1
The decedent's acquisition of an interest in land from the estate of a
grandparent by either intestate inheritance or operation of the state's
antilapse statutes is property inherited from a grandparent and not
ancestral property inherited from a parental source. In Duncan v.
Lafferty's Admin'srator," the grandfather died intestate leaving a tract
of land. Because the grandfather's daughter had predeceased him, the land
passed to his daughter's child1 under a statutory provision requiring
representation in the event that a child of the decedent dies before the
decedent.719 The son of the deceased daughter took his share directly
from the decedent as the grandfather's intestate taker. Since the grandfa-
ther was the source of title to the realty, the ancestral property statute was
inapplicable. In Banks v. Cornelison," a woman devised real property
to her husband, but he predeceased her. Under the applicable antilapse
statute,"2 if a will beneficiary dies before the testator leaving issue who
survive the testator, the issue take the estate devised unless a different
disposition is made or is required by the terms of the will. Therefore, by
operation of the antilapse statute, the child of the testator took the land
as a beneficiary under his mother's will and not as his father's intestate
taker. When the child later died an infant without issue, the land passed
under the ancestral property statute to the kindred of his mother, rather
than to the child's paternal grandparents, because his mother was the
source of title.' Note that if the child's mother had died first and then
her husband had died intestate, the source of the child's title to the land
would have been the father, and the paternal grandparents would have
inherited the property.
71 Id. at 1019-20.
7
'
6 Id. at 1020.
717 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marsh.) 46 (1831).
718 Id.
*w KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.040 (MichiefBobbs-Menill 1984) (corresponds to I
Dig., 438 § 6 (1796), which was the statute in effect at the time).
169 S.W. 502 (Ky. 1914).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394A00 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984) (issue of dead
devisee or legatee take parent's share); see also id. § 394.410 (death of part of the group
of devisees before the testator); id. § 394.500 (void or lapsed devise included in
residuary).
m Banka, 169 S.W. at 503.
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The parental source of an intestate's title to real property activates the
ancestral property statute only if the decedent dies without issue.'
Under early case law, the court found that a child born out of wedlock
was issue of the mother, but not of the father. Therefore, a mother with
a surviving child born out of wedlock would die with issue, whereas the
father of such a child would be a decedent who died without issue,
In another early case m real estate had been devised to out-of-
wedlock children by the father's will When one of the children died an
infant without issue, the court held that the infant's mother and his whole-
blood sibling, who was also an out-of-wedlock child of the infant's father,
inherited the real estate to the exclusion of the decedent's half-blood
sibling who had been born in wedlock to the decedent's father and
another woman. The ancestral property statute directing that the property
of an infant decedent who dies without issue descends to the donor parent
or that parent's kindred was not applicable because the statute was found
to apply only to property derived from a legal parent. According to the
court, the father of a child born out of wedlock is not the child's legal
parent unless the father and mother married."6 In reaching its decision
in both cases, the court relied upon a statutory provision that permitted
an out-of-wedlock child to inherit by, from, and through her or his
mother, but not her or his father unless the father and mother
married.727 The continued validity of these decisions is suspect in light
of the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling in Pendleton v. Pendleton.7'
InPendleton the court declared unconstitutional Kentucky's statute on
inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock.73 The Kentucky
legislature has enacted KRS section 391.105 to replace the unconstitution-
al one. Under the new statute, the inheritance rights of children born out
of wedlock in their mother's estate are coextensive with the maternal
inheritance rights of children born in wedlock. However, the inheritance
rights of children born out of wedlock by, through, and from their father
depends upon proof that the parents attempted a marriage or an adjudica-
' See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Menrill 1984).
''Cherry v. Mitchell, 55 S.W. 689, 690 (Ky. 1900).
' Blankenship v. Ross, 25 S.W. 268 (Ky. 1894).
7
m Id. at 269.
7 Cheny, 55 S.W. at 690; Blankenship, 25 S.W. at 269; see also KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 391.090 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (corresponds to § 5, c. 31, Gen. St, which
was the statute in effect at the time).
' 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977); see also Fykes v. Clark, 635 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Ky.
1982) (permitting intestate inheritance by an out-of-wedlock, posthumous heir).
72 Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d at 539.
730 Id.
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tion of paternity." If a father who died owning realty that he acquired
from a parent was survived by a child born out of wedlock and the out-
of-wedlock child satisfied the requirements of KRS section 391.105, the
father would be survived by issue and the ancestral property statute would
be inapplicable. Similarly, if an infant born out of wedlock died owning
real estate acquired from the father by testamentary or inter vivos gift or
by intestate succession and the requirements of KRS section 391.105
were satisfied, the property would be ancestral property and would
descend to the father, if living, or to the kindred of the father, if the
father were deceased.
The ancestral property statute also treats adopted and posthumous
children as issue. In Lanferman v. Vanzile,7 when an adopted infant
child died without issue and owned real estate derived from an adopted
parent, the property descended to the adoptive parent's kindred."3 This
result is consistent with the statutory provision requiring that adopted
children be treated the same as the biological children of the adopting
parents for all purposes, including inheritance." In Lamar v. Cros-
by,7" a case involving a posthumous child, a daughter died owning
realty acquired by testamentary gift from her father. As a posthumous
child of the deceased father, the daughter shared the ancestral property
with other children of the father because they were all kindred of the
parent.' When the daughter later died, the land descended under the
ancestral property statute to her siblings, to the exclusion of her moth-
er.
73 7
Because the decedent's age at death determines the inheritance rights
of the kindred of a donor parent in ancestral property, litigation has arisen-
concerning the factual question of the decedent's age. In Bertram v.
Witherspoon's Administrator,7" the decedent died owning land that he
had inherited from his mother. He was survived by two half-blood
siblings through his father as well as by a full-blood maternal aunt. Under
the first section of the ancestral property statute, if the decedent were
over the age of majority at death, the real property derived from his
mother would not return to her because she had not survived the
7"1 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
7" 150 S.W. 1008 (Ky. 1912).
73 Id. at 1011.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Meirill 1984).
172 S.W. 693 (Ky. 1915).
7m Id. at 694.737 Id.
73 127 S.W. 533 (Ky. 1910).
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decedent." The land would, instead, pass under the general statute of
descent to the decedent's two half-blood siblings.740 in contrast, if the
decedent were a minor at death, the second section of the statute would
apply. Under that provision the land derived from the decedent's mother
would return to her kindred and the maternal aunt would take it.741
Both the maternal aunt and the half-blood siblings in Bertram
introduced testimony of individuals who supported the parties' respective
assertions concerning the decedent's age at death. Although a larger
number of witnesses supported the aunt's contention that the decedent
died an infant, the court did not rely on this numerical superiority in
resolving this purely factual question. Instead, the court relied on
evidence that the decedent had placed his date of birth such that it made
him an adult at his death and that the decedent had settled his accounts
with his guardian before his death. The court also gave credence to
statements of the aunt before the decedent's death that the decedent was
of age and to the entry of his date of birth in the family Bible. This
evidence persuaded the court that the decedent was an adult at death. As
the parental source of this adult decedent's realty had predeceased the
decedent, the real property passed under the general statute of descent to
the decedent's surviving half-blood siblings, rather than under the
ancestral property statute to his maternal aunt.742
Application of the second section of the ancestral property statute,
which provides for inheritance by the kindred of the parental source of
the land when the decedent dies an infant, can work a hardship on the
nondonor parent. It can also cause property to pass to more distantly
related relatives of the decedent to the exclusion of more closely related
ones as well as other anomalous results that are not in harmony with the
statutory purpose of keeping realty in the family bloodline of the source.
For example, application of the statute has resulted in grandparents
taking realty of an infant decedent to the exclusion of the infant's
surviving parent because the grandparents were the kindred of the donor
parent.743 Similarly, the statute has excluded a surviving parent from
Id. at 533-34; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill1984).14 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1989).
7" Bertram, 127 S.W. at 533-34; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(2)
(Michie/B obbs-Menill 1984).
742 Bertram, 127 S.W. at 534.
Car v. Hart, 22 S.W.2d 432, 433-34 (Ky. 1929) (excluding decedent's mother in
favor of the paternal grandparent); Connell v. Harper, 259 S.W. 1017, 1029 (Ky. 1924)
(excluding decedent's father in favor of the maternal grandparent).
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sharing in the infant decedent's real estate with siblings of the deceased
donor parent (aunts and uncles of the decedent)7' and with children of
the deceased donor parent by another spouse.74 Grandparents have
taken ancestral realty to the exclusion of half-blood siblings of the infant
decedent because the shared parent was the nondonor parent, while the
grandparents were kindred of the donor parent.7" For the same reason,
cousins of an infant decedent who were kindred of the donor parent took
to the exclusion of half-blood siblings of the decedent.747 Aunts and
uncles who were siblings of the donor parent have also excluded half-
blood siblings of the decedent who were not issue of the donor par-
ent.74
Not all kindred of the donor parent can take realty of an infant
decedent and exclude the decedent's other parent and that parent's
kindred. The statute does not permit kindred of the donor parent who are
more remotely related to the decedent than grandparents, aunts or uncles,
and their descendants to exclude kindred of the nondonor parent from
sharing in property classified as ancestral property.749 However, this
limitation still permits first cousins of every degree to qualify as
descendants of grandparents or aunts or uncles and to exclude the
nondonor parent as well as any kindred of that parent.7'
The kindred who take the real property of a minor decedent under the
second section of the statute, while the kindred of the donor parent, are
not necessarily the kindred of the ancestor who originally brought the
realty into the family." This provision occasionally works to take
property out of the bloodline of the family that first acquired the land. In
Power v. Dougherty7 2 an infant inherited real property from his
mother. His mother had obtained the land from her mother. When the
infant died, he was survived by his maternal grandfather (the spouse of
the first purchaser) and maternal aunts and uncles (issue of the first
purchaser). The realty passed to his maternal grandfather under the
T" Weisiger v. McDonald, 76 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Ky. 1903).
74 Vanover v. Steele, 190 S.W. 667, 670 (Ky. 1917).
McCoy v. Ferguson, 60 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. 1933).
i Pulliam v. Paris, 220 S.W. 1075, 1076 (Ky. 1920) (excluding half brother in favor
of paternal cousins); Carnes v. Bingbam, 119 S.W. 738, 739 (Ky. 1909) (excluding half
brother in favor of maternal cousins).
'" Gaddie v. Hogan, 205 S.W. 781, 782 (Ky. 1918) (excluding half brother in favor
of maternal uncle).
9' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
'-' See Carnes v. Bingham, 119 S.W. 738, 739 (Ky. 1909).
751 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
7 83 Ky. 187 (1885).
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ancestral property statute because the grandfather was the closest kindred
of the donor parent.753 If the takers had been determined by their
relationship to the ancestor who first brought the property into the family
(the maternal grandmother of the decedent), as the common law doctrine
would have done, the maternal aunts and uncles would have taken the
property as issue of the first purchaser. M The property would then have
stayed within the maternal grandmother's blood family instead of passing
to the maternal grandfather, who was not a blood relative of the first
purchaser.
Kentucky's statute regulating the inheritance rights of half-blood
intestate takers sometimes affects the size of the share taken under the
ancestral property statute by kindred of the donor parent. The half blood
statute provides that when collaterals of the half and whole blood inherit
together as a class, the half-blood kindred take only half as much as those
intestate takers of the whole blood. 5
In White v. Hogge' the father died survived by four children by
a first marriage and three children by a second marriage. The widow and
children of the second marriage inherited all of the father's land by the
terms of his will. Thereafter, a child of the second marriage died as an
infant without issue. The court determined that when ancestral property
of an infant decedent passes to kindred of the donor parent because the
donor parent predeceased the infant, the kinship relationship to the parent
is the relevant one for determining the descent of the ancestral proper-
ty.7' All of the decedent's siblings were full-blood children of the
donor father because a person cannot have descendants by the half blood.
Therefore, the statute on the inheritance rights of half bloods was
inapplicable because none of the donor parent's kindred were half-blood
relatives to him.7 ' The land that the infant child had inherited from his
father passed in equal shares to the child's four half-blood and two full-
blood siblings.
If the donor parent's surviving kindred had been a class of both full-
blood and half-blood siblings of the donor (that is, two whole-blood and
four half-blood siblings), the half blood statute would have been
applicable.759 The half-blood siblings of the donor parent would have
Id. at 188; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1984).
" ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 39 n.9.
755 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.050 (Micbie/Bobbs-Mernll 1984).
7m 291 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1956).
7 Id. at 25.
7s& Id.
7' See Holmes v. Lane, 123 S.W. 318, 320-31 (Ky. 1909).
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each taken one-eighth of the land, while the full-blood siblings of the
donor parent would have each taken one-fourth of the land.
Recently, in Francis v. Justice,7' Kentucky's Court of Appeals
determined the proper interplay of the ancestral property and dower
statutes when an infant dies without issue but survived by a spouse. The
ancestral property statute provides that the donor parent or kindred of
such parent should inherit the ancestral property."' On the other hand,
the dower statute provides that a surviving spouse is entitled to a fee
interest in one-half of the surplus realty that the deceased spouse was
seized of at the time of death.7' In Francis the court held that the
surviving spouse is entitled to her or his dower share in the ancestral
property. After the dower claim is satisfied, the ancestral property statute
applies to determine the descent of the remaining land.763
Under the common law, a person's legal relationship to land
determined her or his economic, social, political and legal status. The
intent of the common law ancestral property doctrine to keep property
within the blood family of the ancestor who first brought the property
into the family served some recognizable purpose in such a society. In a
contemporary, nonfeudal society, however, where wealth is most often
accumulated in the form of personalty (money, stocks, bonds), there is no
compelling reason to keep realty in the bloodline of the donor parent. The
concept of ancestral property has become an anachronism. As it has
outlived any contemporary usefulness, Kentucky's ancestral property
statute ought to be repealed.
CONCLUSION
In a feudal society, a system of intestate inheritance was predicated
on the importance of consanguineous relationships and the maintenance
of wealth within the blood line may have accurately reflected the average
decedent's desires. The typical decedent in a post-industrial economy,
however, is more likely to be motivated by a desire to provide for her or
his spouse than by an intention to keep property within the family's blood
line. Yet, Kentucky's current system of intestate inheritance continues to
embody the common law's preference for consanguineous inheritance
despite the fact that this preference often functions to the detriment of the
surviving spouse's inheritance rights.
o 687 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
7" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.020(2) (Michieffobbs-Menrill 1984).
7" Id. § 392.020.
70 Francis, 687 S.W.2d at 871.
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In a similar vein, Kentucky's ancestral property statute and the
legislature's failure to cut off inheritance by "laughing heirs" perpetuate
the common law's bias in favor of intestate inheritance by blood relatives
of the decedent. The half blood statute, which gives half-blood intestate
takers only half as much as whole blood takers, is another example of
how strongly the preference for inheritance by blood relatives influences
the laws of intestate descent and distribution in Kentucky.
Kentucky's intestacy law also uses the common law'spure per stirpes
system of representation for distributing intestate property among intestate
takers who stand in different degrees of relationship to the decedent. As
demonstrated in this Article, such a scheme of representation functions,
in some instances, to create anomalous results. For example, it is possible
in Kentucky for intestate takers who stand in the same degree of
relationship to the decedent to inherit different amounts from the
decedent's estate. Similarly, under Kentucky's system of pure per stirpes
representation, intestate takers who stand in a closer degree of
relationship to the decedent can inherit less than those who stand in a
more remote degree of relationship to the decedent. Such results stand in.
sharp contrast to contemporary theories of intestate inheritance, which are
based on the dual notions that decedents have the same degree of
affection for all those who stand in the same degree of relationship to
them and that decedents have a greater interest in providing for those
relatives who stand in closer degrees of relationship than for those
relatives who stand in more remote degrees of relationship to them.
The time has come for Kentucky's legislature to reform its antiquated
laws of intestate inheritance. Changes should be made in those statutory
provisions which fail to approximate the manner in which average,
contemporary decedents would divide their property if they were
presented with the question.
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